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Introduction
This Ph.D. dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter provides a mispricing
explanation for the risk-return relationship on days with and without macroeconomic news
announcements. It demonstrates the importance of investor belief dispersion and short-
selling constraints in shaping the security market line on those two types of days. The second
chapter utilizes a large international sample and studies the firm and country characteristics
that determine stock return exposures to periods of market stress. The third chapter use
tick-by-tick data of benchmark stock index and government bond futures and identify and
characterize occurrences of flights-to-safety at high frequency across 10 countries over the
last 20 years.
The first chapter studies the relation between risk and returns on two different set of
days. In particular, the relationship between market beta and expected returns is positive
on days with pre-scheduled macroeconomic news announcements (MNAs), but negative on
the other days. This paper shows evidence that stock price underreaction to MNAs explains
these phenomena. First, I use high-frequency S&P 500 futures data to identify positive
(good) and negative (bad) news from macro announcements. Stocks with low sensitivities to
bad macro news perform relatively well on announcement days and poorly on the following
non-announcement days. Moreover, the under-performance of low sensitivity stocks is most
pronounced when investor disagreement is high and short-selling constraints are binding.
Subsequently, I show that the relation between market betas and returns on announcement
(non-announcement) days is particularly positive (negative) among stocks with low sensi-
tivities to bad macro news. The results are consistent with stocks, especially those with
high market betas, underreact to bad news on MNA days when high shorting costs pre-
vent prices from reflecting pessimists’ beliefs, and experience low returns on the following
non-announcement days.
The second chapter uses a newly developed crisis indicator and firm-level data from nearly
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40,000 stocks from 54 countries and searches for the firm and country characteristics that
make stocks excessively exposed to stress periods. In a first step, we build a predictive model
for firm betas in ’normal times’ and identify their firm and country determinants. Using
these predicted betas, we calculate abnormal returns and define unexplained increases in
factor loadings and residual correlations during crisis periods as indicative of contagion. We
develop and test several hypotheses that link contagion exposures to (a combination of) firm
and country fundamentals.
The third chapter studies flight-to-safety (FTS). Using tick-by-tick data of benchmark
stock index and government bond futures, we identify and characterize occurrences of flights-
to-safety at high frequency across 10 countries over the last 20 years. We define FTS events
as the 5-minute intervals during which equities crash while bond prices surge. During a
typical 5-minute FTS interval, equities drop with 0.6% to 0.8%, while bonds increase with
0.18% to 0.25%. FTS events tend to be short-lived and associated with high trading volume.
While realized volatility surges during FTS, it is not particularly high before or after FTS
intervals. We document that many FTS are triggered by US macroeconomic announcements
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Underreaction to Macro Announcements and the Boom
and Bust of CAPM
1 Introduction
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966)
implies that stocks with higher market betas should deliver higher expected returns. However,
empirical studies have presented an abundance of evidence suggesting a flat or even downward-
sloping security market line (see Black et al. (1972), Baker et al. (2011), and Frazzini and Pedersen
(2014)). Recently, Savor and Wilson (2014) document a significantly positive relationship between
market beta and average returns on days when pre-scheduled macroeconomic news announcements
(MNAs) are released. However, the positive slope of the security market line on MNA days and its
overall flatness mechanically implies a negative slope on non-MNA days. This paper confirms the
negative relationship between market beta and non-MNA day returns using a comprehensive set
of MNAs. More importantly, I present an explanation for the positive relation on MNA days but
negative relation on non-MNA days: underreaction to negative macroeconomic news.
I first document strong and robust evidence of firm-level stock price underreaction to negative
macro news. To quantify the news, I use five-minute returns on E-mini S&P 500 futures immedi-
ately after the release time of announcements. I distinguish between good and bad news based on
the sign of returns: the news is defined to be bad (good) when the announcement return is negative
(positive). I show that firms with tight short-selling constraints and high investor disagreement have
low sensitivities to bad macro news. In other words, these firms perform relatively well on days
when the market plunges following a macro announcement. Moreover, stocks less sensitive to bad
news experience much lower returns in the following month than high-sensitivity ones, especially
on days without announcements. The relation is particularly strong for stocks with high investor
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disagreement and high short-selling constraints.
Following the argument of Miller (1977), the results are consistent with underreaction to bad
announcement news due to tight short-selling constraints and investor disagreement on firm value.
Specifically, following a bad announcement, stocks with high costs of short-selling will be slower
in incorporating the negative macro news, especially when investors have diverse beliefs on how the
firm should respond. The combination of short-sales constraints and disagreement leads to over-
valuation, or under-reaction to the bad news, as stock prices reflect more of the beliefs of optimistic
investors. Therefore, these stocks will have low sensitivities to bad macro news and experience
lower returns in the future as the mispricing is gradually corrected.
The findings have strong implications for the relationship between market beta and returns on
both MNA and non-MNA days. Since stocks with high market betas tend to have high exposures
to macroeconomic risk, they should be more affected by bad macro news. Meanwhile, investors
of high-beta stocks may also have high disagreement, and underreaction to bad news will be more
pervasive among those stocks. Thus, low sensitivities to bad macro news should lead to high returns
on MNA days and low returns on the non-MNA days particularly for high-beta stocks. I therefore
hypothesize that among stocks with low sensitivities to bad macro news, the relation between beta
and non-MNA day returns is the most negative, and the relation between beta and MNA day returns
is the most positive.
This paper confirms the hypothesis by first showing that, consistent with Diether et al. (2002)
and Hong and Sraer (2016), high-beta stocks tend to observe high investor disagreement. More
importantly, stocks with low sensitivity to bad news have the most negative relationship between
market beta and non-MNA day returns. However, the relation is much more flattened among stocks
with high sensitivities, with the magnitude reduced by 50%. Meanwhile, the relation between
market beta and returns on MNA days is the most positive among stocks with low sensitivities
to bad news, and the magnitude is also lower by around 50% for stocks with high sensitivities.
Therefore, underreaction to bad news on MNA days plays an important role in explaining the beta-
return relation on MNA days and non-MNA days. The results are robust to controlling for a battery
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of firm characteristics and alternative estimations of the sensitivity.
My empirical analysis begins with identifying and quantifying macro news. I collect the pre-
scheduled release dates and times of a comprehensive set of 14 macro news announcements which
trigger significant stock market reactions (see Kurov et al. (2017) and Law et al. (2018)). Many
of the announcements are made at 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time when the US stock market is still
closed. I therefore use E-mini S&P 500 futures, which trade almost around the clock. I use five-
minute returns immediately after announcements to measure market reaction to the news. The
tight window isolates the impact of MNAs from other significant events which may influence stock
prices. Based on the sign of returns, I split news into good (positive returns) and bad (negative
returns) macro news. Furthermore, I compare the five-minute announcement returns with a trailing
jump-robust volatility of returns over the past five trading days. Only the returns with an absolute
value higher than one unit of volatility are included in my further analysis, although my results are
robust to alternative thresholds.
To measure underreaction to negative news, I then estimate firm-level sensitivities to bad an-
nouncement returns. At the end of each month, I regress daily stock returns on good and bad
announcement returns over the past 24 months, controlling for the market factor. I document a
wide dispersion of both good and bad MNA sensitivities. Sorting stocks into deciles based on the
bad MNA sensitivity, I find a statistically and economically significant relationship between the
bad MNA sensitivity and future returns. On the days without MNAs, the highest decile portfolio
outperforms the lowest decile portfolio by 0.89% per month, with a t-stat of 2.74. The difference
mainly comes from the increase in returns from -1.01% for the lowest decile portfolio to -0.17%
for the fifth decile portfolio. The top five deciles, however, have average returns close to zero. On
days with MNAs, average returns across all deciles are close to 0.7% per month, except for the
bottom and top decile with over 1% per month. At the same time, sorting stocks into deciles based
on good MNA sensitivities does not generate much spread in monthly returns on both MNA days
and non-MNA days.
To test the robustness of the relation to well-known firm characteristics that predict cross-
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sectional stock returns, I next perform stock-level Fama-Macbeth regressions. The coefficients
on the bad MNA sensitivity for full month returns and non-MNA day returns are positive and sig-
nificant after controlling for firm and risk characteristics including size, book-to-market, illiquidity,
and idiosyncratic volatility. On MNA days, however, there is no significant explanatory power of
the bad MNA sensitivity. Moreover, I expect that underreaction will be more dominant for stocks
with negative sensitivities to bad macro news. The stocks in the long leg could underreact, but
it should contain the least degree of underreaction. This hypothesis is confirmed as I find that
the positive relation on non-MNA days concentrates on stocks with lower-than-median bad MNA
sensitivities.
I next provide evidence that the underreaction is caused by investor disagreement and short-
selling constraints by exploiting cross-sectional variations in the two variables. I posit that short-
sales constraints are tight for stocks with low residual institutional ownership following Nagel
(2005), Asquith et al. (2005), Boehme et al. (2006), and Weber (2018). For disagreement on how
stocks should react to macro news, I use analysts forecast dispersion on earnings, turnover on
MNA days, and the standard error of estimated market beta following Armstrong et al. (2013),
Diether et al. (2002) and Boehme et al. (2006). Arguably, a larger standard error suggests a higher
uncertainty on the firm’s exposure to the aggregate economy, and potentially higher investor dis-
agreement on the exposure. I first show that stocks with high short-selling constraints and high
investor disagreement tend to have low sensitivities to bad news. Second, I find that stocks with
low sensitivities to bad macro news experience low returns especially when they have low insti-
tutional ownership and high analysts’ forecast dispersion, high turnover on MNA days, or high
standard error of estimated market beta. Both tests lend support to the hypothesis that underre-
action is caused by short-selling constraints preventing stock prices from reflecting the views of
pessimistic investors.
Finally, I examine how stock price underreaction to bad macro news explains the relationship
between market beta and expected returns on MNA days and non-MNA days. First, firm-level
regressions show that high-disagreement stocks also tend to have high market betas. This result
4 12 
suggests that underreaction is more pervasive among high-beta stocks. To show the role underre-
action plays in the beta-return relation, I then conduct portfolio double-sorting where stocks are
first sorted into quintiles based on bad MNA sensitivities and subsequently into quintiles based
on market beta. The slope of the security market line on non-MNA days is the most negative for
stocks within the lowest quintile of bad news sensitivities, which are the stocks that are most likely
to underreact to negative macro news. On the other hand, among stocks within the highest quintile
of sensitivity to the bad news, which are the stocks that are least likely to underreact, the security
market line is only insignificantly negative, with the magnitude shrunk by 50%. On MNA days, the
relation between returns and market betas is the most positive among stocks with low sensitivity
to the bad news. Among high sensitivity stocks, the magnitude of the relation is also reduced by
around 50%. I also show that the result is robust to a battery of firm characteristic and alternative
estimates of bad MNA sensitivity.
A risk-based explanation for the positive relationship between the bad MNA sensitivity and
returns on non-MNA days is faced with many challenges. First, the bad MNA sensitivity may
serve as a direct measure of MNA risk for individual stocks. However, it is difficult to explain
why investors, knowing the dates of pre-scheduled announcements, ask for a premium on MNA
risk during days without announcements instead of MNA days. Second, my analysis shows that
the bad MNA sensitivity is insignificantly related to a list of well-known risk characteristics, such
as downside risk from Ang et al. (2006a). Moreover, a risk-based explanation is inconsistent with
the observation that, among stocks with higher-than-median bad MNA sensitivity, investors are not
compensated for bearing more risk by higher returns on non-MNA days.
The paper is mostly related to the recent literature on stock returns on macroeconomic news
announcement days and non-announcement days. Savor and Wilson (2013) document high stock
market returns and Sharpe ratios on MNA days. Savor and Wilson (2014) show that the relation
between market beta and average returns is positive on MNA days but negative on non-MNA days.
Ai and Bansal (2018) and Wachter and Zhu (2018) show that under certain assumptions about
utility function or consumption process, investors ask for announcement premium around macro
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news announcements. Savor and Wilson (2014) state in their conclusion that “It remains to supply
the fundamental economic explanation as to why our findings hold”. Wachter and Zhu (2018)
present a model with rare events that explains the positive relation between market beta and returns
on MNA days. However, the model also results in a slightly upward-sloping, instead of downward-
sloping, security market line on non-MNA days. In contrast, my study confirms the negative slope
of the security market line on non-MNA days and provides evidence for an explanation based on
underreaction to macroeconomic announcements.
This work also contributes to the literature investigating the potential factors behind the flat
or downward-sloping security market line. Cohen et al. (2005) examine the effect of inflation on
the security market line. Huang et al. (2016) study the impact of speculative capital committed to
betting against beta. Antoniou et al. (2015) examine the relation between the pricing of beta and
variations in investor sentiment. Jylhä (2018) shows that tighter leverage constraints result in a
flatter relation between beta and expected returns. Hong and Sraer (2016) show that disagreement
on aggregate variables affects the slope of market security line as higher-beta stocks are more
likely to be overvalued in the presence of limits to arbitrage and disagreement about aggregate
growth. Although they do not model public information announcements, their model should lead
to lower (higher) returns on high-beta stocks during MNA (non-MNA) days. The reason is that the
overvaluation of high-beta stocks should occur on non-MNA days and be corrected on MNA days,
as announcements will reduce disagreement on aggregate variables. In contrast, my paper focuses
on firm-level disagreement and shows evidence that overvaluation occurs on announcement days
in the form of underreaction to bad news.
This study also relates to the literature on the impact of MNA surprises on asset prices. Mc-
Queen and Roley (1993), Boyd et al. (2005), Andersen et al. (2007), and Law et al. (2018) show
that there is a strong relationship between stock prices and news which varies across the business
cycle. Gilbert et al. (2017) show that timeliness and relation to economic fundamentals explain the
variation in the response of U.S. Treasury yields to macroeconomic news announcements. De Goeij
et al. (2016) find fixed results for the pricing of macroeconomic announcements in the cross-section
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of stock returns. A major difference of this paper is the usage of five-minute announcement returns
to measure MNA shocks rather than the difference between surveyed professional forecast and ac-
tual values. Therefore, the MNA shocks in this study measure the “surprise” from the perspective
of investors revealed in prices. Similarly, Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Gertler and Karadi (2015)
use 30-minute returns on federal fund futures to measure monetary policy surprises. Furthermore,
my firm-level analysis contributes to this literature by showing evidence that stocks underreact to
bad MNA news although the aggregate market immediately respond to announcements.
This study also contributes to the empirical literature on mispricing due to investor disagree-
ment and short-sales constraints. Diether et al. (2002) find that stocks with higher dispersion in
analysts’ earnings forecasts earn lower returns in the future. Asquith et al. (2005) consider insti-
tutional ownership as a proxy for short-selling supply and find under-performance of constrained
stocks on an equal-weight basis. Boehme et al. (2006) find evidence of significant overvalua-
tion for stocks that have both short-selling constraints and investor disagreement. They emphasize
that either condition alone is not sufficient to produce overpricing. Studies such as Nagel (2005),
Phalippou (2008), Hirshleifer et al. (2011), and Weber (2018) use institutional ownership as a proxy
for the ease of short-selling and show that short-sale constraints explain many cross-sectional re-
turn anomalies. This paper adds to the literature by showing evidence that a significant amount of
overpricing occurs on days with MNAs.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 Macroeconomic news announcements
Following Andersen et al. (2007), Kurov et al. (2017) and Law et al. (2018), I focus on 14 macroe-
conomic news announcements, all listed in Table 1. I do not include announcements of PPI, GDP
final, housing sales, government budgets, trade balance, personal income, leading indicators and
factory orders, as surprises of these announcements are not followed by significant stock mar-
ket movements (Table B3 in Kurov et al. (2017) and Table 1 in Law et al. (2018)). The dates
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and times of announcements are mainly obtained from the related agency websites. For those of
which the release dates are not available from websites, I use Factiva to identify historical release
dates. On average, there are 11 trading days with one or more macro announcements during a
month, and 10 trading days without announcement. According to Kurov et al. (2017), two of
these announcements, ISM Manufacturing Index and ISM Non-Manufacturing Index, have pre-
announcement price drift in the same direction of the announcement surprise, indicating informa-
tion leakage before announcement. However, both of the announcements are released at 10:00 a.m,
so an alternative explanation could be that informed investors trade on their private information
after the stock market is open on 9:30 a.m. for liquidity and transaction cost issues. I also include
FOMC announcements for the main results. However, Lucca and Moench (2015) report uncondi-
tional excess returns in equity index futures during 24 hours prior to the FOMC announcements.
Ai and Bansal (2018) also point out that most of the premiums for FOMC announcements are re-
alized in several hours prior to the announcements. It seems that, instead of receiving information
on announcement time, investors obtain signals and update their beliefs on monetary policy before
FOMC announcements. Excluding FOMC announcements in the sample have little impact on the
results of this paper.
2.2 High-Frequency data on E-mini S&P 500 futures
I obtain high-frequency data from Thomson Reuters Tick History for E-mini S&P 500 futures
(ES). As investors of the equity index futures bear market-wide risk instead of firm-specific risk,
the announcement returns measure the impact of announcements on the market. Each observation
is time-stamped to the millisecond. I clean the data by dropping price observations that are higher
(lower) than the daily high (low) price of futures from Datastream. I construct a new liquidity-
maximum continuous series for futures using nearby contracts (closest to maturity) and the next
contracts (second closest to maturity). In particular, I roll over from front-month contract to next
contract on the day when there are more trades in the next contract than the other. Prices are
sampled every five minutes from 7:55 EST until 16:00 EST, using the last recorded trading price
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within each five-minute interval, e.g., 7:55:00:000 to 7:59:59:999. The choice of frequency strikes
a balance between the need of tight window around announcements and and the need to avoid mi-
crostructure noise. There are at most 97 price observations during a day. A trading day is dropped
if it has fewer than 80 sampled price observations. I obtain five-minute returns as the difference
between two adjacent logged prices. If there is no price in a five-minute interval, the return is set to
zero. Following this procedure, there are 96 five-minute returns for each trading day. Announce-
ment returns are defined as the five-minute returns immediately following macroeconomic news
announcements. For example, if an announcement is made on 8:30 EST, then the announcement
return is the log difference in price between 8:29:999 EST and 8:34:999 EST.
Figure 1 further motivates the choice of window size of five minutes. I plot the standard de-
viation of one-minute returns over each one-minute interval around announcements. The figure
shows that the standard deviation increases immediately after the announcements and gradually
decreases to the pre-announcement level over the following five minutes. The pattern indicates that
announcement surprises are mostly incorporated into futures price within five minutes. Therefore,
five-minute returns suit the need to capture market reaction to macro announcements.
An alternative measure is the difference between announcement realizations and their forecast
values from a survey of professionals (MNA surprises). However, announcement returns are more
suitable in this paper for the following reasons. First, the same amount of surprise (the scaled
difference between actual and forecast value) from different announcements have different mar-
ket relevance. Returns on equity index futures provide a uniform measure which is comparable
among MNAs. Second, big MNA surprises may not always have a substantial market impact. An-
nouncement returns serve as a natural proxy for surprises of announcements from the perspective
of investors. Third, good economic surprises (better-than-expected) are not necessarily good news
to the stock market. Using returns allows me to have a clear separation of good and bad MNA
shocks.
However, not all announcements necessarily convey unexpected and important information that
will move the stock market. Following Jiang and Zhu (2017), I restrict my sample of announce-
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ment returns to those presumably dominated by information surprises. Specifically, I compare the
announcement returns with volatility. Consider an MNA released on 8:30 E.T. on a given day. The
return from 8:30 to 8:35 is denoted as r j where j indexes five-minute intervals. I first estimate in-
tegrated variance over the past five days, or in total K = 96×5 observations of five-minute returns,







i= j−K+2 med(|ri|, |ri−1|, |ri−2|)2.
Based on the estimated integrated variance, I get “instantaneous volatility” with respect to five-
minute, σ̂(t j), and compare it to the five-minute returns following MNAs. Lee and Mykland (2007)
use a similar methodology to obtain jump test statistics. Only the announcement returns satisfying
|r j|> κσ̂(t j) are considered as MNA shocks. I set the threshold κ = 1 for my main analysis, but the
results are robust to alternative thresholds. Dropping returns with small magnitudes has two other
benefits. First, announcements have various economic relevance and market impacts. The threshold
mechanically restricts the sample of MNA shocks to announcements with significant market im-
pacts. Second, including announcement returns with small magnitudes blur the distinction between
positive MNA shocks and bad MNA shocks.
Previous studies show that trading volumes and volatility on stocks and equity index futures
tend to be high after stock market opens and before stock market closes, which may compound my
estimation of volatility. I take care of volatility periodicity following the details shown in Appendix
1.
2.3 Stock returns and firm characteristics
I obtain daily and monthly returns on US NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq stocks from CRSP. To ensure that
small and illiquid stocks do not drive my results, I drop stocks with prices lower than $5 dollar and
market valuations lower than the bottom 20 percentile of the NYSE monthly market capitalization
distribution. This procedure is also used by Nagel (2005), Hong and Sraer (2016), and Weber
(2018). The breakpoints as well as risk-free rate, market return are all obtained from Kenneth
French’s online data library.
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I use residual institutional ownership as a proxy for short-sales constraints. I obtain institutional
ownership data from the Thomson Reuters 13F database (TR-13F). If a common stock is on CRSP
but not in the TR-13, I set the institutional ownership as zero. Following Nagel (2005) and Weber
(2018), I perform a logit transformation
logit(INST ) = log( INST1−INST ),
where institutional ownership INST is winsorized at 0.0001 and 0.9999. To control for size effect,
I obtain residual institutional ownership using the following quarterly Fama-Macbeth regression,
logit(INSTi,t) = α +β1log(MEi,t)+β2log(MEi,t)2 +RIi,t
where log(ME) is the natural logarithm of size.
Analysts’ forecast dispersion of earnings is an important measure of investor disagreement.
Data on analyst forecasts of fiscal-year-end earnings is from Institutional Broker’s Estimate System
(IBES). The summary file unadjusted for stock splits is used to avoid the bias induced by ex-
post split adjustment, as pointed out by Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002). The dispersion is
calculated as the standard deviation of forecast scaled by the average forecast.
To save space, the detailed definitions of other firm characteristics and risk measures are listed
in Appendix A2, constructed following the convention of the literature.
3 Underreaction to macro news and its channel
In this section, I present evidence that stocks with low sensitivity to bad announcement returns un-
derreact to bad macro news. Next, I show that the channel of underreaction is investor disagreement
and short-selling constraints. Then I discuss the challenges to interpret the results with a risk-based
explanation.
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3.1 Sensitivity to announcement returns
Panel A of Table 2 reports the mean and standard deviation of announcement returns following
good or bad macro news, as well as the number of days on which good or bad macro news are
released. Good and bad MNA returns have similar magnitude and frequency. On average, there
are around 33 good and bad announcements during a one-year period, and a typical announcement
moves the market by about 0.25%.
To measure underreaction to bad news, I estimate sensitivity of individual stocks to bad and
good announcement returns over a rolling window of 24 months using the following time-series
regression
ri,t − r f ,t = αi +αi,goodIgoodt +αi,badIbadt +βi,goodMNA
good
t +βi,badMNAbadt +βi,MKT MKTt + εi,t . (1)
MNAbadt (MNA
good
t ) is the bad (good) MNA returns on day t. If there are multiple announcements
and multiple bad MNA returns on day t, I use the sum as MNAbadt . However, multiple MNA returns
on the same day is rare in my sample. The rolling window of two years on average contains about
65 bad MNA returns and 65 good MNA returns.
I control for the market factor in the estimation of announcement sensitivity. As a result, instead
of measuring absolute exposures to announcement returns, MNA sensitivity capture the sensitivity
to macro announcements over and above what is captured by the market beta. Note that I allow
the intercept to be different on trading days without announcements, with good announcements or
with bad announcements. Therefore the estimation of MNA sensitivity is not compounded by the
change in αi on announcement days. Panel B of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of good and
bad MNA sensitivity. While they are both close to zero on average, there exists considerable cross-
sectional variation. In particular, their standard deviation is four times larger than that of the market
beta. Moreover, as I will show in Table 3, the decile portfolios sorted on bad MNA sensitivity also
exhibit increasing bad sensitivity from the bottom portfolio to the top. The pattern addresses the
concern that the estimated MNA sensitivity is driven by noise.
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3.2 Under-performance of low sensitivity stocks
3.2.1 Portfolio analysis
If stocks with low sensitivity to bad MNA underreact to bad news, they should have low returns in
the future as the mispricing is corrected, especially on days without announcements. To investigate
the relation between MNA sensitivity and stock returns, I first use uni-variate portfolio sorts. Each
month, stocks are sorted into decile portfolios according to their estimated bad or good MNA
sensitivity. I obtain value-weighted and equal-weighted decile portfolio returns during the one-
month period after the portfolio formation. Moreover, monthly returns are decomposed into two
parts: returns over days with MNAs and returns over days without MNAs. I weigh each stock
by its market value at the end of each estimation period. Portfolio returns are out-of-sample in
the sense that there is no overlap between the time window for estimation and for post-formation
returns. Rolling estimation window forward one month at a time, I repeat the procedure and obtain
time series of monthly returns for all decile portfolios. I report average full monthly returns, average
monthly returns over MNA days and over non-MNA days, alphas and t-stats concerning the Carhart
four-factor model. Appendix A.2 shows similar results for equal-weighted portfolios.
Panel A of Table 3 reports value-weighted returns for the portfolios sorted by bad MNA sensi-
tivity. Portfolio 1 consists of stocks with the lowest bad MNA sensitivity during the past 24 months,
and portfolio 10 consists of stocks with the highest sensitivity. The columns labeled “Full month”
in Panel A show that there is a positive and almost monotonic relation between bad MNA sensi-
tivity and value-weighted monthly returns. Average returns on MNA days are positive, but with a
limited variation from 0.68% to 1.27%. The difference in average excess return between portfolios
1 and 10 over MNA days is 0.1, with an insignificant alpha of 0.1. On non-MNA days, in contrast,
average returns exhibit a strong and monotonic increase from portfolio 1 to 4. From portfolio 4
to 10 average returns are all close to zero. The value-weighted monthly return difference between
decile 10 and decile 1 is 0.89% per month, with an alpha concerning Carhart four-factor model of
0.63% per month with a t-stat of 2.74. Although market returns are close to zero on non-MNA day
(see Savor and Wilson (2013)), the last three columns show that there exists substantial variation in
13 21 
returns on non-MNA days.
Panel B reports the pre- and post-formation loadings of portfolios on MNA returns and Carhart
four factors. The first column presents that sorting on bad MNA sensitivity leads to a wide spread
in pre-formation bad MNA sensitivity across deciles. The post-formation bad sensitivity is esti-
mated for each portfolio using unconditional full-sample daily returns. It shows a virtually mono-
tonic increasing pattern across deciles. In other words, the sorted portfolios vary unconditionally
in their exposures to bad news. Moreover, sorting on bad sensitivity generates little spread in
post-formation good MNA sensitivity. It suggests that stocks exposed to bad macro news are not
necessarily exposed to good news.
Panel C documents a negative relationship between good MNA sensitivity and expected returns.
The long-short strategy produces an average value-weighted monthly return of -0.52%, with a
Carhart four-factor alpha of -0.36% per month. -0.24% is realized on non-MNA days, but the alpha
is small in magnitude and insignificant. Therefore, in the following analysis, I put emphasis on
the relationship between returns and bad MNA sensitivity, though good MNA sensitivity is also
included in most results.
In summary, the portfolio-level analysis shows that stocks with low bad MNA sensitivity earn
economically and statistically low returns in the following month, especially on days without an-
nouncements. The results are consistent with using announcement return sensitivity as a measure
of underreaction. However, these results do not take into account other known cross-sectional
determinants of expected returns, which I investigate in the following section.
3.2.2 Fama-Macbeth regressions of individual stock returns
In this section, I estimate firm-level Fama-Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly
excess stock returns over MNA days and non-MNA days. The independent variable of interest
is the bad MNA sensitivity. This firm-level analysis allows me to control for other firm and risk
characteristics, including market beta, firm size, book-to-market, momentum, illiquidity, and id-
iosyncratic volatility. Specifically, I regress excess stock returns over MNA days or non-MNA days
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in month t +1 on MNA sensitivity and control variables measured at the end of month t. To facil-
itate the interpretation of economic significance, I standardize all independent variables to have a
zero mean and unit variance.
Table 4 reports the results. Column (1) and (2) of Panel A show that bad and good MNA sensi-
tivities are significantly related to full monthly returns. After including control variables, however,
the magnitude of both coefficients become smaller, and the one for good MNA becomes insignif-
icant. Column (3) and (4) show that on MNA days, there is a weak and insignificant connection
between MNA sensitivity and returns. In contrast, Column (5) shows that bad sensitivity positively
predicts non-MNA day returns. The coefficient is 0.13, therefore a one-standard-deviation increase
in bad sensitivity predicts an increase in next month’s stock return on non-MNA days of 0.13%.
The inclusion of control variables makes the coefficient smaller but still highly significant, as re-
ported in Column (6). Note that the intercept is consistently around 1% and highly significant in
Column (1)-(4), but is close to zero and insignificant in Column (5) and (6). The results are con-
sistent with Savor and Wilson (2013) that equity premium and stock market returns are higher on
MNA days yet close to zero on non-MNA days. Also, the coefficients on market β change from
positive to negative from MNA days to non-MNA days, consistent with Savor and Wilson (2014).
Underreaction effect should be dominant among stocks with negative sensitivity to bad MNA
returns. The stocks in the long leg could underreact, but it should contain the least degree of un-
derreaction. Panel B of Table 6 confirms the hypothesis, showing that the positive relation between
bad MNA sensitivity and non-MNA day returns concentrates on stocks with lower-than-median
bad MNA sensitivity. I construct a dummy variable Lowbad (Highbad) equal to 1 if a stock’s bad
MNA sensitivity is lower (higher) than the cross-sectional median at the end of a month and 0 oth-
erwise. I interact Lowbad and Highbad with bad MNA sensitivity and repeat the regressions in Panel
A with control variables included. Column (3) in Panel B of Table 6 shows that the insignificant
relation between bad MNA sensitivity and MNA-day returns holds for stocks with both higher- or
lower-than-median sensitivity to bad news. However, Column (5) shows that stocks with lower bad
MNA sensitivity have higher returns on non-MNA days, and the effect is significant only among
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stocks with lower-than-median sensitivity.
For completeness, I also construct Lowgood (Highgood) equal to 1 if a stock’s good MNA sen-
sitivity is higher than the median at the end of a month and 0 otherwise. Column (4) and (6) show
that the coefficients on good MNA sensitivity are both insignificant for stocks higher or lower than
the median.
3.3 The Channel of Underreaction
If market frictions prevent stock prices from reflecting bad news, stocks with greater short-selling
constraints and investor disagreement will be less sensitive to bad macro announcements. The
intuition follows the argument by Miller (1977). Consider a firm whose investors face tight short-
selling constraints and disagree on how a firm should respond to macro news. Following a bad
macro announcement, the stock price will not fully reflect the view of pessimist investors due to
cost short-selling. Therefore, the stock tends to be overpriced, or in other words, underreact to
the bad news on MNA days. As a result, stocks with high cost of short-selling and high investor
disagreement should tend to have low sensitivity to the bad news. Also, as mispricing is corrected
in the following days, we should observe a particularly positively relation between bad MNA sen-
sitivity and non-MNA day returns among these stocks.
I first test the hypothesis that stocks with costly short-selling and disagreement tend to have
low bad MNA sensitivity. In particular, I conduct Fama-Macbeth regressions of realized bad news
sensitivity on firm and risk characteristics that are known ex ante
β̂i,bad,t = α + γ1Firm Characteristicsi,t−24 + γ2Risk Characteristicsi,t−24 + εi,t . (2)
The bad MNA sensitivity is estimated at the end of month t, while explanatory variables is from
month t-24. I use Newey-West standard error with 24 lags.
I use residual institutional ownership (RIO) to proxy for short-selling constraints following We-
ber (2018) and Nagel (2005). As short sellers have to borrow shares from a stock lender, and higher
institutional ownership indicates higher stock loan supply (see D’avolio (2002)), low institutional
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ownership suggests tight short-selling constraints. I use three proxies for investor disagreement:
dispersion of analysts’ forecast of earnings (DISP), trading volume as a proportion of shares out-
standing (TURN) at the MNA days, as well as standard error of estimated market beta of a firm.
Specifically, I use one-year rolling window of daily returns to estimate a firm’s market beta and
its standard error. A large standard error suggests a high uncertainty on the firm’s exposure to the
aggregate economy, and arguably high investor disagreement on the exposure.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the estimation results. To facilitate comparison across different
variables, I standardize all independent variables to have zero mean and unit variance. Regression
(1) to (3) show that stocks with higher residual institutional ownership, lower analysts’ forecast
dispersion, lower turnover, and lower estimation standard error are more sensitive to bad macro
news, suggesting that short-selling constraints and investor disagreement prevent stock prices from
incorporating the beliefs of pessimistic investors on announcement days. The effect is significant
except for standard error, but the magnitude is larger. With regard to other firm characteristics,
value stocks exhibit higher sensitivity to bad news than growth stocks, suggesting that value stocks
are more affected by an economic downturn. Stocks that are less exposed to bad news may have
lower default risk, downside risk, or co-skewness. However, the coefficients on these variables
are actually all insignificantly. Note that the coefficient on co-kurtosis is significantly negative,
suggesting a relationship between bad MNA sensitivity and co-kurtosis. Therefore, I always control
for co-kurtosis in my following regression.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the result of Fama-Macbeth regression for good MNA sensitivity.
Both the downside and upside beta have a positive relationship with sensitivity to good MNA.
Interestingly, residual institutional ownership, analysts’ forecast dispersion, and standard error have
little predictive power for sensitivity to good news. It suggests that market friction plays a minor
role in how prices respond to good news.
I next test the hypothesis that the positive relation between bad news sensitivity and returns on
non-MNA days concentrate on stocks with high investor disagreement and short-selling constraints.
As I use three measures of disagreement, there are three pairs of constraints-disagreement combi-
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nation. I test the prediction separately for each combination. For example, using analyst forecast




i,t−1×Lowi,t−1× (γ1 + γ2RIOi,t−1 + γ3DISPi,t−1 + γ4RIOi,t−1DISPi,t−1)
+β badi,t−1 ×Highi,t−1 × (η1 + η2RIOi,t−1 + η3DISPi,t−1 + η4RIOi,t−1DISPi,t−1) + controlsi,t + εi,t , (3)
where the indicator variable Lowi,t−1 ( Highi,t−1 ) is equal to 1 if a stock i’s bad MNA sensi-
tivity is lower (higher) than the cross-sectional median at month t− 1 and 0 otherwise. I interact
RIO and DISP with lower- and higher-than-median sensitivity separately. My hypothesis predicts
that the positive relation between bad MNA sensitivity and returns is particularly strong among
stocks with low RIO, large DISP, and lower-than-median sensitivity (Lowi,t−1 = 1). Therefore, γ4
should be significantly negative. At the same time, tight constraints accompanied with high dis-
agreement are less likely to lead to a positive relation between bad sensitivity and returns among
stocks with high-than-median sensitivity (Highi,t−1 = 1) if these stocks are less likely to be affected
by underreaction in the first place. As a result, η4 should be insignificant.
Column 1 to 3 of Table 6 presents the results where the measure of disagreement is the stan-
dard error of estimated beta, forecast dispersion, and turnover on MNA days, respectively. Across
three models, the interaction between bad MNA sensitivity and Low has a significantly positive
coefficient, and when further interacted with disagreement and RIO, the coefficient is significantly
negative. The robust results strongly support the hypothesis that the relation between bad sensi-
tivity and non-MNA returns is especially strong among stocks with low institutional ownership,
hence tight short-selling constraints, and high investor disagreement. The economic significance is
also substantial. Among stocks with average RIO and SE, a one unit decrease in bad beta leads to
a lower return of 0.13% per month on non-MNA days. However, as short-selling constraints RIO
decreases by one unit and investor disagreement DISP increases by one unit, the same decrease
in bad beta leads to lower returns of 0.20%, with the magnitude amplified by 50%. Meanwhile,
the coefficients on interaction terms for stocks with higher-than-median bad betas are insignificant
and have the opposite sign, suggesting that those stocks do not experience market-friction driven
18 26 
underreaction.
In summary, I show that the positive relation between non-MNA day returns and bad MNA sen-
sitivity is particularly strong among stocks with high constraints of short-selling and high investor
disagreement. The results are robust to various measures of investor disagreement. Moreover, the
effect is stronger during time periods when funding constraints are tighter and arbitrage capital is
scarce. The overall results show that the underreaction is caused by short-selling constraints keep
price from reflecting the views of pessimistic investors on days when bad macro news hits the
market.
3.4 Challenges to a risk-based explanation
An alternative explanation for the positive relation between sensitivity to bad MNA and non-MNA
day returns is that bad MNA sensitivity is a proxy for MNA risk, which bear a positive risk pre-
mium. However, the positive premium should be contemporaneous with the risk, and therefore
exist primarily on days with MNAs, instead of on non-MNA days when investors know in advance
no announcements are scheduled. Moreover, a positive price of MNA risk implies that investors
should be always rewarded by higher returns for bearing more risk. But the concentration of the
relation on stocks with lower-than-median bad sensitivity and on stocks with high short-selling
constraints and investor disagreement suggests the opposite.
4 Mispricing: A tale of two days
Savor and Wilson (2014) show that there is a positive relation between market beta and returns on
MNA days, while on non-MNA days the relation is slightly negative. In this section, I show that
the results based on my sample of announcements also exhibit similar pattern, but with a much
stronger negative relation on non-MNA days. Next, I provide evidence that it is driven by stocks
with high market beta but low bad MNA sensitivity. The results suggest that high-beta stocks
experience high returns on MNA days and low returns on non-MNA days because they underreact
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to bad MNA news.
4.1 The robustness of Savor and Wilson (2014)
The MNAs investigated by Savor and Wilson (2014) include only inflation, employment, and Fed-
eral Open Market Committee interest rate decision. I cover a more comprehensive set of 14 macroe-
conomic news announcements and confirm the positive (negative) relation between market beta and
returns on MNA (non-MNA) days.
Specifically, I estimate each stock’s market beta using daily returns in a rolling window of 12
months. Stocks are sorted into decile portfolios based on market beta. I calculate value-weighted
and equal-weighted returns for each portfolio on days with and without MNAs. Moreover, I esti-
mate each portfolio’s market beta using daily returns also within a rolling window of 12 months,
although using the whole sample leads to similar results. Panel A of Figure 2 plots average monthly
excess returns on days with and without macro news announcements against market betas for the
ten market beta-sorted portfolios. On days with announcements there exists a positive relationship
between returns and market beta for both value-weighted and equal-weighted returns. The non-
MNA days, however, show a negative relation between returns and market betas. Furthermore,
compared to Figure 1 from Savor and Wilson (2014), the negative relation in Figure 2 is much
stronger. A potential explanation is that Savor and Wilson (2014) report results of daily returns and
they identify most trading days as non-MNA days. As a result, their monthly returns on non-MNA
days are scaled by a larger number of days than monthly returns on MNA days.
Savor and Wilson (2014) also shows that there is little difference in beta conditional on an-
nouncement days or on non-announcement days. Panel B of Figure 2 presents similar results. For
each of the portfolios sorted by market beta, I estimate the post-formation announcement (non-
announcement) beta using only the returns on announcement (non-announcement) days. It shows
that both the positive and negative relation hold equally for market betas estimated with either set
of trading days.
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4.2 Mispricing and the beta-return relationship
I have shown that stocks with high investor disagreement and tight short-selling constraints are
more likely to underreact to bad macro news, and experience low returns in the future. These
findings provide a potential explanation for the positive (negative) beta-return relation on MNA
(non-MNA) days. As stocks with high market beta tend to have a high exposure to the economy,
they should react more strongly to bad macro news compared with low-beta stocks. However, in-
vestors of high-beta stocks may also have more diverse beliefs. As a result of such market frictions,
underreaction to bad MNA will be more pervasive for high-beta stocks. The underreaction chan-
nel leads to a testable hypothesis that among stocks with low bad MNA sensitivity, the beta-return
relation on MNA days is particularly positive, and the relation on non-MNA days is particularly
negative.
Using Fama-Macbeth regressions of market beta, Table 7 shows that the high-beta stocks in-
deed tend to have high investor disagreement. In particular, analysts forecast dispersion, turnover,
and standard error are all positively and significantly related to market beta. Diether et al. (2002)
document similar result that market beta is positively related to analyst forecast dispersion. Note
that Liu et al. (2018) show that market beta is highly related to idiosyncratic volatility. However,
the relation is greatly reduced when controlling for standard error of market beta as in column
(2). The coefficients on residual institutional ownership are not consistent across regressions. The
conclusion is that there is insignificant relation between market beta and residual institutional own-
ership. Nevertheless, given the same level of short-selling constraints, a higher level of investor
disagreement still indicates that high-beta stocks experience greater degree of underreaction.
Next, Figure 3 confirms the underreaction hypothesis of the positive and negative beta-return
relation using double-sorted portfolios. At the end of each month, I sort stocks into quintiles based
on bad MNA sensitivity. Subsequently, I further sort stocks into quintiles based on market betas.
Panel A of Figure 3 reports the value-weighted average monthly returns on bad MNA days for
each portfolio. Clearly, among stocks with high market beta, those that are less sensitive to bad
news have higher returns. Panel B shows that on days with good news, there is little difference
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in beta-return relation between stocks with high or low bad news sensitivity. More importantly,
Panel C presents the monthly returns on non-MNA days. For stocks with bad MNA sensitivity in
the bottom quintile, there is a pronounced downward-sloping security market line: low-beta stocks
earn a monthly excess return close to zero on days without MNAs, while high-beta stocks earn an
excess return of –1.45% per month, with returns decreasing monotonically in market beta. The
difference in average excess returns between the two extreme market beta portfolios is -1.47% per
month and highly statistically significant (t-stat equal to -2.91). However, moving to the top quintile
of bad MNA sensitivity, the return difference between high and low market beta portfolios shrinks
by around 50% and becomes less statistically significant.
4.3 Fama-Macbeth regression
To provide further evidence for the underreaction hypothesis, this section shows that the result is
robust to controlling for other risk and firm characteristics. Table 8 reports the following Fama-
Macbeth estimation on firm-level of returns on MNA days with positive announcement returns,
negative announcement returns, and on non-MNA days.




i,t×βCAPMi,t + controlsi,t + εi,t+1. (4)
To facilitate the interpretation of economic significance, I standardize all firm characteristics as
well as market beta to have zero mean and unit variance. Specifically, I separate the coefficient on
market beta for stocks from different quintiles of bad MNA sensitivity. Q ji,t is equal to 1 if a stock
i is in the j’th bad beta quintile at month t and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction
between market beta and Q j is the slope of security market line for the stocks from the j’th bad
beta quintile. j is from 1 to 4, as I use the stocks in the top quintile as the benchmark.
The dependent variable in Column (1) and Column (2) are monthly returns on MNA days with
positive announcement returns and negative announcement returns, respectively. Therefore, Col-
umn (1) and (2) cover all the MNA days, and adding (1) and (2) together leads to total monthly
returns on MNA days. The first column shows that on days with positive announcement returns,
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there exists a positive relation between beta and return, which varies little across quintiles of sensi-
tivity to bad news. The second column presents that on days with negative announcement returns,
high beta leads to low return, but less so for stocks with Q1 = 1 or Q2 = 1, that is, low sensitivity
to bad news. This is consistent with the idea that these stocks underreact to bad macro news. In
Column (3), returns are on days without MNA. It shows that the negative relation between beta
and return is -0.17 for stocks with high bad sensitivity. These are the stocks that are least likely
to underreact. But for stocks with Q1 = 1 which are those most likely to underreact, the negative
beta-return relation is as low as -0.33, double the magnitude for stocks with high sensitivity. More-
over, the difference from the benchmark stocks are highly significant, indicating that the beta-return
relation on non-MNA days is the most negative for high-beta stocks with low sensitivity to the bad
news.
Overall, the results support the hypothesis that the downward-sloping security market line on
days without MNA is driven by high-market-beta stocks that underreact to bad macro news and
consequently experience low returns in the following non-MNA days.
4.4 Conditional market beta
Stocks that underreact to negative macro news will by definition have low conditional market beta
on bad days. Therefore, it is probable that the security market line is most downward-sloping
among stocks that experience sharp decrease in market beta on bad days. Therefore, I estimate for
each stock the change in market beta on days when there are bad MNA shocks using the following
model:
ri,t− r f ,t = αi +αi,goodIgoodt +αi,badIbadt +βi,MKT MKTt +∆βi,good,MKT MKTt× I
good
t +
∆βi,bad,MKT MKTt× Ibadt + εi,t (5)
where Ibadt (I
good
t ) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if on day t there exists bad (good) macro news.
∆βi,bad,MKT ( ∆βi,good,MKT ) captures the change in market beta on bad (good) days. Similar to
previous section, I assume Q ji,t to be equal to 1 if a stock i is in the j’th quintile of ∆βi,bad,MKT at
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month t and zero otherwise. With the new quintile dummy I re-estimate model (4) and the results
are reported in Table 9. The coefficient on market beta is significantly negative but similar across
different quintiles. The lack of disparity suggest that ∆βi,bad,MKT is a noisy measure on weather a
stock is underreacting to negative macro news.
5 Robustness Tests
Lucca and Moench (2015) report unconditional excess returns in equity index futures during 24
hours prior to the FOMC announcements. This makes the identification of MNA news not inappro-
priate if investors receive monetary policy information before FOMC announcements. Therefore, I
present the results when FOMC is not included in the sample. Table 10 and 11 show that the main
results of the paper is hardly changed when FOMC is excluded from the sample.
Co-skewness, co-kurtosis, exposure to daily changes in VIX, among other variables are in-
cluded in the main regressions. However, they are not reported in tables to save space. The results
of the paper are robust to these variables.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between individual stocks’ sensitivities to macroeconomic
news announcements (MNAs) and the cross-section of equity returns on days with and without
MNAs. Stocks with low sensitivities to bad MNA shocks tend to underperform relative to other
stocks in the future, especially during days without announcements. The effect is concentrated in
stocks with high investor disagreement and tight short-selling constraints. The results are consistent
with the hypothesis that stocks with high shorting costs underreact to bad macroeconomic news on
announcement days as pessimists’ beliefs are not reflected in prices. As a result, these stocks tend
to underperform in the following non-announcement day as the overpricing is corrected.
These findings provide valuable insights into the documented relationship between market beta
and stock returns on MNA and non-MNA days. Savor and Wilson (2014) argue it is challenging for
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risk-based models to explain why market betas do not change on the two type of days, while return
patterns look very different. In this paper, I provide an explanation based on mispricing. I show
evidence high-beta stocks experience high returns on MNA days and low returns on non-MNA days
because they underreact to bad MNA news. The results are robust to various firm characteristics
and alternative estimations of bad MNA sensitivity. Overall, this study provides strong empirical
evidence that underreaction to macroeconomic news announcements results in a downward-sloping
security market line on days without announcements, as well as an upward-sloping security market
line on days with announcements.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of MNA shocks and MNA sensitivity
This table reports summary statistics of macroeconomic news announcement shocks and MNA sensitivity. Panel A
reports the sample mean and standard deviation of bad and good MNA shocks in percentage. I also report the total
number of MNA shocks and annual average number of shocks. Panel B reports times-series means of cross-sectional
statistics of firm-level MNA sensitivity. At the end of each month, MNA sensitivity is estimated by regressing daily
stock returns on good and bad MNA shocks over the past 24 months, controlling for the market factor. Market beta is
estimated at the end of each month using daily returns over the past 12 months.
Panel A: Summary Statistics of MNA shocks
Mean Sd Total Num Num per year
Bad MNA -0.26% 0.24% 656 33
Good MNA 0.25% 0.21% 684 34
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of MNA sensitivity
Betas Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis P25 P75
Bad MNA sensitivity 0.04 1.80 0.45 19.07 -0.84 0.95
Good MNA sensitivity -0.11 1.79 -0.18 10.48 -1.02 0.82
CAPM β 1.11 0.46 0.75 3.95 0.78 1.36
33 40 
Table 3: MNA sensitivity and expected stock returns
This table reports average value-weighted full monthly returns, monthly returns on MNA days and on non-MNA days,
as well as alphas of ten portfolios sorted by bad and good MNA sensitivity. I also report for each portfolio the pre-
formation average MNA sensitivity, post-formation MNA sensitivity and factor loadings on Carhart four factors. At
the end of each month, I estimate MNA sensitivity using daily excess returns over the preceding 24 months. Stocks are
then sorted into deciles (1-10) based on bad or good MNA sensitivity. I obtain value-weighted portfolio returns during
the one-month period after the portfolio formation. Jensen alpha and the corresponding t-stat of each decile portfolio
are estimated with respect to Carhart four-factor model.
Panel A: Performance of value-weighted portfolios sorted by bad MNA sensitivity
Full month MNA days Non-MNA days
Portfolio Ret Alpha t-stat Ret Alpha t-stat Ret Alpha t-stat
1 0.16 -0.37 -1.30 1.17 0.09 0.44 -1.01 -0.47 -2.49
2 0.19 -0.24 -1.35 0.89 0.03 0.21 -0.70 -0.27 -2.41
3 0.35 -0.08 -0.55 0.78 0.01 0.07 -0.43 -0.08 -0.90
4 0.47 0.03 0.24 0.75 0.03 0.35 -0.28 -0.00 -0.03
5 0.51 0.04 0.41 0.68 -0.06 -0.73 -0.17 0.10 1.45
6 0.58 0.08 0.72 0.68 -0.08 -0.89 -0.10 0.16 2.23
7 0.77 0.26 2.20 0.86 0.10 1.11 -0.10 0.16 2.08
8 0.84 0.28 2.20 0.87 0.05 0.48 -0.03 0.24 2.83
9 0.81 0.17 1.20 0.94 0.04 0.37 -0.13 0.13 1.46
10 1.15 0.36 2.01 1.27 0.20 1.42 -0.12 0.17 1.43
.
High-Low 0.99 0.73 2.05 0.10 0.10 0.38 0.89 0.63 2.74
9-2 0.61 0.41 1.51 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.57 0.40 2.32
Panel B: Characteristics of value-weighted portfolios sorted by bad MNA sensitivity
pre-formation post-formation
Portfolio Bad Good βMKT Bad Good βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD
1 -3.05 -0.12 1.37 -0.22 0.06 1.27 0.32 -0.40 -0.34
2 -1.38 -0.15 1.14 -0.05 -0.05 1.09 0.05 -0.32 -0.17
3 -0.82 -0.12 1.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.97 -0.03 -0.16 -0.09
4 -0.43 -0.11 1.01 -0.03 -0.10 0.90 -0.08 -0.02 0.01
5 -0.11 -0.08 1.00 0.00 -0.18 0.91 -0.10 0.06 0.00
6 0.19 -0.08 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.94 -0.13 0.09 0.05
7 0.51 -0.08 1.02 0.09 0.08 0.94 -0.11 0.12 0.06
8 0.88 -0.07 1.06 0.02 -0.00 0.98 -0.07 0.21 0.04
9 1.40 -0.09 1.12 0.07 0.06 1.06 0.02 0.17 0.09
10 2.92 -0.08 1.28 -0.03 0.15 1.22 0.28 0.14 0.10
34 41 
Table 3: Continued
Panel C: Performance of value-weighted portfolios, sorted by good MNA sensitivity
Full month MNA days Non-MNA days
Portfolio Ret Alpha t-stat Ret Alpha t-stat Ret Alpha t-stat
1 0.82 0.05 0.28 1.14 0.05 0.32 -0.32 0.01 0.05
2 0.64 -0.01 -0.04 0.88 -0.03 -0.31 -0.24 0.03 0.28
3 0.81 0.26 2.12 0.99 0.14 1.40 -0.18 0.13 1.65
4 0.50 0.04 0.32 0.88 0.09 0.92 -0.38 -0.05 -0.63
5 0.59 0.10 0.81 0.86 0.09 0.99 -0.27 0.01 0.13
6 0.57 0.13 1.09 0.82 0.09 1.04 -0.25 0.04 0.47
7 0.70 0.26 2.35 0.77 0.03 0.38 -0.07 0.23 3.24
8 0.43 -0.07 -0.59 0.81 0.01 0.12 -0.38 -0.08 -1.07
9 0.30 -0.17 -1.34 0.71 -0.07 -0.71 -0.41 -0.10 -1.23
10 0.30 -0.30 -1.68 0.86 -0.13 -0.94 -0.56 -0.18 -1.48
High-Low -0.52 -0.36 -1.25 -0.28 -0.17 -0.80 -0.24 -0.18 -1.00
9-2 -0.33 -0.17 -0.76 -0.16 -0.04 -0.22 -0.17 -0.13 -0.92
Panel D: Characteristics of value-weighted portfolios, sorted by good MNA sensitivity
pre-formation post-formation
Portfolio Good Bad βMKT Good Bad βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD
1 -2.76 -0.10 1.25 -0.13 -0.16 1.19 0.26 0.34 -0.04
2 -1.35 -0.00 1.11 -0.16 -0.12 1.02 0.09 0.31 0.02
3 -0.87 0.00 1.06 -0.14 0.00 1.02 -0.05 0.13 -0.01
4 -0.52 0.01 1.02 -0.13 -0.07 0.97 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07
5 -0.23 0.03 1.01 0.02 -0.00 0.97 -0.09 -0.03 0.04
6 0.05 0.04 1.01 0.04 -0.04 0.94 -0.13 -0.06 0.02
7 0.35 0.07 1.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.94 -0.15 -0.00 0.00
8 0.69 0.06 1.04 0.04 -0.03 0.98 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00
9 1.16 0.07 1.10 0.04 0.16 0.99 -0.05 -0.11 0.02
10 2.61 -0.04 1.30 0.04 0.11 1.18 0.19 -0.18 -0.06
35 42 
Table 4: Stock-level Fama-MacBeth regressions
This table reports results from stock-level Fama-MacBeth regressions of full monthly returns, monthly returns on MNA
days and on non-MNA days. MNA sensitivity is estimated by regressing daily stock returns on good and bad MNA
shocks over the past 24 months, controlling for the market factor. Market beta is estimated at the end of each month
using daily returns over the past 12 months. Control variables include size, book-to-Market, momentum, illiquidity,
return reversal, maximum and minimum daily return over the past month, co-skewness, co-kurtosis. All of the betas
and firm characteristics are standardized, i.e., demeaned and divided by standard deviation, cross-sectionally within
each month. to have a zero mean and unit variance. Lowbad (Lowgood) is equal to one if a stock’s bad (good) MNA
sensitivity is lower than the cross-sectional median at the end of a month. Highbad (highgood) is equal to one if a stock’s
bad (good) MNA sensitivity is higher than the cross-sectional median at the end of a month. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Continued
Panel A: Fama-Macbeth regressions of monthly returns
Full month MNA days non-MNA days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bad MNA sensitivity 0.14∗∗ 0.061∗ 0.015 -0.0089 0.13∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(2.09) (1.68) (0.28) (-0.29) (2.96) (2.70)
Good MNA sensitivity -0.16∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.051 0.012 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.040∗
(-3.06) (-0.92) (-1.25) (0.44) (-3.11) (-1.67)
MKT β -0.13 0.16 -0.27∗∗∗
(-0.80) (1.40) (-2.63)
Size -0.20∗∗∗ -0.083 -0.10∗
(-2.72) (-1.51) (-1.93)
BM -0.013 0.016 -0.024
(-0.25) (0.44) (-0.73)
MOM 0.041 -0.016 0.059
(0.37) (-0.21) (0.89)
ILLIQ 0.010 0.11 -0.084
(0.10) (1.16) (-1.25)
IVOL -0.024 0.12 -0.13
(-0.18) (1.44) (-1.40)
REV -0.24∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ 0.032
(-2.69) (-4.14) (0.63)
Max 0.11 0.031 0.070
(1.23) (0.50) (1.26)
Min 0.043 0.13∗∗ -0.099∗
(0.52) (2.19) (-1.69)
Coskew 0.12 0.029 0.084
(1.08) (0.45) (1.60)
Cokurt 0.11 0.064 0.039
(1.05) (0.99) (0.76)
Constant 1.02∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.00041
(2.91) (2.77) (3.81) (3.61) (-0.06) (-0.00)
r2 0.011 0.10 0.011 0.091 0.011 0.10
N 383038 362552 383038 362552 383038 362552
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Table 4: Continued
Panel B: Piecewise Fama-Macbeth regressions of monthly returns
Full month MNA days non-MNA days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bad MNA sensitivity × Lowbad 0.085 -0.010 0.088∗∗
(1.53) (-0.25) (2.26)
Bad MNA sensitivity × Highbad 0.036 -0.0059 0.048
(0.58) (-0.12) (1.19)
Good MNA sensitivity × Lowgood 0.019 0.074 -0.047
(0.33) (1.62) (-1.14)
Good MNA sensitivity × Highgood -0.080 -0.054 -0.028
(-1.49) (-1.27) (-0.71)
Bad MNA sensitivity 0.060∗ -0.0086 0.068∗∗∗
(1.67) (-0.28) (2.68)
Good MNA sensitivity -0.031 0.011 -0.039
(-0.91) (0.41) (-1.62)
MKT β -0.12 -0.12 0.16 0.16 -0.27∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗
(-0.79) (-0.79) (1.40) (1.42) (-2.63) (-2.65)
Size -0.20∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.083 -0.084 -0.10∗∗ -0.10∗
(-2.77) (-2.76) (-1.52) (-1.53) (-1.98) (-1.96)
BM -0.013 -0.015 0.014 0.014 -0.022 -0.024
(-0.26) (-0.30) (0.39) (0.39) (-0.69) (-0.76)
MOM 0.042 0.046 -0.016 -0.011 0.060 0.060
(0.38) (0.41) (-0.21) (-0.15) (0.90) (0.90)
ILLIQ 0.0079 0.0100 0.11 0.12 -0.082 -0.086
(0.08) (0.10) (1.14) (1.16) (-1.21) (-1.26)
IVOL -0.031 -0.012 0.12 0.13 -0.13 -0.12
(-0.24) (-0.09) (1.36) (1.54) (-1.42) (-1.39)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.10 0.10 0.093 0.093 0.10 0.10
N 362552 362552 362552 362552 362552 362552
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Table 5: MNA sensitivity and firm characteristics
This table reports the results of monthly Fama-Macbeth regressions of bad and good MNA sensitivity on firm charac-
teristics. At the end of each month, MNA sensitivity is estimated by regressing daily stock returns on good and bad
MNA shocks over the past 24 months, controlling for the market factor. I match MNA sensitivity with firm charac-
teristics and risk measures known 24 months ago. DISP is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts’
current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts on the current month scaled by the absolute value of the mean
forecast. IVOL is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of daily excess returns on
Fama-French 3 factors over a one-months window. TURN is computed as the percentage of shares outstanding that
is traded in the last month. Panel A reports the regression results for bad MNA sensitivity, and Panel B reports the
results for good MNA sensitivity. The t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West t-statistic with 24 lags and reported
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Continued
Panel A: Bad MNA sensitivity
(1) (2) (3)








Size -0.0250 -0.0274 -0.0394
(-0.61) (-0.71) (-1.06)
BM 0.0323 0.0282 0.0228
(1.11) (1.17) (0.95)
Downside β -0.0146 -0.00239 0.00378
(-0.39) (-0.07) (0.13)
Upside β 0.00416 0.00813 0.00216
(0.24) (0.50) (0.11)
Coskew -0.00796 -0.0165 -0.0148
(-0.43) (-0.92) (-0.86)
Cokurt -0.0553∗∗ -0.0665∗∗∗ -0.0642∗∗∗
(-2.34) (-3.08) (-3.19)
O-score -0.0461 -0.0350 -0.0341
(-1.44) (-1.23) (-1.34)
ILLIQ 0.00336 -0.00510 0.00481
(0.12) (-0.45) (0.48)
r2 0.0688 0.0643 0.0814
N 225592 253018 253060
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Table 5: Continued
Panel B: Good MNA sensitivity
(1) (2) (3)








Size 0.0520 0.0593 0.0486
(1.07) (1.00) (0.79)
BM -0.0108 -0.00550 -0.00872
(-0.42) (-0.26) (-0.45)
Downside β 0.0258 0.0171 0.0255
(1.09) (0.74) (1.23)
Upside β 0.0390 0.0399 0.0406
(1.07) (1.15) (1.16)
Coskew -0.00145 -0.00496 -0.000305
(-0.08) (-0.35) (-0.02)
Cokurt -0.0371∗∗ -0.0418∗∗∗ -0.0370∗∗
(-2.09) (-2.64) (-2.44)
O-score -0.0297 -0.0300 -0.0300
(-0.62) (-0.65) (-0.66)
ILLIQ -0.0148 0.0291 0.0260
(-0.24) (0.99) (0.89)
r2 0.0718 0.0665 0.0762
N 225592 253018 253060
41 48 
Table 6: Stock-level Fama-MacBeth regressions: Disagreement and short-selling constraints
This table reports results from stock-level Fama-MacBeth regressions of full monthly returns, monthly returns on
MNA days and non-MNA days. MNA sensitivity is estimated by regressing daily stock returns on good and bad MNA
shocks over the past 24 months, controlling for the market factor. Market beta is estimated at the end of each month
using daily returns over the past 12 months. High (Low) is equal to one if a stock’s bad MNA sensitivity is higher
(lower) than the cross-sectional median at the end of a month and zero otherwise. RIO is defined as the residual in
a cross-sectional regression of the percentage of shares held by institutional investors on market capitalization. DISP
is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts on
the current month scaled by the absolute value of the mean forecast. IVOL is defined as the standard deviation of the
residuals from the regression of daily excess returns on Fama-French 3 factors over a one-months window. TURN
is computed as the percentage of shares outstanding that is traded in the last month. Other controls include size,
book-to-market, momentum, illiquidity, return reversal, maximum and minimum daily return over the past month, co-
skewness, co-kurtosis, as well as interactions of High (Low) with RIO, DISP, IVOL, and TURN. All of the betas and
firm characteristics are standardized, i.e., demeaned and divided by standard deviation, cross-sectionally within each






Bad MNA sensitivity × Low 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(3.15) (2.31) (2.03)
Bad MNA sensitivity × Low × RIO -0.013 -0.041 -0.0097
(-0.34) (-1.30) (-0.29)
Bad MNA sensitivity × Low × DISA -0.037 0.014 0.023
(-0.89) (0.36) (0.59)
Bad MNA sensitivity × Low × RIO × DISA -0.067∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.060∗
(-2.13) (-2.73) (-1.85)
Bad MNA sensitivity × High 0.052 0.049 0.032
(1.23) (1.01) (0.75)
Bad MNA sensitivity × High × RIO 0.030 0.032 0.036
(0.83) (0.82) (0.97)
Bad MNA sensitivity × High × DISA 0.015 -0.060 0.11∗∗
(0.33) (-1.39) (2.21)
Bad MNA sensitivity × High × RIO × DISA 0.011 0.017 0.042
(0.26) (0.29) (1.05)
MKT β -0.28∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗ -0.25∗∗
(-2.83) (-2.55) (-2.54)
Size -0.093∗ -0.092∗ -0.11∗∗
(-1.95) (-1.79) (-2.16)
BM -0.018 -0.012 -0.025
(-0.64) (-0.32) (-0.87)
MOM 0.053 0.056 0.062
(0.87) (0.84) (0.95)
ILLIQ 0.021 0.048 -0.0018
(0.71) (0.90) (-0.07)
IVOL -0.12∗ -0.073 -0.083
(-1.65) (-0.83) (-0.97)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.12 0.12 0.12
N 361835 318886 361760
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Table 7: Market beta and firm characteristics
This table reports the results of monthly Fama-Macbeth regressions of market beta on firm characteristics. At the end
of each month, market beta is estimated using daily returns over previous 12 months. I match market beta with firm
characteristics known 12 months ago. RIO is defined as the residual in a cross-sectional regression of the percentage
of shares held by institutional investors on market capitalization. DISP is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation
of analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts on the current month scaled by the absolute value of
the mean forecast. IVOL is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of daily excess returns
on Fama-French 3 factors over a one-months window. TURN is computed as the percentage of shares outstanding that
is traded in the last month. The t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West t-statistic with 12 lags and are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RIO -0.00212 0.00495∗∗ -0.00195 -0.00358







Size -0.0650∗∗∗ -0.0259 -0.0632∗∗∗ -0.0507∗∗∗
(-3.64) (-1.64) (-3.64) (-2.88)
BM -0.0121 0.00760 -0.0167 -0.00987
(-0.87) (0.81) (-1.00) (-0.74)
ILLIQ -0.0361∗∗ -0.0205∗ -0.0197 -0.0121
(-2.34) (-1.83) (-0.88) (-0.98)
Coskew -0.00563 0.00215 -0.00648 -0.00353
(-0.35) (0.18) (-0.37) (-0.24)
Cokurt 0.00658 0.0158 0.00631 0.00975
(0.53) (1.63) (0.46) (0.86)
O-score -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0292∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗
(-3.06) (-4.46) (-3.23) (-3.19)
IVOL 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(10.34) (9.01) (9.95) (10.39)
Constant 1.091∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗
(32.71) (44.74) (31.47) (32.80)
r2 0.251 0.338 0.266 0.272
N 317183 297464 281003 317128
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Table 8: Stock-level Fama-MacBeth regressions on market beta
This table reports results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly returns on market beta. The dependent variable
in Column 1 is monthly returns on days with positive announcement returns. The dependent variable in Column 2
is monthly returns on days with negative announcement returns. The dependent variable in Column 3 is monthly
returns on non-MNA days. Q j is equal to 1 if a particular stock’s bad sensitivity is in the j’th quintile at month
t and zero otherwise. Market β is estimated by a regression of daily excess returns on market factor over a 12-
months window. Control variables include firm size (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL),
illiquidity (ILLIQ), momentum (MOM), return reversal, maximum and minimum daily return over the past month, co-
skewness, and co-kurtosis. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
MKT β 0.41∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.17∗
(4.21) (-2.61) (-1.69)
MKT β ×Q1 -0.0054 0.11∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(-0.10) (1.77) (-2.62)
MKT β ×Q2 0.019 0.11∗∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.38) (2.24) (-2.34)
MKT β ×Q3 -0.033 0.033 -0.095∗
(-0.75) (0.76) (-1.95)
MKT β ×Q4 -0.040 0.056 -0.030
(-1.02) (1.34) (-0.60)
Size -0.042 -0.024 -0.12∗∗
(-1.06) (-0.66) (-2.36)
BM 0.0092 0.0029 -0.028
(0.41) (0.13) (-0.96)
MOM -0.015 -0.020 0.060
(-0.32) (-0.43) (0.94)
ILLIQ 0.022 0.12 -0.098
(0.95) (1.17) (-1.31)
IVOL 0.034 0.059 -0.14∗∗
(0.67) (1.27) (-2.21)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.10 0.089 0.10
N 361663 361663 361663
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Table 9: Stock-level Fama-MacBeth regressions on market beta: Conditional market beta
This table reports results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly returns during non-MNA days on market beta.
Q ji,t is equal to 1 if a stock i is in the j’th quintile of ∆βi,bad,MKT at month t and zero otherwise. Market β is estimated
by a regression of daily excess returns on market factor over a 12-months window. Control variables include firm size
(Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), illiquidity (ILLIQ), momentum (MOM), return
reversal, maximum and minimum daily return over the past month, co-skewness, and co-kurtosis. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
MKT β ×Q1 -0.25∗∗ -0.27∗∗
(-1.99) (-2.58)
MKT β ×Q2 -0.25∗∗ -0.25∗∗
(-1.99) (-2.38)
MKT β ×Q3 -0.22∗ -0.24∗∗
(-1.75) (-2.42)
MKT β ×Q4 -0.23∗ -0.24∗∗
(-1.86) (-2.39)
















Table 10: Robustness test: Stock-level Fama-Macbeth regressions on bad MNA sensitivity
This table reports results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly returns over non-MNA days. FOMC is excluded
from the sample of announcements. High (Low) is equal to one if a stock’s bad MNA sensitivity is higher (lower) than
the cross-sectional median at the end of a month and zero otherwise. RIO is defined as the residual in a cross-sectional
regression of the percentage of shares held by institutional investors on market capitalization. DISP is defined as the
ratio of the standard deviation of analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts on the current month
scaled by the absolute value of the mean forecast. IVOL is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from
the regression of daily excess returns on Fama-French 3 factors over a one-months window. TURN is computed as
the percentage of shares outstanding that is traded in the last month. Other controls include firm size (Size), Book-
to-Market (BM), momentum (MOM), illiquidity (ILLIQ), reversal, maximum daily return, minimum daily return,
coskewness, cokurtosis, as well as interactions of High (Low) with RIO, DISP, IVOL, and TURN. All of the betas and
firm characteristics are standardized, i.e., demeaned and divided by standard deviation, cross-sectionally within each






Bad MNA sensitivity × Low 0.12∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.078∗
(3.10) (2.16) (1.92)
Bad MNA sensitivity × Low × RIO -0.0079 -0.036 -0.0049
(-0.21) (-1.15) (-0.15)
Bad MNA sensitivity × Low × DISA -0.041 0.012 0.020
(-1.00) (0.32) (0.50)
Bad MNA sensitivity × Low × RIO × DISA -0.069∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.061∗
(-2.18) (-2.71) (-1.87)
Bad MNA sensitivity × High 0.045 0.045 0.026
(1.12) (0.97) (0.63)
Bad MNA sensitivity × High × RIO 0.032 0.034 0.038
(0.88) (0.86) (1.05)
Bad MNA sensitivity × High × DISA 0.019 -0.061 0.11∗∗
(0.41) (-1.41) (2.26)
Bad MNA sensitivity × High × RIO × DISA 0.0094 0.015 0.039
(0.23) (0.25) (0.98)
MKT β -0.28∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗ -0.25∗∗
(-2.87) (-2.58) (-2.55)
Size -0.099∗∗ -0.098∗ -0.12∗∗
(-2.08) (-1.94) (-2.30)
BM -0.014 -0.0069 -0.021
(-0.53) (-0.20) (-0.74)
MOM 0.055 0.058 0.064
(0.93) (0.90) (1.03)
ILLIQ 0.024 0.051 0.00056
(0.80) (0.96) (0.02)
IVOL -0.13∗ -0.077 -0.088
(-1.72) (-0.88) (-1.04)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.12 0.12 0.12
N 361835 318886 361760
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Table 11: Robustness test: Stock-level Fama-Macbeth regressions on market beta
This table reports results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly returns on market beta. FOMC is excluded
from the sample of announcements. The dependent variable in Column 1 is monthly returns on days with positive
announcement returns. The dependent variable in Column 2 is monthly returns on days with negative announcement
returns. The dependent variable in Column 3 is monthly returns on non-MNA days. At the end of each month, market
beta is estimated using daily returns over previous 12 months. Q ji,t is equal to 1 if a stock i is in the j’th quintile at month
t and zero otherwise. Control variables include firm size (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), idiosyncratic volatility
(IVOL), illiquidity (ILLIQ), momentum (MOM), reversal return, maximum daily return, minimum daily return, co-
skewness, and co-kurtosis. Firm characteristics are standardized, i.e. demeaned and divided by standard deviation,
cross-sectionally within each month. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
MKT β 0.39∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗ -0.17
(4.05) (-2.54) (-1.56)
MKT β ×Q1 0.013 0.14∗∗ -0.16∗∗
(0.22) (2.30) (-2.53)
MKT β ×Q2 0.037 0.082 -0.097∗
(0.72) (1.64) (-1.68)
MKT β ×Q3 0.0017 0.051 -0.12∗∗
(0.04) (1.06) (-2.15)
MKT β ×Q4 -0.021 0.040 -0.076
(-0.46) (0.93) (-1.43)
Size -0.044 -0.024 -0.12∗∗
(-1.11) (-0.65) (-2.39)
BM 0.0080 0.0011 -0.027
(0.36) (0.05) (-0.95)
MOM -0.015 -0.020 0.057
(-0.30) (-0.43) (0.90)
ILLIQ 0.022 0.12 -0.099
(0.93) (1.19) (-1.29)
IVOL 0.032 0.059 -0.14∗∗
(0.64) (1.26) (-2.23)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.10 0.089 0.10
N 361334 361334 361334
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Figure 1: Volatility of one-minute returns around macro announcements
This figure plots the standard deviation of one-minute returns on E-mini S&P 500 futures around MNA
shocks for the period of 1997-2017. Returns are expressed as percentages. The horizontal axis marks the
ordinal number of the one-minute intervals around announcement time point. Specifically, number t from -6














Figure 2: Average excess returns for 10 market beta-sorted portfolios
This figure plots average monthly excess returns on days with and without macro news announcements
against market betas for 10 market beta-sorted portfolios. Individual stock market betas are estimated at the
end of each month using daily returns in a rolling window of 12 months. Stocks are then sorted into decile
portfolios based on the market beta. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly. Value-weighted and equal-weighted
returns are calculated for each portfolio on days with and without MNAs. Panel A estimates portfolio market
beta using all days. Panel B estimates market beta for MNA days and non-MNA days separately. Returns
are expressed as percentages.
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Figure 3: Average excess returns on 25 double-sorted portfolios
This figure plots average value-weighted monthly returns against market beta on days with good or bad
macro news, and on days without macro news announcements for 25 double-sorted portfolios. At the end
of each month stocks are first sorted into quintiles based on bad MNA sensitivity and subsequently into
quintiles based on market beta. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly. Portfolio market betas are estimated over
the whole sample. Returns are expressed as percentages.
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Figure 4: Continued
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I control volatility periodicity following the non-parametric weighted standard deviation (WSD)
estimator in Boudt et al. (2011) which is built on shortest half estimator. For each year I estimate
the periodicity factor which varies across the day of the week and the j′th interval during the day.
Suppose r j = {r(1), j,r(2), j,r(3), j, ...,r(T ), j} is the vector of returns observed on the the time j of the
day and a certain day of the week (e.g. Friday), such that r(1), j ≤ r(2), j ≤ r(3), j ≤, ...≤ r(T ), j. The
shortest half scale is
ShortH j = 0.741×min{r(hi), j− r(1), j, ...,r(Ti), j− r(T−h+1), j}, where h = [T/2]+1.
Suppose there are L observations during a day, the shortest half scale estimator for periodicity at








. The WSD periodicity

















and wt, j = 1 if rt, j/ f ShortHj <= 6.635 and 0 otherwise.
I scale five-minute returns with WSD periodicity factor and use the scaled returns to estimate
instantaneous volatility. Specifically, suppose rt, j on day t over the j′th interval of five-minute dur-
ing the day as an WSD-scaled announcement return , I estimate the local “instantaneous volatility”














with K = 5×96.
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A2.Variable Definition
• Analysts’ forecast dispersion of earnings (DISP): Data on analyst forecasts of fiscal-year-end
earnings is from Institutional Broker’s Estimate System (IBES). The summary file unadjusted for
stock splits is used to avoid the bias induced by ex-post split adjustment, as pointed out by Diether,
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002). The dispersion is calculated as the standard deviation of forecast
scaled by the average forecast.
• Book-to-Market (BM): I following Novy-Marx (2013) and measure book equity as share-
holder equity, plus deferred taxes, minus preferred stock, when available, for the fiscal year ending
in the calendar year t-1. If shareholder equity is missing, I calculate it as the sum of the book value
of common and preferred equity. If all of these are missing, we calculate shareholder equity as total
assets minus total liabilities. Market value of equity is stock price times shares outstanding at the
end of December of year t − 1.
• Downside beta β−i : The downside beta at the end of month t is estimated using the follow-
ing model of daily returns over the past 12 months, ri,d − r f ,d = αi,d +β−i ×MKTd + εi,d on the
condition that MKTd < µm, where µm is the average market excess return.
• Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL): Following Ang et al. (2006b), idiosyncratic volatility at the
end of month t as ivoli,t =
√
var(εi,t) , where εi,t is the error term of the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor regression. The regression is estimated using daily returns over month t.
• Illiquidity (ILLIQ): Following Amihud (2002), I calculate illiquidity of stock i at the end
of month tas the average daily ratio of the absolute stock return to the dollar trading volume of that
month:
ILLQi,t = 1N ∑d(
|ri,d |
volumei,d×pricei,d ),
where N is the number of trading days in month t, ri,d is the daily return, volumei,d is the daily
trading volume, and pricei,d is the daily price on day d.
• Maximum daily return (MAX): MAX of month t is defined as the maximum daily return
of that month, following Bali et al. (2011).
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• Momentum (MOM): The cumulative return over the past 12 months, skipping the return in
the last month.
• MKT beta: The regular market β at the end of month t is estimated using the following
model of daily returns over the past 12 months,
ri,d− r f ,d = αi +βi×MKTd + εi,d,
where ri,d is the return on stock i, MKT is the market factor, and r f ,d is the risk-free rate.
• Reversal (REV): REV in month t is defined as the monthly stock return over the month.
• Residual institutional ownership (RIO): I obtain institutional ownership data from the
Thomson Reuters 13F database (TR-13F). If a common stock is on CRSP but not in the TR-13, I
set the institutional ownership as zero. Following Nagel (2005) and Weber (2018), I perform a logit
transformation
logit(INST ) = log( INST1−INST ),
where institutional ownership INST is winsorized at 0.0001 and 0.9999. To control for size effect,
I obtain residual institutional ownership using the following quarterly Fama-Macbeth regression,
logit(INSTi,t) = α +β1log(MEi,t)+β2log(MEi,t)2 +RIi,t + εi,t
where log(ME) is the natural logarithm of size.
• Standard error of estimated market beta (SE): The standard error of the estimated market
β at the end of month t is estimated using the following model of daily returns over the past 12
months,
ri,d− r f ,d = αi +βi×MKTd + εi,d,
where ri,d is the return on stock i, MKT is the market factor, and r f ,d is the risk-free rate.
• Size: The natural logarithm of the market value of equity (the product of closing price and
the number of shares outstanding) at the end of each month.
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• Turnover (TURN): The turnover in month t is measured as the ratio of the number of shares
traded during the month divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the month.
• Upside beta β+i : The upside beta at the end of month t is estimated using the following model
of daily returns over the past 12 months, ri,d− r f ,d = αi,d +β+i ×MKTd +εi,d on the condition that




Table 12: MNA Sensitivity and expected stock returns
This table reports average equal-weighted full monthly returns, monthly returns on MNA days and non-
MNA days, as well as alphas of ten portfolios sorted by bad and good MNA sensitivity. I also report for each
portfolio the pre-formation average MNA sensitivity, post-formation MNA sensitivity and factor loadings on
Carhart four factors. At the end of each month, I estimate MNA sensitivity using daily excess returns over
the preceding 24 months. Stocks are then sorted into deciles (1-10) based on bad or good MNA sensitivity.
I obtain equal-weighted portfolio returns during the one-month period after the portfolio formation. Jensen
alpha and the corresponding t-stat of each decile portfolio are estimated with respect to Carhart four-factor
model.
Panel A: Performance of equally-weighted,sorted by bad MNA sensitivity
Full month MNA days Non-MNA days
Portfolio Ret Alpha t-stat Ret Alpha t-stat Ret Alpha t-stat
1 0.64 -0.06 -0.31 1.16 0.09 0.63 -0.52 -0.15 -1.19
2 0.78 0.13 1.31 1.04 0.13 1.75 -0.26 -0.00 -0.06
3 0.92 0.27 3.10 0.96 0.12 1.82 -0.05 0.15 2.69
4 0.85 0.20 2.53 0.96 0.15 2.37 -0.11 0.06 1.10
5 0.92 0.28 3.35 0.90 0.10 1.61 0.02 0.18 3.29
6 0.93 0.28 3.36 0.91 0.11 1.78 0.01 0.17 3.14
7 1.02 0.33 3.91 1.00 0.17 2.58 0.02 0.16 3.02
8 1.03 0.30 3.31 1.00 0.13 1.87 0.02 0.17 2.92
9 1.12 0.32 3.32 1.09 0.14 1.82 0.03 0.19 3.02
10 1.11 0.22 1.54 1.15 0.06 0.55 -0.04 0.16 1.77
.
High-Low 0.47 0.28 1.16 -0.00 -0.03 -0.15 0.47 0.30 1.99
9-2 0.34 0.19 1.29 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.19 1.98
Panel B: Characteristics of equally-weighted portfolios sorted by bad MNA sensitivity
pre-formation post-formation
Portfolio βbad βgood βMKT βbad βgood βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD
1 -3.18 -0.24 1.37 -0.13 0.08 1.20 0.83 -0.22 -0.30
2 -1.45 -0.19 1.14 -0.10 -0.17 1.03 0.59 0.02 -0.16
3 -0.85 -0.16 1.05 -0.04 -0.13 0.96 0.51 0.11 -0.08
4 -0.44 -0.14 1.01 -0.06 -0.15 0.94 0.44 0.18 -0.05
5 -0.11 -0.10 1.00 -0.04 -0.21 0.92 0.42 0.19 -0.02
6 0.21 -0.08 1.00 -0.01 -0.18 0.93 0.39 0.21 -0.02
7 0.55 -0.06 1.02 0.03 -0.09 0.96 0.44 0.26 -0.00
8 0.95 -0.04 1.06 0.05 -0.18 1.00 0.47 0.27 -0.00
9 1.51 -0.08 1.13 0.09 -0.08 1.08 0.56 0.30 0.00
10 3.15 -0.03 1.29 0.15 0.01 1.22 0.78 0.15 -0.02
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Table 12: Continued
Panel C: Performance of equally-weighted portfolios sorted by good MNA sensitivity
Full month MNA days Non-MNA days
Portfolio Ret Alpha t-stat Ret Alpha t-stat Ret Alpha t-stat
1 1.13 0.29 2.37 1.11 0.07 0.74 0.01 0.22 2.76
2 1.09 0.34 4.06 1.12 0.19 2.92 -0.03 0.15 2.85
3 1.04 0.33 4.25 1.06 0.19 3.17 -0.03 0.14 2.85
4 1.03 0.36 4.60 1.02 0.19 3.15 0.01 0.17 3.44
5 0.89 0.25 3.14 0.99 0.19 3.00 -0.10 0.07 1.32
6 0.93 0.28 3.56 0.96 0.15 2.57 -0.03 0.13 2.48
7 0.99 0.33 4.02 1.01 0.18 2.87 -0.02 0.15 2.84
8 0.85 0.20 2.39 0.95 0.11 1.72 -0.10 0.09 1.68
9 0.85 0.17 1.83 0.92 0.03 0.49 -0.07 0.13 2.35
10 0.66 -0.09 -0.68 1.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.36 -0.08 -1.00
.
High-Low -0.46 -0.38 -2.17 -0.09 -0.07 -0.54 -0.38 -0.31 -2.65
9-2 -0.24 -0.17 -1.48 -0.21 -0.16 -1.74 -0.03 -0.02 -0.25
Panel D: Characteristics of equally-weighted portfolios sorted by good MNA sensitivity
pre-formation post-formation
Portfolio Good Bad βMKT Good Bad βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD
1 -3.11 -0.14 1.26 -0.01 -0.04 1.14 0.78 0.21 -0.10
2 -1.46 -0.05 1.12 -0.12 -0.04 1.04 0.58 0.26 -0.08
3 -0.93 0.02 1.06 -0.17 -0.05 0.99 0.49 0.26 -0.06
4 -0.56 0.03 1.02 -0.17 -0.03 0.94 0.46 0.23 -0.05
5 -0.24 0.04 1.01 -0.20 -0.06 0.93 0.41 0.19 -0.04
6 0.06 0.06 1.00 -0.12 -0.03 0.93 0.40 0.20 -0.03
7 0.37 0.11 1.01 -0.14 -0.02 0.95 0.44 0.20 -0.04
8 0.74 0.09 1.04 -0.06 0.01 0.98 0.44 0.14 -0.05
9 1.25 0.10 1.10 -0.15 0.07 1.03 0.48 0.11 -0.05
10 2.82 0.11 1.29 -0.03 0.09 1.18 0.72 -0.08 -0.14
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Chapter 2
Firm and Country Determinants of Firm Betas and
Contagion
1 Introduction
There is a large and active literature modeling firm-level betas, both during normal and in stress
times. There is also a continued interest in what characteristics make countries particularly exposed
to disruptive foreign contagion. We combine both literatures and test using a sample of firm-level
data from 54 countries what country and firm characteristics (and possibly their interactions) make
firms particularly exposed (unexposed) to periods of market stress.
Our empirical strategy involves several steps. First, because we will differentiate between betas
in normal and crisis times, we develop a new methodology to identify crisis periods first. We begin
with the idea that crisis periods have persistently low equity returns and high equity market volatil-
ity, and typically start with a crash. We adopt an ordinal approach to transform these symptoms
into a crisis indicator. We use the US market to calibrate the key model parameters. In particular,
we set the parameters so that the US crisis incidence is close to the population incidence of the
top volatility regime in a 3-state regime-switching volatility model (about 17%). We then impose
the parameters calibrated on US data on the other markets. After applying the methodology to
individual countries, we create global crisis indicators based on local ones. Specifically, we define
a week as being in global crisis if more than 66% of all countries (or 75% of total market cap)
experience a local crisis during that week. For the 75% market cap measure, we find about 8.5%
of weeks to be global crisis weeks (with an average equity index return of -1.16%). The 66% of
countries measure leads to a lower crisis incidence (4.86% of weeks) but a higher average weekly
return impact (-1.91%).
In the second step, we build a predictive model for firm global and (orthogonalized) local equity
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market exposures in ‘normal times’, that is, outside crisis periods. We first measure yearly (July
to June) realized global and local factor betas using the simple and robust estimation procedure
recently proposed by Welch (2019). Subsequently, we relate next year’s betas to a combination of
past betas (measured at different frequencies, as in the Corsi (2009) volatility model) as well as
firm and country characteristics. We estimate the prediction model for developed and developing
countries separately. For developed markets, we find a strong relationship between future global
betas and both the current one-year and particularly 5-year realized betas. While country character-
istics capturing economic and financial openness have little to no predictive power for firm betas,
we find a robust relationship with firm fundamentals such as size, stock liquidity, and idiosyncratic
volatility. Surprisingly, we do not find firm betas to be associated with financial leverage. Results
for developing market global betas are mostly similar, except for the strong positive relation be-
tween firm betas and country-level measures of de jure and de facto integration. We also build a
prediction model for local betas, and confirm a strong relationship with past realized betas as well
as with the same set of firm characteristics.
The final step then searches for the characteristics that make firms perform excessively poorly
(well) during crisis times. Excessive here should be interpreted as worse (better) relative to what
was to be expected given the predicted factor exposures. To empirically test this, we first calcu-
late a firm’s abnornal return as the difference between the firm’s return and its predicted return
(in turn calculated as the product of the predicted factor exposures and the factor returns). Sub-
sequently, we test whether (1) the abnormal returns are significantly negative during crisis times
(which would signal “contagion unrelated to the factors), (2 and 3) whether the abnormals returns
tend to positively correlate with the global and local factors during stress times. Under the null
of no global (local) factor contagion, we expect this correlation to be indistinguisable from zero.
The main contribution of our paper is that we let these contagion exposures depend on (the inter-
action between) country and firm characteristics. More specifically, we develop and test 4 separate
hypotheses (future versions will develop other hypotheses). Our first hypothesis tests the idea that
quality stocks provide downside market protections as they may benefit from flight to quality during
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crises (see Asness et al. (2019)). We only find evidence for this hypothesis in developed markets,
where firms with higher ROE and low earnings volatilty (a crude proxy for managerial quality)
tend to be less prone to local and global factor contagion, respectively. High financial leverage is
not robustly related to contagion exposures. Second, following Bekaert et al. (2014), we test the
so-called wake-up call hypothesis, which states that when investors re-evaluate their positions in
market downturns, countries with strong domestic macroeconomic fundamentals should be more
insulated from contagion than countries with week fundamentals. Again, we find strong evidence
for this channel, but only within developing markets. Our third hypothesis originates from the ten-
dency of fire-sales during downturns documented by Ben-David et al. (2012). In particular, they
show evidence that when confronted with large withdrawals, fund managers tend to first sell the
largest and most liquid stocks, and stick to their positions in smaller illiquid stocks that they would
otherwise have to sell at fire-sale prices. We therefore hypothesize that, at least initially, large and
liquid firms should be more crisis-prone relative to smaller and less liquid ones, and that the effect
should be increasing with de facto market integration (as reflected by e.g., a high level of foreign
market participation). Our empirical findings for developed markets, however, direct to the oppo-
site conclusion: large and liquid firms tend to be less crisis prone relative to smaller and less liquid
firms. These findings are consistent with those in Baele et al. (2019) and indicate a flight to large
and liquid stocks during stress times. In developing markets, however, we find global and local
crisis exposures to be positively related to foreign equity market participation, and especially so
for the more liquid firms. We also find strong contagion unrelated to the factors, but this contagion
intensity seems largely unrelated to both country and firm characteristics. The fourth hypothesis is
based on the literature showing that foreign banking crises may spill over to the local credit market
either through the negative effect on the domestic banking system (via inter-banking market and
surges in funding costs) or directly by reducing the amount of credit that foreign banks lend to local
firms (see Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Schnabl (2012), Iyer et al. (2013), Ongena et al. (2015),
and Degryse et al. (2019)). With worsening domestic credit conditions during crisis periods, it is
straight-forward to expect more levered firms to be more exposed to contagion. Also, Giannetti and
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Ongena (2009) show that foreign banks tend to lend to mainly large firms. Therefore, we expect a
credit contraction shock should have a stronger impact on these firms. Furthermore, we expect the
effect to be stronger in countries that have a higher reliance on foreign funding, and measure foreign
credit dependence by total domestic borrowing from foreign banks relative to GDP. For developed
markets, we do find larger contagion exposures in countries that borrow more from abroad, but
not that these exposures depend on firm size. In developing markets, however, consistent with our
hypothesis, we do find highly levered and large firms to be more exposed to contagion in countries
that depend more on foreign credit.
This paper contributes to several streams in the literature. First, this paper contributes to the
huge literature on international financial contagion, most of which focus on aggregate stock market
indices. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Baig and Goldfajn (1999) find evidence of contagion dur-
ing the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and Asia crisis. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) find that contagion
evidence based on changes in cross-market correlations across normal and crisis periods can be
biased by heteroscedasticity. Bae et al. (2003) propose a multinomial logistic regression approach
to measure contagion. Bekaert et al. (2005a) and Bekaert et al. (2014) define contagion as “correla-
tion over and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals.” They use a factor model
with time-varying betas to accommodate various degrees of market integration. More recently, the
literature uses data on ownership or borrowing activity of individual companies to study shock
transmission and contagion. With fund-level data, Jotikasthira et al. (2012) and Hau and Lai (2017)
find that stock transactions induced by fund flow of mutual fund lead to significant price pressure
on shares they owned, and cause shock transmission from developed countries to emerging markets
or from financial stocks to non-financial stocks. Schnabl (2012), Iyer et al. (2013), Ongena et al.
(2015) document transmission of bank funding shock across countries, with firms dependent on
bank credit suffering the most.
Our study also relates to the research on stock performance during market downturns and nor-
mal times. Kapadia et al. (2018) show that stocks hedging bad times earn high average returns.
Similarly, Gormsen and Greenwood (2017) show that firm with characteristics associated with
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good performance during bad times also perform well during good times. Ang et al. (2006), Kelly
and Jiang (2014), Bali et al. (2014), Van Oordt and Zhou (2016), Chabi-Yo et al. (2018), and
Atilgan et al. (2019) investigate individual stock exposures to extreme market downturns and test
whether left-tail risk predicts cross-sectional variation in future stock returns. This paper differs
from these studies as we focus not only on raw return performance but also on contagion, i.e. ex-
cess comovement over and above what is implied by exposures to global and local factors. Also,
our study features an international dimension and study stocks from a large sample of countries.
Last, our paper also provides insightful results on the determinants of firm-level betas. The-
oretically, Gomes et al. (2003), Carlson et al. (2004), and Zhang (2005) link market beta to size
and book-to-market. Empirically, Brooks and Negro (2006) find that companies operate globally
have higher exposures to global shocks. Cosemans et al. (2016) find a significant relation between
beta and size, book-to-market, and leverage. In this paper, we build a beta prediction model in-
cluding firm and country characteristics, past beta, and crisis incidence. Moreover, we test it using
international stocks instead of only US stocks used by other studies.
2 Empirical Framework
The goal of our paper is to identify the firm and country characteristics that make firms particularly
vulnerable to crisis periods. Below, we propose a two-factor model that decomposes firms’ crisis
sensitivities into multiple components. First of all, firms with higher exposures to global and/or
local factor shocks are expected to be hit harder during crisis periods compared to firms with low
exposures. We model firm betas as a function of past betas as well as country and firm characteris-
tics in Section 2.2, hereby contributing to a large literature on how to optimally model and predict
firm-level betas. A second reason for firms to be hit harder by crises is that their factor exposures
may suddenly increase during crisis times. This ‘excess’ comovement, that is, comovement in ex-
cess of what is predicted by the baseline factor exposures, is often denoted as ‘contagion’ (see e.g.,
Bekaert et al. (2005b)). An alternative source of excess comovement is that all stocks with specific
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characteristics tend to drop in value, irrespective of their market exposures. Section 2.3 introduces
the methodology to identify these different channels of excess comovement and develops a set of
hypotheses that link country and firm fundamentals to excess contagion. We relegate the discus-
sion of the empirical results to Section 3. Both to estimate firm betas in normal and stress times,
we need to identify crisis periods. We therefore first develop and implement a new ‘ordinal’ crisis
identification method in Section 2.1.
2.1 Identifying Crises Periods
There is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes a crisis period, and hence also no
unified way of identifying such periods. In their paper, Kapadia et al. (2018) use the methodology
by Pagan and Sossounov (2003) to identify downwards (‘bear’) markets. When we apply their
measure to our US sample, we find that about 25% of weeks are identified as bear markets. On
average, a downward spell takes 45 weeks, with a minimum of 14 and a maximum of 133 weeks.
As can be seen from Figure 1, this method identifies longer spells of downward markets from top
to bottom. Gormsen and Greenwood (2017) follow a simple three-step approach. First, they define
financial bad times as quarters in which either the quarterly or the yearly US stock market excess
return is in the bottom quintile of their sample. Second, they define a quarter to be economic bad
times if at least one of its months is registered as a recession by the NBER. Finally, they set their
quarterly ‘rainy day’ dummy equal to one if the quarter has both economic and financial bad times
and zero otherwise. They describe their definition of bad times as ‘restrictive’, as it ‘may leave
out some periods that would be admitted as a bad time under some specifications’, and directed at
’minimizing false positives. Not surprisingly then, over their 1963-2013 sample for the US, they
only identify 7 spells; the number of spells in their 1986-2013 international sample is limited to 5.
In our view, not all crisis periods are necessarily part of a persistent downward market or reces-
sion period. A good example is the 1987 crash, which is not characterized as a crisis period by the
Gormsen and Greenwood (2017) methodology. Similarly, not all weeks within a downturn should
necessarily be characterized as crisis weeks. For instance, as Figure 1 illustrates, downward market
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spells are frequently interrupted by (temporary) recovery periods. In what follows, we develop
a new crisis identification methodology that allows for a more detailed crisis identification at the
weekly frequency.
2.1.1 An Ordinal Crisis Model
Two key symptoms of crisis periods are persistently low equity returns and high equity market
volatility. We now develop an ordinal approach that transforms these two symptoms into a crisis









At each point in time t = 1..T −K, we calculate forward cumulative returns over horizons K =
5,13,26,52 weeks, that is, approximately, over the next 1, 3, 6, and 12 months. Similarly, we
calculate realized volatility σc,t,K over the same set of horizons, that is, the realized volatility of
daily returns over the next 5, 13, 26, and 52 weeks. To increase the accuracy of our volatility
estimates, we use daily rather than weekly returns. Subsequently, we transform the cumulative
return (forward realized volatility) series into an ordinal indicator by replacing each observation by
its ranking (in descending order for cumulative returns, in ascending order for realized volatility)
over the sample period, normalized by the total number of observations; values closer to one (zero)
are therefore associated with a lower (higher) future cumulative return and higher (lower) future
realized volatility. We stack the 4 ordinal series for the forward returns and volatilities in T × 4
matrices OI f r and OI f σ , respectively. Finally, as we will need it to decide whether the current
weekly return initiates a new crisis period, we use a similar procedure to transform the weekly
returns into a vector of ordinal numbers OIr (ranking from high to low, so that extreme negative
returns are associated with ordinal numbers close to 1). With those ordinal numbers in hand, we
categorize a weekly observation t as a crisis if:
1. The ordinal number of that week is larger than a crisis trigger threshold level, i.e. OIr,t ≥ Tr,
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and at least one of the 8 ordinal numbers for future returns/volatilities is larger than some
threshold level T hr f .
2. The previous week was categorized as a crisis week, and at least one of the 8 ordinal numbers
for future returns/volatilities is larger than some threshold level T hr f .
As is also the case for other crisis identification methods, our crisis measure will ultimately depend
on the chosen value of some key parameters. In our model, these are the crisis trigger level Tr and
crisis threshold level for the forward returns/volatilities T hr f . Also slight changes to the model
(e.g. only taking into account forward returns, or requiring both the forward return / volatility
ordinal numbers to be above the threshold) could change crisis identification. Given that plenty of
validation statistics are available for it, we propose to first validate our measure for the US market.
We then impose the ‘optimal’ model / set of parameters to the other countries.
It is our intention for future versions to actually ‘fit’ our model to a large set of US crisis
indicators. We will not only fit our model to standard crisis indicators, but also to a self-created
text-based crisis indicator. Our current approach is simpler and only serves as a first step. First, it is
our prior that crisis incidence should be somewhere in between 2-3 percent (the incidence of FTS
in Baele et al. (2019)) and 25 percent (the percentage of bear market weeks according to the Pagan
and Sossounov (2003) measure). At the same time, crisis periods should be somewhat persistent
(but not as persistent as bear markets). Second, the population incidence of the highest volatility
regime in a 3-state regime-switching model may serve as an anchor. That probability estimated
for the US over our sample is 17.87%. Finally, we compare values of various sentiment and real
indicators between crisis and non-crisis periods. We would expect sentiment and real indicators
of our measure to be worse relative to the more conservative bear market measure of Pagan and
Sossounov (2003).
We summarize the main findings of this calibration exercise here; detailed results are available
upon request in a separate document. To simplify the analysis, we impose Tr = T hr f . Not sur-
prisingly, we find crisis incidence and persistence to decrease with the threshold levels. Incidence
decreases from nearly 30% for a threshold level of 0.80 to less than 5% when the threshold is set at
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0.95. Crisis incidence is close the population incidence of the top (of 3) volatility regime of 17.87%
when we set the threshold level to 0.875. Figure 2 compares crisis incidence for this threshold level
generated from a model that takes only future returns into account (Panel A) and the full model that
incorporates both future returns and volatilities (Panel B). As is more generally the case, incidence
is lower for the return-only (15%) compared to the full (18%) measure. Spells are generally less
frequent but more persistent when volatility is also used in the crisis identification process. The
return-only measure generates some very short crisis periods that may be too brief to be properly
characterized as crises. For that reason, in what follows, we use the full measure using a threshold
level of 0.875.
During our identified crisis periods, we find the levels of realized volatility, the VIX, the TED
spread, as well as term structure noise measure of Hu et al. (2012) to be substantially higher com-
pared to during normal times and relative to the values during downward markets as identified by
the Pagan and Sossounov (2003) measure. Similarly, we find US Treasury Bonds and safe haven
currencies (Japanese Yen, Swiss Frank, US Dollar) to appreciate during crisis times. Real eco-
nomic indicators, such as the Chicago Fed National Activity Index as well industrial production,
on the other hand, decrease substantially.
2.1.2 Application to other markets
We subsequently identify crisis periods in other countries by setting the trigger and threshold pa-
rameters in our full model equal to 0.875. The first columns of Table 1 report local crisis incidence
and return impact for developed (Panel A) and developing markets (Panel B). Median crisis inci-
dence across developed countries equals 16.9%, with a tight interquartile range (IQR) of [16.0%;
18.9%]. During a crisis period, the weekly developed market returns are on average -0.71% with
an IQR of [-0.89%; -0.60%]. Crisis incidence is the lowest in Switzerland (13%) and highest in
France (22.5%). Panel B shows that both median crisis incidence (18.4%, with IQR of [16.8% -
19.8%]) and return impact (0.80%, with IQR of [-0.94% -0.55% ]) are slightly higher for develop-
ing markets.
9 77 
Based on the individual crisis measures, we create two global crisis indicators. Our first global
crisis indicator is ‘on’ if at least 66% of all countries (with equal weights) experience a crisis. Our
second ‘value-weighted’ indicator defines a global crisis as a week during which at least 75% of
market cap suffers a local crisis. De facto, this means that the US and several other (large) markets
must experience a crisis at the same time. Apart from global crisis indicators, we also construct
developed and developing country crisis indicators by aggregating within developed or developing
countries only.
Columns 3-6 of Panel A show that median global crisis incidence is lower for the equally
(4.86%) compared to the value-weighted (8.5%) measure, that is, the requirement that at least 2 out
3 countries must be in crisis is a more stringent requirement than the 75% market cap threshold.
Both measures are substantially below the median local crisis incidence of 16.9%, suggesting that
a large fraction of local crisis events are country-specific. Median return impact is substantially
higher during global (EW: -1.91%; VW: -1.16%) compared to during local (-0.71%) crises, espe-
cially for the more demanding equally-weighted measure. The corresponding columns in Panel B
show that both crisis incidence and return impact are similar albeit slightly higher for emerging
markets. The final columns of both panels report summary statistics for the developed and devel-
oping markets specific crisis indicators. Developed market crisis incidence (Panel A) is only mod-
erately higher (EW: 7.11%, VW: 10.94%) compared to global crisis incidence (EW: 4.86%, VW:
8.49%), indicating that a large proportion of developed-market-specific crisis is global in nature.
For emerging markets, as the standard threshold of 75% proved too stringent (less than 3% crisis
incidence), we set the market-cap threshold to 50%. The median developed market crisis incidence
then amounts to 5.16% for the equally-weighted and 11.2% for the value-weighted measure.
2.2 Predicting Firm-Level Factor Exposures
The first reason why stocks may be hit differently by crises is that their expected factor exposures
(or ‘betas’) are different, with high beta stocks expected to be more affected relative to low beta
stocks. As in Bekaert et al. (2014), we distinguish between a global and a domestic equity market
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factor, that is, stocks comove because they are jointly exposed to both global and local equity
market shocks1. As domestic markets are likely highly influenced by global market events, in
Section 2.2.1, we first orthogonalize the local to the global market returns. Subsequently, in Section
2.2.2, we develop a predictive model for realized global and local firm betas in normal times. This
section discusses the empirical strategy only; empirical results are relegated to Section 3.2.
2.2.1 Identification of pure local market shocks
One common way to orthogonalize local to global market shocks is to just take the residual from
a regression of local on global market shocks. This approach implicitly assumes a constant global
market beta for local market returns. Evidence in Baele and Inghelbrecht (2010), however, shows
that global market betas fluctuate both over the cycle and with measures of economic and financial
openness. To acknowledge this time variation in global market betas, we proceed in several steps.
First, we estimate for every July to June period the yearly realized beta by regressing the weekly
excess local returns over that period on the corresponding global returns. Second, we predict the
global beta for country j in year t +1 using the following model:
β
w
j,t+1 = α + γ1 ×β wj,t + γ2 ×β
w (5)
j,t + γ3 ×X j,t (1)
+γ4 ×CRt+1 + γ5 ×CRt + γ6 ×CR
(5)




















Similar in spirit to Corsi (2009)’s volatility prediction model, we make country j’s next year’s
global beta β wj,t+1 a function of the country’s realized 1-year (β
w
j,t) and 5-year (β
w (5)
j,t ) betas mea-
sured at time t. We additionally include a set of country indicators X j,t to capture the effect of
time-varying economic and financial openness and of the economic cycle on global betas. As we
want to predict market betas in normal times (that is, outside crisis periods), we also need to control
for the potential effect of crisis periods on market betas (previous research suggests betas increase
1Future versions may also consider other equity factors, such as the Fama-French size and value factors.
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during stress periods). We therefore also include the percentage of crisis weeks within the current
and past year, as well as over the last 5 years. Third, we use the estimates in this model to predict
next year’s market beta β̂ wj,t+1, assuming that no crisis is expected for the next year, that is, in our
prediction models, we set CRt+1 = 0. Finally, we calculate the pure country return shock r̃ j,τ for
week τ in year t +1 by subtracting β̂ wj,t+1 times the global market return r̃ j,τ for that week from the
local market return.
2.2.2 Predicting firm-level betas in normal times
To estimate firm level global and local market betas, we regress on a yearly basis (year t, from July
to June) firm i’s return during week τ on global factor rworld,τ and local factor r̂ j,τ :
ri,τ = αi,t +β wi,t×rworld,τ +β
l
i,t×r̂ j,τ + εi,τ (2)
As realized betas tend to be rather noisy and unstable, we use the robust one-pass estimator recently
introduced by Welch (2019). More specifically, instead of estimating equation (2) on the raw firm
return ri,τ , we estimate it on the return winsorized to [r j,τ −10%, r j,τ +10%], that is, 10% below
or above the local market return. Welch (2019) shows that betas estimated following this procedure
predict future realized betas better than prominent market-beta estimators, including the Vasicek
(1973) model which is much more difficult to implement.
Subsequently, we estimate the following panel model to predict firm global betas over time:
β̂
w









+ηw5 ×X j,t +η
w
6 ×Zi,t (4)
+ηw7 ×CRt+1 +ηw8 ×CRt +ηw9 ×CR
(5)
t + εi,τ .
Similar to the country beta model, we predict each firm’s next year’s beta using its current 1 year
and 5 year global beta (‘Corsi Model’). We also include the 1 and 5-year global betas of the country
in which the firm is located, a number of country characteristics X j,t to capture the potential effect
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of time-varying economic and financial openness and changing economic conditions on firm betas,
as well as the proportion of crisis weeks during the current and past 1 and 5 years. We additionally
make firm level betas a function of a set of lagged firm characteristics Zi,t . Following Cosemans
et al. (2016), we include firm size, book-to-market, and financial leverage as firm characteristics.
We additionally include measures of a stock’s liquidity (percentage of nonzero returns over last
year), idiosyncratic volatility (the standard deviation of the residual in equation (2), as well as the
firm’s Altman Z-score and Gross Profit. To facilitate the (economic) interpretation of the parameter
estimates, we (cross-sectionally) standardize all firm characteristics within developed countries
and developing countries, respectively. We build a similar prediction model for local betas; only
we remove country characteristics and replace global crises by local crises.
Finally, we use the estimates in this model to predict next year’s global and local beta β̂ wi,t+1 and
β̂ li,t+1, assuming that no crisis is expected for the next year, that is, in our prediction models, we set
CRt+1 = 0
2.3 Modelling Excess Comovement
The main goal of this paper is to identify the characteristics of firms that perform particularly badly
during crisis times, that is, worse than one would expect given their normal factor exposures. In
Section 2.3.1, we first outline our test for excess comovement. In Section 2.3.2, we develop the
hypotheses that link country and firm characteristics to excess comovement.
2.3.1 A Test for Excess Comovement
To study return comovement over and above the predicted exposures to global and local factors, we
first calculate abnormal stock returns:
abreti,τ ≡ ri,τ − β̂ wi,t×rworld,τ − β̂ li,t×r̂ j,τ . (5)
13 81 
Under the null hypothesis that our factor model is correctly specified, one would expect these abnor-
mal returns to be uncorrelated with firm or country characteristics, factor returns, crisis dummies,
and all their interactions. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following panel model:
abreti,τ = α + γ1Zi,t−1 + γ2X j,t−1 + γ3X j,t−1Zi,t−1
+(γ4 + γ5Zi,t−1 + γ6X j,t−1)× rworld,τ
+(γ7 + γ8Zi,t−1 + γ9X j,t−1)× r̂ j,τ
+(γ10 + γ11Zi,t−1 + γ12X j,t−1 + γ13Zi,t−1X j,t−1)×Crisisτ (6)
+(γ14 + γ15Zi,t−1 + γ16X j,t−1 + γ17Zi,t−1X j,t−1)× rworld,τ ×Crisisτ
+(γ18 + γ19Zi,t−1 + γ20X j,t−1 + γ21Zi,t−1X j,t−1)× r̂ j,τ ×Crisisτ
+ εi,τ
First of all, we relate abnormal returns to both firm (Z j,t) and country (X j,t) characteristics. We ex-
pect especially many elements of parameter vector γ1 to be significant, as they capture the tendency
of certain firm characteristics (e.g. size, book-to-market, ROE, leverage) to be associated with
higher returns. In principle, even if we do not have clear hypotheses for this channel right now, it
may be that the pricing of these firm characteristics interacts with country characteristics, which
would be captured by parameter γ3. Second, we may be systematically under- or overestimating
the global and local betas of firms (effect captured by γ4 and γ7), and this bias may depend on firm
(captured byγ5 and γ8) and country (captured by γ6 and γ9) characteristics. Finally, we test for three
sources of excess comovement during crisis times, each potentially dependent on (a combination
of) firm and country fundamentals:
1. Excess comovement unrelated to the factors, captured by γ10 to γ13.
2. Excess comovement with respect to the global factor, captured by γ14 to γ17.
3. Excess comovement with respect to the local factor, captured by γ18 to γ21.
To prevent a proliferation of parameters, we restrict ourselves to those combinations of firm and
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country characteristics for which clear hypotheses can be proposed. We discuss those in the next
section.
2.3.2 Hypothesis Development
Hypothesis I: Top quality firms are less crisis-prone compared to firms with lower quality
characteristics. Our first hypothesis states that firms with quality characteristics should be rel-
atively insulated from disruptive crises. Quality is a broad term that includes low leverage, high
profitability, stable earnings, top quality management, and high (stock) liquidity. To the extent that
there is a flight to quality and/or liquidity within the stock market, we would expect high quality
stocks to outperform stocks with lower quality characteristics. Baele et al. (2019) in fact document
for a large sample of international equities that flights-to-safety are as much flights to quality as
they are flights to liquidity. Both Kapadia et al. (2018) and Gormsen and Greenwood (2017) shows
that more profitable and liquid firms tend to outperform unprofitable and illiquid ones during mar-
ket downturns. Kapadia et al. (2018) furthermore document highly levered firms to perform worse
during bear markets. In what follows, we will use Financial Leverage, Altman’s Z-Score, Return
on Equity (ROE), and stability of earnings (proxies by the 5-year trailing standard deviation in
earnings) as quality proxies.
Hypothesis II: Countries with weaker domestic macroeconomic fundamentals are more vul-
nerable to contagion Bekaert et al. (2014) show that high current account deficits or low foreign
exchange reserves make countries more vulnerable to contagion. This is consistent with a wake-up
call hypothesis where a crisis leads investors to re-examine their positions and exit countries with
poor fundamentals. Following the measures from Bekaert et al. (2014), we hypothesize that mar-
kets with a high current account deficit, high government budget deficit, high unemployment, low
sovereign credit rating, and low foreign exchange reserves are more vulnerable to contagion.
The next hypotheses involve the interaction between country and firm characteristics.
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Hypothesis III: Large and liquid firms are more exposed to contagion, especially in financially
integrated markets. Foreign investors tend to have a preference for large and liquid firms (see
e.g., Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001)) located in financially developed
equity markets. When confronted with large withdrawals, fund managers often tend to first sell the
largest and most liquid stocks, and stick to their positions in smaller illiquid stocks that they would
otherwise have to sell at fire-sale prices (see Ben-David et al. (2012)). We therefore hypothesize
that, at least initially, large and liquid firms should be more crisis-prone relative to smaller and less
liquid ones, and the effect should be increasing with de facto market integration (as reflected by
e.g., a high level of foreign market participation).
Hypothesis IV: Highly levered firms are more exposed to contagion, especially in countries
highly dependent on foreign credit.
Foreign banking crises may spill over to the local credit market either through the negative effect
on the domestic banking system (via inter-banking market and surges in funding costs) or directly
by reducing the amount of credit that foreign banks lend to local firms. To the extent that crises
periods are associated with worsening domestic credit conditions, we expect more levered firms to
be more exposed to contagion. Also, given the tendency of foreign banks to lend to mainly large
firms (see Giannetti and Ongena (2009)), a credit contraction shock should have a stronger impact
on these firms. Furthermore, we expect the effect to be stronger in countries that have a higher
reliance on foreign funding, and measure foreign credit dependence by total domestic borrowing
from foreign banks relative to GDP.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Sample Construction
We collect data on individual stock returns and firm characteristics for 24 developed and 30 devel-
oping countries over the period July 1981 to December 2018. Our initial set of stocks contains all
firms, both active and inactive, covered by Worldscope. Following Griffin et al. (2010), we only
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include common stocks2 that trade on major stock exchanges3 and are the main issue of their firm.
This first set of filters reduces the number of stocks from 82,620 to 54,297. Excluding financial
firms reduces the sample further to 42,665 firms. Subsequently, we collect daily and weekly total
returns (both in USD and local currency) from Datastream for each of these 42,665 firms. Dropping
firms that have no return data reduces the sample further to 42151 stocks. We require a stock to
have at least 52 weekly return observations. We set weekly returns as missing if the return index
that week is equal or below 0.01. Within each country, we winsorize weekly returns at the 99.9
percentile. For our liquidity screen, we download daily returns (in local currency) and calculate
for each stock the percentage of zero daily returns over the previous year (June to June) (see e.g.,
Lesmond et al. (1999) and Bekaert et al. (2007)). We drop the entire year of weekly returns of
firms that had a proportion of zero daily returns more than 75% in the previous year. Our final
sample includes 39,432 (25,988 from Developed Markets; 13,444 from Emerging Markets). The
first columns of Table 2 report per country the year from which each country is included, as well
as the total and average number of stocks per country, both for Developed Markets (Panel A) and
Emerging Markets (Panel B). Most developed countries enter the sample from 1981. Data coverage
on emerging market stocks starts mostly in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Therefore, our sample on
emerging markets starts from 1989 July.
Subsequently, we download for each stock the accounting variables necessary to calculate the
firm characteristics listed in Appendix A4. To minimize data errors in Worldscope, we employ the
following procedure. We set the values of total debt, cash holding, total asset to be missing if
they are negative. Next, we wonsorize them and earnings per share volatility at the top 99.5%.
Other firm characteristics including gross profit, ROE, and BE/ME winsorized on both bottom
and top at 0.5% and 99.5%. Z-score from Altman et al. (2017) is calculated using winsorized firm
characteristics. Columns 4 and following of Table 2 report for each indicator the percentage of firm-
2This de facto removes all preferred stocks, warrants, REITs, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and de-
pository receipts.
3While for most countries there is a single ‘main’ stock exchange, we include stocks from two exchanges in China
(Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange) and Japan (Tokyo Stock Exchange and Osaka Securities
Exchange) and three in the US (Amex, NYSE, and Nasdaq).
4We calculate Altman Z-score by ourselves, according to the Z” model in Altman et al. (2017).
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week observations that have non-missing values for each firm characteristics. Across countries, we
find the Czech Republic, Cyprus, and Israel to be more affected by missing values.
Table 3 presents summary statistics of weekly returns (denominated in US dollars) and firm
characteristics (either as ratio or denominated in US dollars) for the final sample. The first four
columns show time-series means of the weekly returns on (1) Datastream’s Total Market Index
(matched to our sample period), the (2) value-weighted and (3) equally weighted returns, and fi-
nally also of (4) the median returns. The average value-weighted return over our sample is very
close to the average return on Datastream’s Total market indices, despite that our sample excludes
financial companies. The average equally-weighted returns are higher in nearly all countries, sug-
gesting a strong small firm effect is at work. Surprisingly, the average median return is negative
across most countries. The rest columns are time-series mean of median firm characteristics within
each country. There is considerable cross-country variation in all firm characteristics, and the mag-
nitudes and cross-sectional patterns are in large consistent with Hou et al. (2011).
We obtain data on country openness indicators and macroeconomic fundamentals from IMF,
Oxford Economics, and BIS. We consider three types of country-level exposure: stock market de
jure openness, de factor openness, and dependence on foreign credit. For de jure openness, we
use capital control measure on equity from Fernández et al. (2016) based on IMF’s Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). It is on a [0, 1] scale with
one meaning total openness. We refer to it as Schindler index as the methodology is created by
Schindler (2009). We use the size of the trade sector (exports plus imports) relative to GDP as
a measure of economic openness. Baele (2005); Bekaert et al. (2005a) find that trade integration
increases exposures of country stock returns to the global or regional equity market. To measure de
facto equity market openness, we use foreign assets and liabilities of portfolio equity scaled by GDP
following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Bekaert et al. (2016). As for dependence on foreign
credit, we use total borrowing from foreign banks as a percentage of GDP from BIS Consolidated
Banking Statistics, as well as cross-boarder borrowing by domestic banks and non-banks from BIS
Locational Banking Statistics. Table 4 reports the data coverage of country indicators.
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3.2 Country and Firm-Level Betas
3.2.1 Predicting country level beta
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, we orthogonalize local to global equity market returns by subtracting
from the local return the global return times its predicted yearly global market beta. Table 5 reports
estimation results for the predictive model for realized global market betas (equation (1) in Section
2.2.1). Panel A and B report results for developed and developing markets, respectively. As results
are robust to using developed/developing market-specific crisis indicators, we only report results for
the model using the global crisis indicator. We do distinguish between the equally-weighted global
crisis measure, which requires at least 66% of countries to be in a crisis, and the value-weighted
measure, which requires at least 75% of market cap to be in a crisis state. Both for developed
(Panel A) and developing (Panel B) markets, we find next year’s betas to be significantly related to
both the one and 5-year realized betas. For developed markets, the weight is predominantly on the
5-year beta (slope coefficient of about 0.50, compared to 0.13 for the 1-year betas); for developed
markets, past 1 and 5-year betas get relatively similar weights. The three integration measures
(Schindler’s index of de facto equity market integration, the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities
of portfolio equity scaled by GDP, and trade openness), as well as the cyclical indicator (detrended
OECD leading indicator) seem to add little in terms of explanatory power for developed market
betas. For developing markets, however, we do notice a slight increase in R2 when these 4 country
characteristics are added. In particular, global betas tend to be higher in countries with higher
levels of foreign equity ownership. Contrary to our expectations, developing countries’ global
market betas seem to negatively related to trade integration; the effect is, however, only marginally
significant at best. Current crisis intensity is positive and significant for developed market betas,
while the 1-year lagged crisis intensity is negative (but mostly not significant), indicating that betas
tend to increase during crisis periods. The lagged 5-year crisis intensity is, however, somewhat
surprisingly positive and significant. For developing markets, we find crisis intensities to be mostly
insignificant.
Given the little additional explanatory power of country fundamentals for global betas, in what
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follows, we will use the parsimonious Corsi model (augmented with contemporaneous and lagged
global crisis incidence) to predict the different countries’ global market betas, and subsequently, to
calculate the orthogonalized country shocks (assuming no crisis is expected for the next year, i.e.
CRt+1 = 0).
3.2.2 Predicting firm level beta
Table 6 reports detailed estimation results for the firm-level global (Panel A) and local (Panel B)
beta prediction model outlined in Section 2.2.2. The first two columns report results for developed
markets; the last two for developing markets. Firm betas in developed markets are significantly
related to both past 1-year and 5-year realized betas. The past global betas of the country firms
belong to have about equal weights as the firms’ own past betas. Firm betas tend to be lower rather
than higher during crisis intense periods. While country characteristics are not robustly related to
firms’ global market exposures, plenty of firm characteristics are. To facilitate the economic in-
terpretation of the parameter estimates, all country and firm characteristics are standardized within
developed and developing countries, respectively. We confirm previous evidence that global be-
tas are higher for larger and more liquid firms. Our finding that a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is
strongly correlated with the firm’s global beta confirms recent results by Liu et al. (2018); in fact,
in economic terms, in our data, it is the most important determinant. The effect of leverage on betas
is positive but never significant; a higher Z-score is associated with higher not lower betas (even
though in economic terms the effect is small). Finally, more profitable firms, as measured by the
Gross Profits to Total Assets ratio, tend to have slightly lower global market betas. Overall, for
global beta our model leads to a R2 of 31%, suggesting that a parsimonious Corsi model combined
with firm characteristics leads to a reasonable prediction outcome.
The final two columns of the same table report results for developing markets. The explanatory
power of the model for developing countries betas is much lower, with R2 equal to 18%. With
regard to local betas, we also observe a lower R2 of 13% in developed countries compared to the
case of global betas. For emerging markets, the R2 of local beta prediction is 19%, similar to the
20 88 
global beta counterpart. We will conduct a out-of-sample test of the prediction model in the future
version. Note that to mitigate the concern for model misspecification, we use γ4 to γ9 in Equation
6 to capture the bias related to country and firm characteristics. Firm betas are mostly related to
the 5-year lagged firm beta; no robust relationship is found to past one-year realized betas. Betas
also seem mostly unrelated to current or past crisis incidence. We do find betas to increase with
our two measures of de jure (Schindler index) and de facto (ratio of foreign assets and liabilities
of portfolio equity scaled by GDP) integration. Similar to our findings for developed markets, we
find that firm betas increase with firm size, liquidity (of its stock), and idiosyncratic volatility, but
tend to be unrelated to leverage and Z-score. What is different though is that we find a significantly
positive relationship between a firm’s beta and its book-to-market ratio, and that more profitable
developed market firms tend to have larger not smaller betas.
Panel B of Table 6 reports estimation results for the local beta model, using the local rather than
the global crisis indicator. As before, the 5-year realized beta turns out to be a more robust predictor
of local betas compared to 1-year realized betas. We find mostly similar relationships with respect
to firm characteristics.
Based on the estimated coefficients, we obtain predicted firm-level global and local beta β̂ wi,t+1
and β̂ li,t+1 assuming again that no crisis is expected, that is CRt+1 = 0.
3.3 Excess Comovement Results
The abnormal returns during crisis times calculated following Equation (5) are summarized in Ta-
ble 7. The first column reports for each country the average of weekly abnormal returns across
stocks during value-weighted global crisis. Across countries, the median is -0.10% with a wide
interquartile range [-0.24%, 0.02%]. Column 2 and 3 reports the average correlation between
abnormal returns and global/local factors for each country. The median is around -0.07, with a rel-
atively tight interquartile range [-0.1,-0.05] and [-0.13, -0.05]. The rest columns of Panel A as well
as Panel B report similar results for equal-weighted global crisis and developing countries. They
suggest that different markets have limited variation in the average correlation between abnormal
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returns and factors.
Next, we test for excess comovement during stress times using the framework outlined in Sec-
tion 2.3.1. In our discussion, we follow the order of hypotheses as in Section 2.3.2, with a separate
table for each hypothesis. Across all tables, Panels A and B report results for developed and de-
veloping markets, respectively. Similarly, the left and right hand sides of each table reports results
involving the value-weighted and equally-weighted crisis indicators, respectively. To further keep
the size of the tables manageable, we only report parameter estimates for terms involving crisis
dummies. Results on non-interacted terms will be relegated to an online appendix.
In Table 8, we test our hypothesis I which states that high quality firms should be less ex-
posed to contagion. Panel A shows that at least for developed countries there is little evidence
that quality characteristics determine contagion exposures. We do find that global factor exposures
tend to increase during crisis periods with leverage; the effect is, however, small in magnitude and
only significant at the 10% level when the equally-weighted crisis indicator is used. Unrelated
to firm characteristics, we find comovement with the local factors to decrease during stress times
(a “negative local contagion effect”). On the other hand, consistent with contagion, we do find
that, unrelated to the factors, firm value drops about 20 bps more than expected given factor ex-
posures during crisis times. Panel B shows that, for developing markets, there is a considerable
degree of heterogeneity in contagion exposures across firms. More profitable firms (as measured
by their ROE) tend to have lower local crisis exposures during crisis times compared to less prof-
itable firms. Global crisis exposures tend to be higher for firms with high volatility in earnings (per
share), a (crude) measure of management quality. Contrary to our expectations, however, global
factor exposures during crisis times tend to decrease (increase) with leverage (Altman’s Z-score).
Table 9 tests for the wake-up call hypothesis (hypothesis II) which states that firms in countries
with weaker fundamentals should be hit harder by contagion. As can be seen from Panel A, there is
little evidence that contagion exposures of developed markets depend on country fundamentals. In
contrast, Panel B presents strong evidence for the wake-up hypothesis among developing countries.
Across different measures of fundamentals, we find a one-standard-deviation increase in fundamen-
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tal strength to decrease global market exposure during crisis times by in between 0.037 and 0.10
(value weighted crisis measure) and 0.077 and 0.13 (equally-weighted crisis measure). Bekaert
et al. (2014) also find evidence in support of the wake-up call hypothesis. Our results show that the
relation between contagion impact and fundamentals seems to concentrate on emerging markets.
In Table 10 we test our hypothesis III that large and liquid stocks should be hit harder by
contagion, especially in countries whose equity markets are better integrated with global capital
markets. Panel A shows estimation results for developed countries. While there is little evidence
that global and local factor exposures during crisis times vary with firm size or liquidity, we do
find returns unrelated to the factors to be positively related to both firm size and liquidity. We do
not find robust evidence that this effect depends on foreign market participation. Our findings are
consistent with those in Baele et al. (2019) and indicate a flight to large and liquid stocks during
stress times, but inconsistent with our initial hypotheses that foreign investors would above all sell
large and liquid stocks when stress hits the market. Panel B reports results for emerging markets.
Consistent with our expectations, global and local crisis exposures are positively related to foreign
equity market participation (but only statistically significant for the latter), and especially so for the
more liquid firms. We find strong contagion unrelated to the factors, but this contagion intensity
seems largely unrelated to both country and firm characteristics.
Table 11 tests our hypothesis IV that large and highly leverage firms should be more affected
by contagion, especially in countries relying more heavily on foreign credit. Panel A shows that
contagion unrelated to factors tends to be more intense for firms located in developed countries that
rely more on foreign credit. Large firms, however, tend to be less exposed to this type of contagion,
and even less so if they are located in countries that rely more on foreign credit. This suggests that
large stocks are actually less affected by contagion in countries that borrow a lot from foreign banks.
We do not find any robust relationship between excess factor exposures, firm characteristics, and
foreign bank dependence. Turning to developing countries, Panel B reports that unconditionally,
large firms are significantly less vulnerable to global and local contagion. Excess global factor
exposures also decrease with firm leverage. However, the negative effect of firm size and leverage
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on excess global factor exposures is (partly) neutralized when they are interacted with foreign bank
dependence. This is consistent with the idea that foreign banks mainly lend to large firms which are
particularly affected when foreign lenders cut back on loans during a crisis. In unreported results,
we also show that low Z-score firms are also significantly more affected by contagion if the country
depends on cross-border credit. The findings are consistent with the argument that when foreign
banks reduce lending, they first drop loans to risky firms with high leverage and a low Z-score.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the characteristics that protect or expose firms to market stressed peri-
ods. We develop a new methodology of crisis identification and build a predictive model for firm
global and local equity market exposures. We focus on abnormal price movements for each firm
by subtracting predicted factor exposures (in ‘normal times’) times the factor returns from weekly
stock returns. We observe a substantial variation in contagion effects across firm and country char-
acteristics in developing countries, but much less variation in developed ones. Second, stocks in
developing countries with quality characteristics such as high ROE and low earnings volatility are
related to significantly less global contagion or local contagion, consistent with a flight-to-quality
hypothesis. Third, we find evidence of contagion caused by a wake-up call, as developing coun-
tries that have weaker domestic fundamentals are hit harder by global contagion. Moreover, higher
liquidity leads to significantly higher exposure to both global and local contagion, especially in
emerging markets with higher equity market openness. Also, larger and more higly levered stocks
in countries highly dependent on foreign banks tend to be more vulnerable to global contagion.
The results suggest that investor fire-sales and global credit contraction play an important role in
the occurrence of contagion.
This version of the paper mainly serves to outline our overall empirical strategy and to present
a first set of results. Progress is needed on all aspects of the paper. First efforts will be directed
to finetuning further the crisis identification method. Currently, we have developed a data-light
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method to identify crises periods. To set some key parameters, which we do now in a rather adhoc
way, it is our intention to fit our model to various crises indicators for the US, including some self-
created text-based measure. We will then use these fine-tuned parameters to also estimate crises in
other markets. Second, further hypotheses setting is necessary, both in the modeling of firm level
factor exposures and in the excess contagion tests. This step will require a deeper reading of both
the theoretical and empirical literature, and most likely, the collection of additional data.
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Table 1: Crisis Indicator
This table reports summary statistics for the crisis indicator developed in Section 2.1. Panel A reports for
each developed country the average incidence and return impact of local, global, and developed-markets-only
crises. Panel B reports corresponding statistics for developing markets.
Panel A: Developed Markets
Local Crisis Global Crisis Developed Markets Crisis
75% VW 66% EW 75% VW 66% EW
Incidence Impact Incidence Impact Incidence Impact Incidence Impact Incidence Impact
Australia 16.16 -0.68 8.49 -1.04 4.86 -2.08 10.94 -0.81 7.11 -1.41
Austria 19.07 -0.36 8.49 -1.27 4.86 -2.01 10.94 -0.87 7.11 -1.31
Belgium 16.36 -0.61 8.49 -1.21 4.86 -1.69 10.94 -0.86 7.11 -1.19
Canada 14.88 -0.69 8.49 -1 4.86 -1.58 10.94 -0.87 7.11 -1.14
Denmark 19.27 -0.48 8.49 -1.09 4.86 -1.6 10.94 -0.78 7.11 -1.17
Finland 15.21 -1.05 9.54 -0.98 5.24 -1.94 12.28 -1.11 8.04 -1.18
France 22.49 -0.43 8.49 -1.26 4.86 -1.94 10.94 -1.06 7.11 -1.45
Germany 18.81 -0.77 8.49 -1.37 4.86 -1.9 10.94 -1.09 7.11 -1.35
Hong Kong 17.02 -1.35 8.49 -1.24 4.86 -2.33 10.94 -1.02 7.11 -1.59
Ireland 16.82 -0.82 8.49 -1.24 4.86 -2.23 10.94 -0.84 7.11 -1.59
Israel 15.35 -1 10.92 -0.91 6.05 -1.3 14.17 -0.71 9.3 -0.9
Italy 17.38 -0.7 8.49 -1.31 4.86 -1.94 10.94 -1.1 7.11 -1.43
Japan 18.35 -0.88 8.49 -0.72 4.86 -1.15 10.94 -0.79 7.11 -0.69
Luxembourg 16.42 -0.56 10.52 -1.11 5.83 -0.9 13.65 -0.89 8.96 -0.8
Netherlands 18.30 -0.6 8.49 -1.33 4.86 -1.96 10.94 -1.09 7.11 -1.52
New Zealand 19.12 -0.66 9.47 -0.97 5.2 -1.46 12.19 -0.74 7.98 -0.95
Norway 16.46 -0.72 8.49 -1.16 4.86 -2.21 10.94 -0.9 7.11 -1.43
Portugal 19.78 -0.77 10.12 -1.32 5.56 -1.74 13.03 -1.1 8.53 -1.32
Singapore 15.39 -1.02 8.49 -1.47 4.86 -1.96 10.94 -1.1 7.11 -1.26
Spain 19.10 -0.76 10 -1.15 5.54 -1.91 12.89 -0.89 8.19 -1.34
Sweden 15.50 -0.89 8.61 -1.37 4.77 -2.15 11.09 -1.1 7.05 -1.46
Switzerland 13.29 -0.91 8.49 -0.91 4.86 -1.42 10.94 -0.75 7.11 -1.06
UK 16.72 -0.57 8.49 -1.1 4.86 -1.74 10.94 -0.92 7.11 -1.28
US 18.10 -0.6 8.49 -1.01 4.86 -1.41 10.94 -0.86 7.11 -0.98
Median 16.92 -0.71 8.49 -1.16 4.86 -1.91 10.94 -0.89 7.11 -1.30
Min 13.29 -1.35 8.49 -1.47 4.77 -2.33 10.94 -1.11 7.05 -1.59
Max 22.49 -0.36 10.92 -0.72 6.05 -0.90 14.17 -0.71 9.30 -0.69
Quartile 1 16.00 -0.88 8.49 -1.28 4.86 -1.97 10.94 -1.09 7.11 -1.43
Quartile 3 18.88 -0.60 8.83 -1.01 4.95 -1.55 11.37 -0.83 7.33 -1.12
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Table 1 continued...
Panel B: Developing Markets
Local Crisis Global Crisis Developed Markets Crisis
75% VW 66% EW 50% VW 66% EW
Incidence Impact Incidence Impact Incidence Impact Incidence Impact Incidence Impact
Argentina 13.66 -1.98 11.17 -1.02 6.19 -1.49 12.08 -1.03 5.51 -1.27
Brazil 20.60 -1.37 11.59 -1.59 6.42 -1.58 12.22 -1.17 5.72 -2.01
Chile 16.84 -0.33 9.95 -0.7 5.46 -0.89 11.18 -0.53 4.81 -1.22
China 18.25 -0.38 11.16 -0.33 6.18 -1.09 12.07 -0.7 5.51 -1.86
Colombia 19.81 -0.56 10.59 -0.71 5.87 -0.85 11.44 -1.11 5.22 -1.07
Cyprus 20.78 -0.85 10.91 -1.95 6.04 -2.03 11.79 -1.33 5.38 -1.41
Czech 19.07 -0.6 11.29 -0.85 6.25 -1.25 12.2 -0.7 5.57 -1.14
Egypt 17.76 -1.01 12.76 -0.76 7.07 -1.13 13.45 -1.06 6.29 -1.36
Greece 17.59 -1.3 10.12 -1.55 5.56 -2.15 10.91 -0.82 4.89 -1.1
Hungary 17.91 -0.53 10.31 -1.64 5.71 -2.45 11.22 -1.31 5.09 -1.96
India 19.25 -0.51 10.12 -1.09 5.56 -1.51 10.91 -1.11 4.89 -1.77
Indonesia 19.81 -1.29 10.21 -1.8 5.6 -1.75 11.01 -1.33 4.94 -2.4
Lithuania 18.95 -0.91 13.59 -1.09 7.39 -1.83 12.11 -1.41 6.38 -2.03
Malaysia 15.07 -0.69 9.94 -0.98 5.46 -1.2 11.24 -0.93 4.81 -2.04
Mexico 18.97 -0.89 9.94 -1.12 5.46 -1.63 11.24 -1.08 4.81 -1.66
Pakistan 15.52 -0.81 10.73 -0.75 5.95 -1.25 11.6 -1.49 5.29 -1.55
Peru 21.03 -0.63 11.36 -0.65 6.29 -1.16 12.05 -0.78 5.6 -1.4
Philippines 14.10 -1.1 9.94 -1.46 5.46 -1.57 11.24 -0.61 4.81 -2.19
Poland 18.46 -0.94 11.43 -1.32 6.33 -2.2 12.05 -1.21 5.64 -1.54
Romania 20.09 -1.2 12.87 -2.05 7.13 -3.3 13.57 -2.23 6.35 -2.93
Russia 14.21 -0.86 13.47 -1.39 7.33 -2.87 12.83 -1.38 6.42 -3.36
Slovakia 19.13 -0.32 11.36 -0.42 10.16 -0.58 10.76 -0.57 6.73 -0.26
South Africa 13.71 -0.88 9.94 -1.03 5.46 -1.32 11.24 -0.65 4.81 -1.97
South Korea 14.17 -0.48 9.94 -1.34 5.46 -1.7 11.24 -0.89 4.81 -1.93
Sri Lanka 17.48 -0.06 9.94 -0.58 5.46 -0.6 11.24 -0.22 4.81 -1.03
Taiwan 15.14 -0.85 9.94 -1.59 5.46 -1.51 11.24 -0.68 4.81 -1.76
Thailand 14.04 -0.73 9.94 -1.46 5.46 -1.41 11.24 -0.62 4.81 -2.45
Turkey 21.90 -0.95 9.94 -1.3 5.46 -1.9 11.24 -0.45 4.81 -2.2
Median 18.08 -0.85 10.45 -1.11 5.79 -1.51 11.24 -0.98 5.16 -1.77
Min 13.66 -1.98 9.94 -2.05 5.46 -3.30 10.76 -2.23 4.81 -3.36
Max 21.9 -0.06 13.59 -0.33 10.16 -0.58 13.57 -0.22 6.73 -0.26
Quartile 1 15.12 -0.97 9.94 -1.48 5.46 -1.85 11.24 -1.24 4.81 -2.03
Quartile 3 19.39 -0.55 11.36 -0.76 6.30 -1.19 12.07 -0.67 5.61 -1.34
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Table 2: Stocks and Firm Characteristics Availability by Country
This table reports the availability of stock and firm characteristics for each country over the period July 1981 to December 2018. The sample includes
only non-financial common stocks listed on its country’s major exchange(s) and that are the main issue of their company. To address the potential
biases from illiquid stocks, we drop the stocks that have a proportion of more than 75% zero daily returns during the previous July-June period.
Stocks are also required to have at least 126 trading days during a July-June period. The total and average numbers of stocks are reported for each
country, as well as the year of the first entry. The remaining columns show the time-series average of percentage of firms that have observations for
the Book-to-Market (BM) ratio, Total Leverage, the Z-score, Earnings Volatility, Return on Equity (ROE), and Gross Profits. Leverage and gross
profits are all scaled by total asset.
Panel A: Developed Markets
Time-Series Average of % of Firms that have Data on:
Starting Total # Average % Book-to-Market Total Altman Earnings Return on Gross
Country Year of Firms of Firms Ratio Leverage Z-score Volatility Equity Profit
Australia 1981 2448 628 80 81 76 85 75 77
Austria 1981 116 39 87 91 78 88 86 85
Belgium 1981 158 61 89 91 58 87 86 83
Canada 1981 1723 617 71 74 66 74 68 71
Denmark 1981 196 71 91 93 74 90 89 88
Finland 1987 188 82 94 97 93 92 94 92
France 1981 1299 408 91 95 84 88 89 87
Germany 1981 888 334 86 89 81 82 84 80
Hong Kong 1981 1358 428 85 88 81 85 82 87
Ireland 1981 71 23 88 92 82 87 87 89
Israel 1986 367 173 59 60 55 60 53 59
Italy 1981 421 141 93 95 87 88 90 91
Japan 1981 3481 1929 90 92 83 94 88 91
Luxembourg 1992 15 7 83 87 62 85 84 70
Netherlands 1981 223 101 83 85 37 83 81 81
New Zealand 1986 176 56 82 85 78 88 79 79
Norway 1981 368 85 91 94 64 87 88 86
Portugal 1988 86 39 89 91 89 87 84 89
Singapore 1981 539 191 86 89 74 89 83 87
Spain 1986 205 83 95 96 92 90 92 94
Sweden 1982 772 195 89 92 90 87 88 87
Switzerland 1981 249 111 90 93 83 89 89 90
UK 1981 3199 833 86 88 79 86 79 84
US 1981 7442 2667 90 92 74 87 85 89
Total # Firms 25,988
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Table 2 continued...
Panel B: Developing Markets
Time-Series Average of % of Firms that have Data on:
Starting Total # Average # Book-to-Market Total Altman Earnings Return on Gross
Country Year of Firms of Firms Ratio Leverage Z-score Volatility Equity Profit
Argentina 1988 87 36 87 89 83 85 84 87
Bangladesh 1992 75 31 51 54 51 58 46 54
Brazil 1994 163 62 94 97 84 87 89 96
Chile 1990 132 53 83 85 82 84 80 84
China 1991 3189 1166 83 93 89 83 89 93
Colombia 1992 31 12 87 91 86 87 87 91
Cyprus 1994 71 20 34 42 38 51 34 42
Czech 1994 79 22 58 59 58 72 47 58
Egypt 1996 133 75 77 77 65 78 71 78
Greece 1988 335 161 88 89 82 90 83 81
Hungary 1991 53 22 87 87 82 84 81 88
Iceland 2001 18 7 79 80 79 79 76 80
India 1983 1294 566 56 57 26 64 47 58
Indonesia 1990 446 160 90 92 80 87 84 92
Lithuania 1998 38 17 66 69 66 72 60 69
Malaysia 1981 877 396 84 85 75 86 79 84
Mexico 1988 121 44 92 95 87 92 89 94
Pakistan 1991 243 124 76 77 57 80 68 76
Peru 1992 64 20 87 89 84 89 84 87
Philippines 1988 166 65 89 89 82 85 84 89
Poland 1992 562 205 85 87 87 81 81 87
Romania 1997 95 46 67 66 64 72 58 67
Russia 1996 244 82 89 96 92 84 88 96
Slovakia 2000 5 2 100 100 94 92 97 100
South Africa 1981 553 141 82 85 77 86 78 73
South Korea 1981 2262 894 75 77 71 75 71 75
Sri Lanka 1987 175 81 69 71 62 75 63 69
Taiwan 1988 945 506 86 87 80 84 83 87
Thailand 1987 647 270 84 86 46 84 82 87
Turkey 1988 341 166 82 83 80 82 76 83
Total # Firms 13,444
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Table 3: Firm-Level Data Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of firm-level data. For each country, time series mean of cross-sectional value-weighted and equally-weighted
excess return denominated in US dollar are reported. The column TOTMK reports the time-series mean of Datastream stock market index for each
country. Weekly risk-free rate is based on one-month US Treasury bill yield from CRSP. We also report the time series mean of cross-sectional
median of stock return and firm characteristics including dividend yield, market capitalizatoin, book-to-market, illiquidity as the proportion of zero
returns, total leverage, tangibility, Z-score, earnings volatility, return on equity, gross profit. Leverage and gross profit are all scaled by total asset.
Size is the market capitalizaiton in millions at the end of June. Except for Size, BM, and Earnings VOL, other variables are all in percentage.
Panel A: Developed Markets
Time-Series Average of: Time-Series average of median:
Return on Datastream’s Value-Weighted Eq Weighted Median Market Book-to-Market % Zero Total Altman Earnings Return on Gross
Total Market Index Return Return Return Value (mn $) ratio returns Leverage Z-score Volatility Equity Profit
Australia 0.13 0.12 0.25 -0.20 49.89 0.68 42.65 11.26 6.48 0.69 1.85 5.17
Austria 0.16 0.09 0.18 0.06 358.41 0.62 25.46 20.65 5.73 0.60 9.26 15.05
Belgium 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.07 161.37 0.82 24.46 22.29 5.49 0.70 10.14 8.91
Canada 0.11 0.07 0.38 -0.16 95.42 0.63 25.43 18.80 6.02 0.87 5.62 10.60
Denmark 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.03 130.45 0.73 30.82 22.11 6.48 0.70 9.96 19.73
Finland 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.01 191.50 0.73 25.36 28.07 6.17 0.90 10.22 25.59
France 0.19 0.19 0.24 -0.05 129.34 0.67 18.59 18.93 5.82 0.63 10.40 9.93
Germany 0.14 0.13 0.19 -0.10 138.45 0.55 18.03 13.08 6.13 0.71 8.18 25.35
Hong Kong 0.17 0.16 0.23 -0.29 94.05 0.78 30.20 14.80 7.01 0.72 12.43 11.02
Ireland 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.19 263.80 0.69 44.83 23.29 6.11 0.65 10.38 18.42
Israel 0.11 0.13 0.37 -0.06 36.95 0.68 28.93 25.22 6.01 0.89 8.28 20.01
Italy 0.10 0.14 0.10 -0.16 171.12 0.77 14.25 23.66 5.53 0.76 6.80 19.34
Japan 0.07 0.10 0.18 -0.13 254.76 0.76 18.15 18.95 6.13 0.62 5.91 21.68
Luxembourg 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.31 396.52 0.87 31.89 9.82 6.09 0.68 14.81 22.57
Netherlands 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.00 311.30 0.77 15.42 19.43 5.67 0.61 13.38 25.41
New Zealand 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.09 129.50 0.63 37.67 25.39 6.52 0.47 11.56 13.81
Norway 0.21 0.19 0.20 -0.03 116.09 0.69 28.08 29.63 5.44 1.05 8.63 13.59
Portugal 0.06 0.08 0.12 -0.08 179.16 0.83 25.98 36.07 4.58 0.76 7.88 4.94
Singapore 0.09 0.09 0.18 -0.07 97.71 0.81 37.52 13.59 6.98 0.65 9.31 10.92
Spain 0.13 0.14 0.11 -0.08 495.30 0.70 14.75 26.03 5.14 0.57 9.56 14.19
Sweden 0.22 0.21 0.30 -0.06 77.44 0.57 27.57 17.25 6.12 0.73 9.68 12.51
Switzerland 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.04 296.89 0.70 26.46 19.31 6.99 0.49 9.23 22.20
UK 0.14 0.15 0.13 -0.17 119.44 0.56 41.93 13.15 6.56 0.60 11.42 26.07
US 0.15 0.16 0.30 -0.01 354.37 0.51 15.43 19.63 6.82 0.62 10.17 32.88
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Table 3 continued...
Panel B: Developing Markets
Time-Series Average of: Time-Series average of median:
Return on Datastream’s Value-Weighted Eq Weighted Median Market Book-to-Market % Zero Total Altman Earnings Return on Gross
Total Market Index Return Return Return Value (mn $) ratio returns Leverage Z-score Volatility Equity Profit
Argentina 0.11 0.15 0.19 -0.14 132.78 0.91 33.00 22.09 5.70 1.13 8.58 17.40
Bangladesh 0.26 0.43 0.04 52.95 0.31 25.32 23.47 7.28 0.30 18.46 15.74
Brazil 0.22 0.34 0.37 -0.05 705.54 0.89 22.15 26.46 5.77 0.78 8.72 16.57
Chile 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.07 503.36 0.67 34.71 26.12 6.53 0.52 11.93 14.37
China 0.23 0.20 0.31 -0.16 421.96 0.39 13.32 22.25 6.34 0.57 8.53 11.05
Colombia 0.12 0.22 0.19 0.24 1122.94 1.04 37.93 12.70 7.02 0.42 6.74 10.95
Cyprus 0.06 0.09 0.24 0.34 56.96 2.11 57.10 26.68 6.12 0.82 5.57 14.63
Czech 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.29 705.21 1.13 22.25 16.88 6.20 0.57 10.66 12.74
Egypt 0.14 0.08 0.17 -0.25 69.83 0.72 24.59 16.04 6.44 0.43 16.19 14.28
Greece 0.05 0.11 0.24 -0.22 44.63 0.97 29.41 26.01 6.06 0.73 7.50 17.17
Hungary 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.28 57.41 0.88 26.66 14.42 6.80 0.70 8.77 18.62
Iceland 0.22 0.23 0.54 382.84 0.57 29.67 37.22 5.52 0.94 9.74 26.88
India 0.21 0.06 0.59 -0.36 5.49 0.98 28.61 31.16 5.12 0.76 9.82 12.02
Indonesia 0.11 0.14 0.30 -0.30 92.40 0.76 45.08 31.32 6.10 0.89 10.11 15.46
Lithuania 0.15 0.37 0.34 0.14 66.44 1.06 54.72 21.99 6.21 0.96 7.20 17.62
Malaysia 0.16 0.14 0.23 -0.15 62.61 0.86 32.73 16.65 6.79 0.66 8.50 10.13
Mexico 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.04 889.23 0.81 20.02 22.88 7.08 0.59 10.84 20.34
Pakistan 0.14 0.19 0.33 -0.18 32.37 0.77 29.97 30.76 5.15 0.56 16.67 14.58
Peru 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.15 308.38 0.77 48.70 19.81 6.52 0.68 13.48 19.80
Philippines 0.17 0.18 0.35 -0.14 89.16 0.85 41.70 21.43 7.19 0.66 13.59 12.98
Poland 0.09 0.05 0.13 -0.30 31.81 0.76 23.07 11.79 6.81 0.96 9.19 22.52
Romania 0.12 0.14 0.43 -0.22 14.52 1.56 41.58 8.33 8.16 0.86 4.28 16.74
Russia 0.33 0.40 0.49 -0.03 643.12 1.55 18.70 18.83 6.89 0.86 10.48 21.59
Slovakia 0.17 0.65 0.71 1.81 537.19 1.59 57.82 12.02 6.78 2.43 7.52 13.92
South Africa 0.17 0.14 0.26 -0.01 253.35 0.60 35.46 11.16 7.25 0.48 18.50 21.53
South Korea 0.16 0.17 0.29 -0.36 52.73 1.09 14.97 32.09 5.59 0.93 5.97 13.95
Sri Lanka 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.04 11.07 0.91 51.44 22.92 6.46 0.60 11.66 15.65
Taiwan 0.12 0.12 0.17 -0.24 212.15 0.67 15.09 21.21 6.86 0.59 8.90 12.99
Thailand 0.22 0.20 0.26 -0.17 51.00 0.76 32.86 28.30 5.59 0.67 11.66 20.06
Turkey 0.29 0.35 0.45 -0.37 62.69 0.60 29.62 20.76 6.58 0.93 13.80 23.46
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Table 4: Country variable coverage
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of a country vis-a-vis the world. De jure integration measure is from Fernández, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler
and Uribe (2016). Foreign asset and liability is from Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2017). Stock market Capitalization is from
Financial Development and Structure Dataset. Foreign bank ownership is from CvH Bank Ownership Database. Cross-border borrowing is from
BIS-Locational banking statistics, where claims are grouped from a residence perspective and adjusted for breaks in series and exchange rate
movement. Foreign borrowing is from BIS-Consolidated banking statistics, where claims are grouped from a nationality perspective. Short-term
foreign borrowing are those with maturity lower than 1 year. Local-in-local borrowing are extended by foreign bank subsidiaries denominated in
local currency. All absolute values are scaled by GDP.
Panel A: Developed Markets
Trade De jure openness: De facto openness: Cross-border borrowing Foreign borrowing
Equity market Equity Asset+Liability by banks by non-banks (based on nationality of banks)
Australia 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Austria 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Belgium 1997-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Canada 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Denmark 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Finland 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
France 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Germany 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Hong Kong 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Ireland 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Israel 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Italy 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Japan 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Luxembourg 1997-2018 1990-2015 1983-2018 1983-2018 1999-2018
Netherlands 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
New Zealand 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Norway 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Portugal 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Singapore 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Spain 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Sweden 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
Switzerland 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
UK 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
US 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1999-2018
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Table 4 continued...
Panel B: Developing Markets
Trade/GDP De jure openness: De facto openness: Cross-border borrowing Foreign borrowing
Equity market Equity Asset+Liability by banks by non-banks (based on nationality of banks)
Argentina 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Bangladesh 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Brazil 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Chile 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
China 1980-2018 1980-2016 1981-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Colombia 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Cyprus 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1984-2018
Czech 1995-2018 1980-2016 1993-2015 1995-2018 1995-2018 1995-2018
Egypt 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Greece 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Hungary 1980-2018 1980-2016 1982-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Iceland 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1985-2018
India 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Indonesia 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Lithuania 1995-2018 1992-2015 1995-2018 1995-2018 2000-2018
Malaysia 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Mexico 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Pakistan 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Peru 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Philippines 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Poland 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Romania 1980-2018 1980-2016 1990-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Russia 1992-2018 1980-2016 1993-2015 1993-2018 1993-2018 1993-2018
Slovakia 1993-2018 1993-2015 1993-2018 1993-2018 1993-2018
South Africa 1998-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
South Korea 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Sri Lanka 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Taiwan 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Thailand 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
Turkey 1980-2018 1980-2016 1980-2015 1980-2018 1980-2018 1983-2018
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Table 5: Country beta prediction
This table presents estimation results for the country-level global beta prediction model developed in Section
2.2.1. Panel A and B report results for developed and developing countries, respectively, using both the
equally and value-weighted global crisis indicator.
Panel A: Developed countries
VW 75% EW 66%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beta: Last year 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(3.01) (2.89) (3.10) (2.84)
Beta: 5 year mean 0.51∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(9.56) (8.66) (9.35) (8.32)
Crisis intensity: Current 0.14∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(2.39) (2.20) (2.68) (2.89)
Crisis intensity: Last year -0.12∗ -0.084 -0.054 -0.0033
(-1.80) (-1.21) (-0.66) (-0.04)
Crisis intensity: 5 year mean 0.46∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.29∗ 0.28∗
(4.05) (3.31) (1.92) (1.83)
Schindler 0.047 0.062
(0.72) (0.94)






Adj. R-Square 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33
N 815 815 815 815
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Table 5 continued...
Panel B: Developing countries
VW 75% EW 66%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beta: Last year 0.33∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(7.37) (6.04) (6.97) (4.87)
Beta: 5 year mean 0.28∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(5.31) (5.58) (5.52) (6.27)
Crisis intensity: Current -0.058 -0.12 0.18 0.28∗∗
(-0.60) (-1.16) (1.54) (2.11)
Crisis intensity: Last year -0.18∗ -0.075 -0.061 0.13
(-1.74) (-0.66) (-0.48) (0.95)
Crisis intensity: 5 year mean 0.24 -0.0064 -0.23 -0.50∗∗
(1.32) (-0.03) (-0.99) (-2.09)
Schindler 0.026 0.013
(0.55) (0.29)






Adj. R-Square 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.38
N 748 678 748 678
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Table 6: Firm global beta prediction
This table reports estimation results for the firm-level global (Panel A) and local (Panel B) beta prediction model
outlined in Section 2.2.2.
Panel A: Global beta prediction
Developed countries Developing countries
VW 75% EW 66% VW 75% EW 66%
Beta last year 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.0071 0.0067
(9.07) (8.67) (0.16) (0.15)
Beta 5 year average 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.34*** 0.34***
(12.64) (11.84) (8.65) (9.13)
Country beta last year 0.13** 0.14** 0.14* 0.12*
(2.11) (2.22) (1.93) (1.69)
Country beta 5 year average 0.21*** 0.19*** -0.10* -0.095
(3.43) (2.97) (-1.70) (-1.52)
Crisis intensity -0.25*** -0.17*** -0.12 -0.15
(-5.86) (-3.72) (-1.29) (-1.53)
Crisis intensity last year -0.15*** -0.098* 0.078 0.17*
(-4.08) (-1.75) (0.97) (1.95)
Crisis intensity 5 year average 0.62*** 0.32** 0.14 -0.075
(5.07) (2.44) (0.66) (-0.38)
Schindler 0.023 0.011 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.34) (0.15) (4.03) (3.68)
Portfolio equity 0.00015 0.00022 0.049*** 0.051***
(0.01) (0.01) (2.68) (2.81)
Trade -0.021* -0.017 0.023 0.020
(-1.76) (-1.34) (1.39) (1.15)
Size 0.11*** 0.096*** 0.029* 0.028*
(14.95) (13.85) (1.84) (1.78)
Liquidity 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.046*** 0.047***
(8.73) (8.63) (4.86) (5.00)
IVOL 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.080*** 0.079***
(24.70) (21.06) (5.31) (5.40)
B/M -0.0028 -0.0015 0.019* 0.018*
(-0.53) (-0.28) (1.92) (1.81)
Leverage 0.0040 0.00097 0.0071 0.0067
(1.01) (0.22) (1.46) (1.31)
Z-score 0.0086** 0.0064* -0.0059 -0.0057
(2.51) (1.82) (-1.52) (-1.39)
Gross profit -0.022*** -0.023*** 0.016** 0.016*
(-6.42) (-6.20) (1.98) (1.88)
Adj. R-Square 0.31 0.30 0.18 0.17
N 246,021 246,021 97,673 97,673
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Table 6 continued...
Panel B: Local Beta Prediction
Developed countries Developing countries
Beta last year 0.087*** 0.095
(6.97) (1.43)
Beta 5 year average 0.28*** 0.48***
(12.48) (7.19)
Local crisis intensity -0.10* -0.019
(-1.67) (-0.19)
Local crisis intensity last year -0.11* -0.0025
(-1.74) (-0.04)














Gross profit -0.013** 0.019**
(-2.09) (2.41)
Adj. R-Square 0.13 0.19
N 246,021 97,624
41 109 
Table 7: Abnormal Returns
This table reports summary statistics for abnormal returns and their correlation with global and local factors.
Panel A reports for each developed country the cross-sectional mean of time series average of abnormal re-
turns, as well as the average correlation between abnormal returns and factors. Panel B reports corresponding
statistics for developing markets.
Panel A: Developed Markets
Global Crisis 75% VW Global Crisis 66% EW
Abnormal Correlation with Abnormal Correlation with
return world factor local factor return world factor local factor
Australia -0.22 -0.01 -0.01 -0.32 -0.01 -0.01
Austria -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 0.19 -0.09 -0.10
Belgium -0.18 -0.06 -0.15 -0.12 -0.07 -0.16
Canada 0.23 -0.01 -0.03 0.21 0.02 -0.00
Denmark -0.24 -0.05 -0.06 -0.32 -0.04 -0.04
Finland -0.10 -0.18 -0.29 0.11 -0.12 -0.17
France -0.15 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.10 -0.10
Germany 0.05 -0.09 -0.13 0.04 -0.07 -0.13
Hong Kong -0.18 -0.05 -0.05 -0.23 -0.06 -0.06
Ireland -0.18 -0.12 -0.17 -0.15 -0.14 -0.21
Israel -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05
Italy 0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 -0.09
Japan 0.16 -0.06 -0.05 0.22 -0.03 0.01
Netherlands 0.01 -0.11 -0.12 0.09 -0.10 -0.11
New Zealand -0.28 0.14 0.15 -0.51 0.15 0.16
Norway -0.35 -0.08 -0.11 -0.46 -0.08 -0.12
Portugal 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 0.08 -0.07 -0.08
Singapore -0.25 0.01 0.02 -0.21 0.01 0.02
Spain -0.07 -0.13 -0.17 -0.09 -0.11 -0.16
Sweden -0.06 -0.09 -0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.11
Switzerland -0.39 -0.06 -0.08 -0.28 -0.01 -0.01
UK -0.36 -0.07 -0.08 -0.43 -0.07 -0.08
US 0.22 -0.06 -0.07 0.13 -0.05 -0.05
Median -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08
Min -0.39 -0.18 -0.29 -0.51 -0.14 -0.20
Max 0.23 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.16
Quartile 1 -0.24 -0.10 -0.13 -0.28 -0.10 -0.12
Quartile 3 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.09 -0.03 -0.01
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Table 7 continued...
Panel B: Developing Markets
Global Crisis 75% VW Global Crisis 66% EW
Abnormal Correlation with Abnormal Correlation with
return world factor local factor return world factor local factor
Argentina -0.30 0.09 -0.05 -0.39 0.16 -0.02
Brazil -0.38 0.08 0.08 -0.21 0.06 0.06
Chile -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.07 -0.13 -0.05
China 0.30 -0.26 -0.29 0.06 -0.31 -0.33
Colombia 0.19 0.06 0.15 -0.28 0.12 0.14
Cyprus 0.60 -0.15 -0.29 0.77 -0.14 -0.29
Czech 0.02 -0.20 -0.19 0.11 -0.16 -0.19
Egypt 0.61 -0.16 -0.06 0.73 -0.17 -0.07
Greece -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.42 -0.06 -0.08
Hungary -0.25 -0.10 -0.05 -0.47 -0.10 -0.03
India -0.56 0.05 -0.00 -0.47 0.08 0.02
Indonesia -0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.13 0.02 -0.04
Malaysia 0.14 -0.08 -0.01 0.19 -0.10 -0.05
Mexico -0.49 0.03 0.03 -0.55 0.07 0.07
Pakistan -0.13 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 -0.03 -0.10
Peru -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.06
Philippines -0.28 0.05 0.06 -0.45 0.05 0.07
Poland -0.51 0.07 0.00 -0.60 0.03 -0.03
Romania 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.08 -0.06 -0.07
Russia -0.50 -0.04 -0.06 -0.53 -0.11 -0.13
South Africa -0.25 -0.05 -0.06 -0.23 -0.04 -0.06
South Korea 0.20 -0.01 0.08 0.22 -0.03 0.11
Sri Lanka 0.48 -0.04 0.14 0.48 -0.05 0.14
Thailand -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 -0.06
Turkey -0.11 0.17 0.15 -0.40 0.18 0.15
Median -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.11 -0.04 -0.04
Min -0.56 -0.26 -0.29 -0.60 -0.30 -0.33
Max 0.61 0.16 0.08 0.77 0.18 0.15
Quartile 1 -0.28 -0.08 -0.06 -0.40 -0.10 -0.07
Quartile 3 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.06
43 111 
Table 8: Quality stocks and contagion
This table reports the estimates for the contagion coefficient for Hypothesis I. *,**, and *** indicates statistical signif-
icance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by week.
Panel A: Developed countries
Global crisis VW 75% Global crisis EW 66%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ROE Z-score Leverage EPS Vol Full ROE Z-score Leverage EPS Vol Full
Global × Crisis -0.057 -0.059 -0.057 -0.057 -0.056 -0.059 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 -0.029
(-1.55) (-1.61) (-1.55) (-1.57) (-1.55) (-1.64) (-0.60) (-0.59) (-0.61) (-0.60) (-0.64) (-0.64)
Local × Crisis -0.079∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.020 -0.018 -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019
(-2.67) (-2.56) (-2.69) (-2.63) (-2.72) (-2.57) (-0.55) (-0.51) (-0.57) (-0.52) (-0.60) (-0.53)
Crisis -0.18∗ -0.18∗ -0.18∗ -0.18∗ -0.19∗ -0.19∗ -0.19 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.20 -0.20
(-1.73) (-1.70) (-1.72) (-1.74) (-1.90) (-1.90) (-1.28) (-1.25) (-1.28) (-1.31) (-1.37) (-1.38)
Global × Crisis × ROE 0.016 0.020 0.0099 0.013
(1.20) (1.51) (0.69) (0.87)
Local × Crisis × ROE 0.0039 0.0036 0.0043 0.0049
(0.29) (0.24) (0.28) (0.29)
Crisis × ROE 0.058 0.065 0.053 0.067
(1.36) (1.51) (1.04) (1.28)
Global × Crisis × Z-score -0.0029 -0.0091 0.0035 -0.0011
(-0.40) (-0.98) (0.48) (-0.11)
Local × Crisis × Z-score 0.013 0.00077 0.0049 0.0011
(1.07) (0.06) (0.35) (0.07)
Crisis × Z-score 0.00061 0.0027 0.019 0.013
(0.03) (0.10) (0.71) (0.38)
Global × Crisis × Leverage 0.0072 0.0094 0.014 0.019∗
(0.66) (0.88) (1.29) (1.87)
Local × Crisis × Leverage -0.016 -0.015 -0.0084 -0.0082
(-1.03) (-1.02) (-0.44) (-0.49)
Crisis × Leverage 0.028 0.033 -0.015 -0.0089
(0.76) (0.94) (-0.38) (-0.26)
Global × Crisis × EPS vol 0.0016 0.0023 0.0031 0.0030
(0.39) (0.55) (0.66) (0.64)
Local × Crisis × EPS vol -0.0066 -0.0039 -0.0016 0.0014
(-1.10) (-0.70) (-0.19) (0.17)
Crisis × EPS vol -0.012 -0.014 -0.021 -0.020
(-1.02) (-1.10) (-1.39) (-1.28)
Adj. R-Square 0.00018 0.00022 0.00018 0.00018 0.00019 0.00025 0.000046 0.000081 0.000053 0.000055 0.000057 0.00012
N 12525780 11921124 12525780 12525780 11601454 11045012 12525780 11921124 12525780 12525780 11601454 11045012
44 112 
Table 8 continued...
Panel B: Developing Markets
Global crisis VW 75% Global crisis EW 66%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ROE Z-score Leverage EPS Vol Full ROE Z-score Leverage EPS Vol Full
Global × Crisis -0.10∗ -0.11∗ -0.10∗ -0.10∗ -0.099 -0.10 -0.16∗∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.16∗∗
(-1.67) (-1.71) (-1.66) (-1.67) (-1.58) (-1.61) (-2.27) (-2.31) (-2.26) (-2.27) (-2.19) (-2.22)
Local × Crisis 0.045 0.043 0.046 0.044 0.041 0.041 0.054 0.053 0.055 0.053 0.050 0.050
(0.84) (0.79) (0.85) (0.83) (0.76) (0.73) (0.85) (0.82) (0.86) (0.84) (0.79) (0.77)
Crisis -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.24 -0.29 -0.29 -0.39 -0.39 -0.38 -0.38 -0.44∗ -0.44∗
(-1.19) (-1.16) (-1.18) (-1.19) (-1.46) (-1.42) (-1.53) (-1.51) (-1.52) (-1.52) (-1.73) (-1.70)
Global × Crisis × ROE -0.0011 -0.012 0.0029 -0.010
(-0.08) (-0.77) (0.17) (-0.56)
Local × Crisis × ROE -0.036∗∗ -0.040∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.054∗∗
(-2.10) (-1.91) (-2.40) (-2.25)
Crisis × ROE 0.015 0.0054 0.0025 -0.014
(0.31) (0.09) (0.04) (-0.19)
Global × Crisis × Z-score 0.028∗∗ 0.019 0.038∗∗ 0.020
(2.00) (1.07) (2.23) (1.01)
Local × Crisis × Z-score 0.011 0.016 0.015 0.021
(0.67) (0.70) (0.93) (0.91)
Crisis × Z-score 0.068 0.077 0.096 0.075
(1.08) (0.93) (1.14) (0.80)
Global × Crisis × Leverage -0.031∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(-2.56) (-2.77) (-2.53) (-2.72)
Local × Crisis × Leverage -0.0081 -0.011 -0.015 -0.017
(-0.47) (-0.61) (-0.86) (-0.96)
Crisis × Leverage -0.043 -0.0074 -0.070 -0.032
(-0.84) (-0.19) (-1.06) (-0.62)
Global × Crisis × EPS vol 0.014∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(2.20) (2.92) (1.86) (2.60)
Local × Crisis × EPS vol 0.0064 0.0056 0.0084 0.0085
(0.81) (0.61) (0.89) (0.84)
Crisis × EPS vol -0.0081 -0.0058 0.00070 0.011
(-0.36) (-0.27) (0.02) (0.38)
Adj. R-Square 0.00036 0.00040 0.00038 0.00039 0.00040 0.00050 0.00047 0.00054 0.00050 0.00050 0.00052 0.00064




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: Equity market openness and contagion
This table reports the estimates for the contagion coefficient for Hypothesis III. *,**, and *** indicates statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by week.
Panel A: Developed countries
Global crisis VW 75% Global crisis EW 66%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global × Crisis -0.048 -0.046 -0.047 0.010 0.0091 0.0090
(-1.16) (-1.13) (-1.20) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)
Local × Crisis -0.073∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.077∗∗ 0.016 0.013 0.010
(-2.10) (-2.20) (-2.26) (0.31) (0.25) (0.20)
Crisis -0.16 -0.17∗ -0.18∗ -0.14 -0.18 -0.19
(-1.54) (-1.73) (-1.88) (-1.01) (-1.32) (-1.44)
Global × Crisis × Portfolio equity -0.019 -0.018 -0.017 -0.066 -0.064 -0.064
(-0.55) (-0.52) (-0.47) (-1.55) (-1.45) (-1.42)
Local × Crisis × Portfolio equity 0.013 0.015 0.019 -0.022 -0.018 -0.016
(0.32) (0.37) (0.43) (-0.38) (-0.31) (-0.26)
Crisis × Portfolio equity -0.13 -0.11 -0.098 -0.16 -0.13 -0.11
(-1.26) (-0.99) (-0.83) (-1.17) (-0.87) (-0.72)
Global × Crisis × Size -0.024 -0.010 -0.022 -0.015
(-1.04) (-0.36) (-0.69) (-0.41)
Local × Crisis × Size 0.013 0.0049 0.0041 -0.0066
(0.80) (0.21) (0.18) (-0.18)
Crisis × Size 0.19∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(3.40) (2.03) (3.61) (2.52)
Global × Crisis × Portfolio equity × Size 0.011 0.0062 0.016 0.022
(0.81) (0.28) (0.95) (0.87)
Local × Crisis × Portfolio equity × Size -0.016 -0.023 0.00083 -0.0059
(-1.02) (-0.93) (0.04) (-0.16)
Crisis × Portfolio equity × Size 0.053 -0.032 -0.0089 -0.084
(1.10) (-0.38) (-0.17) (-0.89)
Global × Crisis × Liquidity -0.031∗ -0.023 -0.021 -0.011
(-1.81) (-1.07) (-0.90) (-0.43)
Local × Crisis × Liquidity 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.020
(0.62) (0.43) (0.41) (0.42)
Crisis × Liquidity 0.17∗∗∗ 0.086 0.28∗∗∗ 0.14∗
(3.38) (1.29) (3.40) (1.68)
Global × Crisis × Portfolio equity × Liquidity 0.014 0.0092 0.0055 -0.0087
(0.93) (0.40) (0.33) (-0.35)
Local × Crisis × Portfolio equity × Liquidity -0.00040 0.012 0.0068 0.0094
(-0.02) (0.48) (0.30) (0.23)
Crisis × Portfolio equity × Liquidity 0.10∗∗ 0.12 0.042 0.090
(2.04) (1.40) (0.64) (0.84)
Adj. R-Square 0.00038 0.00032 0.00042 0.00027 0.00021 0.00031
N 12525780 12525780 12525780 12525780 12525780 1252578048 116 
Table 10 continued...
Panel B: Developing Markets
Global crisis VW 75% Global crisis EW 66%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global × Crisis -0.10∗ -0.12∗ -0.11∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.20∗∗ -0.18∗∗
(-1.72) (-1.91) (-1.86) (-2.33) (-2.52) (-2.44)
Local × Crisis -0.015 -0.045 -0.035 -0.061 -0.10 -0.083
(-0.33) (-0.88) (-0.74) (-0.98) (-1.45) (-1.29)
Crisis -0.28 -0.30 -0.29 -0.51∗ -0.57∗ -0.53∗
(-1.48) (-1.43) (-1.55) (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1.91)
Global × Crisis × Portfolio equity 0.014 0.015 0.012 0.044 0.049 0.042
(0.35) (0.34) (0.28) (0.89) (0.90) (0.84)
Local × Crisis × Portfolio equity 0.12∗ 0.092 0.089∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(1.86) (1.61) (1.66) (2.23) (2.02) (2.06)
Crisis × Portfolio equity 0.038 0.042 0.037 0.20 0.23 0.20
(0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.90) (0.93) (0.88)
Global × Crisis × Size -0.084∗ -0.065 -0.11∗∗ -0.079∗
(-1.88) (-1.52) (-2.37) (-1.78)
Local × Crisis × Size -0.057 -0.055 -0.096∗ -0.093∗∗
(-1.24) (-1.40) (-1.74) (-2.09)
Crisis × Size -0.054 -0.027 -0.22 -0.17
(-0.37) (-0.20) (-1.11) (-0.98)
Global × Crisis × Portfolio equity × Size 0.040 0.018 0.065∗∗ 0.038
(1.44) (0.62) (2.12) (1.20)
Local × Crisis × Portfolio equity × Size -0.030 -0.051∗∗ 0.0092 -0.012
(-1.31) (-2.52) (0.27) (-0.44)
Crisis × Portfolio equity × Size 0.11 0.082 0.25∗∗ 0.21∗
(1.45) (0.92) (2.06) (1.70)
Global × Crisis × Liquidity -0.056∗ -0.027 -0.10∗∗∗ -0.063∗
(-1.72) (-0.98) (-2.62) (-1.95)
Local × Crisis × Liquidity 0.012 0.032 0.0056 0.044
(0.35) (1.23) (0.13) (1.42)
Crisis × Liquidity -0.048 -0.031 -0.18 -0.088
(-0.42) (-0.34) (-1.10) (-0.73)
Global × Crisis × Portfolio equity × Liquidity 0.063∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.059∗
(2.24) (1.75) (2.40) (1.68)
Local × Crisis × Portfolio equity × Liquidity 0.069∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.091∗ 0.086∗∗
(1.70) (2.16) (1.81) (1.97)
Crisis × Portfolio equity × Liquidity 0.096 0.063 0.19 0.091
(1.03) (0.62) (1.35) (0.66)
Adj. R-Square 0.00093 0.00094 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0014
N 4888557 4888557 4888557 4888557 4888557 488855749 117 
Table 11: Foreign credit reliance and contagion
This table reports the estimates for the contagion coefficient for Hypothesis IV. *,**, and *** indicates statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by week.
Panel A: Developed countries
Global crisis VW 75% Global crisis EW 66%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global × Crisis -0.070∗ -0.072∗ -0.070∗ -0.045 -0.045 -0.045
(-1.74) (-1.91) (-1.75) (-0.86) (-0.95) (-0.87)
Local × Crisis -0.077∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.077∗∗ -0.0072 -0.0080 -0.0076
(-2.24) (-2.26) (-2.27) (-0.15) (-0.17) (-0.16)
Crisis -0.22∗ -0.20∗ -0.23∗ -0.18 -0.15 -0.20
(-1.91) (-1.75) (-1.95) (-1.16) (-1.02) (-1.25)
Global × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.043 -0.042 -0.043
(-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.50) (-1.12) (-1.09) (-1.10)
Local × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance 0.0099 0.0083 0.0091 -0.047 -0.048 -0.048
(0.27) (0.23) (0.26) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.92)
Crisis × Foreign credit reliance -0.12 -0.13∗ -0.12∗ -0.18∗ -0.19∗ -0.19∗
(-1.63) (-1.72) (-1.66) (-1.76) (-1.85) (-1.82)
Global × Crisis × Size -0.013 -0.014 -0.0085 -0.0091
(-0.60) (-0.65) (-0.29) (-0.32)
Local × Crisis × Size 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.016
(0.96) (1.06) (0.71) (0.71)
Crisis × Size 0.22∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(4.09) (4.32) (3.22) (3.54)
Global × Crisis × Leverage 0.0045 0.0080 0.0077 0.0094
(0.43) (0.79) (0.75) (0.94)
Local × Crisis × Leverage -0.011 -0.0099 0.0039 0.0031
(-0.77) (-0.73) (0.20) (0.16)
Crisis × Leverage 0.0042 -0.038 -0.062∗ -0.12∗∗∗
(0.13) (-1.22) (-1.81) (-3.55)
Global × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Size -0.018 -0.018 -0.010 -0.010
(-1.50) (-1.52) (-0.68) (-0.66)
Local × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Size -0.035∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.012
(-2.80) (-2.76) (-0.84) (-0.78)
Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Size 0.056∗ 0.060∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.086∗∗
(1.70) (1.86) (1.98) (2.38)
Global × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Leverage -0.0088 -0.0061 -0.013 -0.012
(-0.85) (-0.63) (-1.25) (-1.26)
Local × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Leverage -0.00030 0.00053 -0.0079 -0.0081
(-0.03) (0.05) (-0.67) (-0.70)
Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Leverage 0.0032 -0.018 0.020 -0.011
(0.12) (-0.72) (0.69) (-0.42)
Adj. R-Square 0.00037 0.00019 0.00038 0.00027 0.00010 0.00028
N 9591086 9591086 9591086 9591086 9591086 959108650 118 
Table 11 continued...
Panel B: Developing countries
Global crisis VW 75% Global crisis EW 66%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global × Crisis -0.12∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.11∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗
(-1.80) (-2.14) (-1.73) (-2.36) (-2.72) (-2.32)
Local × Crisis -0.00072 -0.013 0.00074 0.010 -0.013 0.013
(-0.01) (-0.22) (0.02) (0.16) (-0.19) (0.21)
Crisis -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.41 -0.47 -0.40
(-1.09) (-0.97) (-1.09) (-1.41) (-1.47) (-1.43)
Global × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance 0.044 0.079 0.039 0.078 0.12∗∗ 0.073
(1.02) (1.48) (0.92) (1.58) (2.01) (1.53)
Local × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance 0.039 0.055 0.038 0.059 0.087 0.059
(0.58) (0.72) (0.59) (0.80) (1.05) (0.81)
Crisis × Foreign credit reliance 0.078 0.077 0.074 0.24 0.29 0.23
(0.42) (0.35) (0.41) (0.99) (1.02) (1.00)
Global × Crisis × Size -0.080∗∗ -0.080∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.087∗∗
(-2.20) (-2.22) (-2.32) (-2.33)
Local × Crisis × Size -0.054∗ -0.053∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.067∗∗
(-1.70) (-1.68) (-2.19) (-2.18)
Crisis × Size 0.014 0.014 -0.061 -0.060
(0.13) (0.13) (-0.49) (-0.48)
Global × Crisis × Leverage -0.033∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.030∗∗
(-2.53) (-2.58) (-2.30) (-2.30)
Local × Crisis × Leverage 0.0011 0.0014 -0.0011 -0.00093
(0.08) (0.10) (-0.08) (-0.07)
Crisis × Leverage -0.025 -0.023 -0.020 -0.014
(-0.55) (-0.50) (-0.42) (-0.30)
Global × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Size 0.074∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(2.36) (2.36) (2.72) (2.72)
Local × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Size 0.00085 -0.00016 0.018 0.017
(0.03) (-0.00) (0.58) (0.55)
Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Size 0.036 0.034 0.13 0.12
(0.36) (0.34) (1.14) (1.13)
Global × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Leverage 0.024∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.022∗
(2.00) (2.17) (1.75) (1.88)
Local × Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Leverage 0.012 0.011 0.016 0.014
(0.93) (0.84) (1.22) (1.11)
Crisis × Foreign credit reliance × Leverage 0.0058 0.00071 0.0031 -0.0015
(0.14) (0.02) (0.07) (-0.04)
Adj. R-Square 0.0021 0.0016 0.0021 0.0024 0.0019 0.0024






Size Firm market capitalization (MV) at the end of June.
Book to Market The inverse of the ratio of Price to Book (WC09304) which is computed as the year-end market value of
equity divided by book value of equity.
Leverage Ratio The ratio of Total Debt (WC03255) to Total Assets (WC02999).
ROE Return on equity (WorldScope item 08301).
Gross Profit The Gross Income (WC01100), which is the difference between sales or revenues and cost of goods sold,
depreciation, depletion and amortization, scaled by Total Assets (WC02999).
Liquidity The fraction of trading days with nonzero return over the past year.
Earnings Volatility The standard deviation of Earnings Per Share (WC05201) in the last five years divided by the average of
EPS in the past five years.






total liability +3.25, as in Altman et al
(2016) Z”-score.
Country characteristics
Size of the trade sector Exports plus imports relative to GDP. Bilateral trade data are gathered from the IMF’s Direction of Trade
Statistics.
Capital account openness Schindler index. The index was initially introduced in Schindler(2009). It is based on the binary dummy
variables that are coded at the level of resident/nonresident restrictions reported in the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
De facto
Equity Market Integration
The total stock portfolio equity asset plus liabilities relative to GDP. The data is from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007). All stock variables are measured as of Dec 31 and hence converted in USD at the
end-of-period exchange rate.
Total borrowing form foreign
banks (+)



















































Flight to Safety at High Frequency
1 Introduction
The last 30 years have witnessed many flights-to-safety (FTS, henceforth). FTS events are charac-
terized by contemporaneous large drops in risky asset prices but large increases in safe asset values,
as well as surging equity volatility and risk premiums (see e.g. Baele et al. (2019)). Existing work
has predominantly identified FTS events using benchmark equity indices as a proxy for risky assets
and top-rated Treasury bonds as a proxy for safe assets.1 A recent example of an extreme FTS event
occurred in the two days following the unexpected vote for Brexit, when the Euro Stoxx50 dropped
with more than 11% while German 10-year bonds went up with nearly 2%. These events have
substantial implications for risk management and portfolio allocation. It is thus important to un-
derstand what triggers FTS, how the market behaves around FTS episodes, and how FTS transmit
across both countries and asset markets.
What differentiates this paper from previous work is the frequency of the data: Rather than
using daily returns, we collect tick-by-tick data on equity index and government bond futures for
10 countries. This high-frequency dataset allows us to identify FTS events at a 5-minute frequency,
which in turn enables us to answer a number of questions that studies using daily data cannot. First,
we can identify the dynamics of an FTS within a single day. Second, we can dramatically reduce
the list of all candidate FTS trigger events that occur during an FTS day to the ones occurring
during or directly before a 5-minute FTS interval. Third, once the sources of FTS are identified,
we can analyze in detail how FTS events transmit across markets. Again, this is not possible using
daily data, as by the end of the day, all markets have absorbed the new information, and one cannot
identify receiver and sender countries.
1Beber, Brandt, and Cen (2014) identify “risk-off” episodes based on correlations between foreign exchange re-
turns; Bauer and Lucey (2010) additionally include gold as a potential safe asset.
1 123 
Section 2 describes this high-frequency dataset in more detail. We obtain tick-by-tick data
for equity index futures and 10-year government bond futures for seven developed markets (the
US, the UK, Germany, Japan, Canada, Australia, and France) and three emerging markets (Brazil,
Mexico, and South Africa) over the period 1996-2017. Starting dates are in the nineties for nearly
all countries; even for Mexico, which has the shortest sample, we still have ten years of data. By
including emerging markets in our sample, we can investigate to what extent FTS in developed
markets are disruptive for emerging markets (and vice versa).
Section 3 introduces our FTS identification method, which is inspired by the co-exceedance
measures of Bae et al. (2003) and Baele et al. (2019). In essence, we identify a 5-minute interval
as an FTS when equity and bond futures returns scaled by their corresponding 250-day historical
instantaneous (jump-robust) volatility (excluding the five most recent days) are respectively below
and above a threshold level κ . In other words, during an FTS, equities should drop with at least
κ times the trailing equity volatility, while Treasuries should at least increase with κ times the
trailing bond volatility. A threshold level of κ = 4 works well in our application, but our results
are robust to setting κ = 3 or κ = 5 as well. For all developed markets, we use the local Treasury
bond as the safe benchmark. Because the local bond is typically not considered a safe asset for an
emerging market country, we use the benchmark safe asset within the region (the US for Brazil and
Mexico, Germany for South Africa) instead. When we set κ equal to four, 3.43% of US trading
days experience at least one FTS. This value is close to the daily FTS incidence found in Baele et al.
(2019) using a more involved approach. However, US FTS incidence is towards the upper bound
across countries; trading days with FTS events are below 1% for Japan and Australia. Within a
5-minute FTS interval, equities drop in between 0.6% to 0.8%, while bonds increase with between
0.18% to 0.25%.
Section 4 characterizes our FTS events in more detail. We find that while most FTS days
experience only one FTS event, about 10% of days experience two and 3% even three. We show that
before and after FTS events, 5-minute return volatility is close to its unconditional average, much
lower than the volatility during FTS intervals. Also, futures trading volumes increase drastically
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during an FTS event, but then immediately revert towards pre-FTS levels. The findings on volatility
and trading volume suggest that FTS occur fast and tend to be short-lived.
Section 5 provides a first analysis of the triggers of FTS. At this time, we only examine US
macroeconomic announcements as potential triggers. We use an extensive list of pre-scheduled
macroeconomic news covering major news announcements widely considered in the existing liter-
ature. By counting the number of FTS that happen in the first five-minute interval following macro
announcements, we find that the announcements of Employment Situation are an important trigger
for FTS events. We also find that a significant portion of FTS across countries occur immediately
after macro announcements. Thus, US macro announcements serve as an important trigger for FTS
events not only for the US, but also for other countries.
Section 6 studies the transmission of FTS across countries. We report for each country the
number of local FTS that occur during the same interval as US, German, or Japanese FTS, as well
as the local bond and equity returns during these FTS events. We find that a large number of local
FTS events overlap with US FTS events, with the percentage overlap ranging between 30% and
85%. Equity markets tend to experience abrupt declines and bond market substantial surges during
the same five-minute interval, with the average magnitude close to or above the FTS threshold.
Similar results are found for German FTS events. To investigate the transmission more formally,
we estimate a Firthlogit model to quantify to what extent the occurrence of a high frequency FTS
in a particular country increases the possibility of flight-to-safety in another country in the same
5-minute interval. The results show that FTS events transmit within regions, with the US being the
sender for countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Canada, while Germany being the sender for countries
in Europe and Africa. Moreover, during overlapping trading hours, there is strong evidence of
global transmission from the US and Germany to other countries.
Finally, Section 7 studies if our results are robust to FTS events identified with 1-minute returns.
We show that 1-minute FTS events are qualitatively similar to the 5-minute ones. Specifically, a
substantial number of 1-minute FTS events occur immediately after US macro announcements, and
FTS events from other countries tend to occur in the same one-minute intervals of US and German
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FTS. However, we find that index futures are traded less frequently in developing countries than
their developed country counterparts. Therefore, 1-minute frequency is less suitable for our study
of FTS trigger and transmission.
This paper contributes to several related strands of literature. The literature on FTS has been ad-
vancing in both empirical and theoretical front. Early empirical work such as Connolly et al. (2005)
and Baele et al. (2010) show that VIX and stock-bond illiquidity are associated with episodes of
negative stock-bond return correlations. Our paper is closely related to Baele et al. (2019), which
identify FTS using daily data from 23 countries since 1980 and conduct a systematic characteriza-
tion of FTS. Our paper identifies FTS at a high frequency of five-minute and shows strong evidence
of FTS transmission across countries. Also, the high-frequency identification enables us to study
the importance of macroeconomic news announcements as a trigger of FTS.
Our results provide guidance to the theoretical literature on FTS. In Vayanos (2004)’s model,
an increase in volatility leads to fears of redemption and higher risk aversion, which in turn give
rise to flight-to-safety. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) show that as volatility increases, margin
requirements rise, causing not only a liquidity dry-up, but also a flight-to-quality, which they define
as a sharp drop in liquidity provision for the high margin, more volatile assets. In the consumption-
based asset pricing literature (e.g. Barsky (1989); Bekaert et al. (2009)) a flight-to-safety is typi-
cally defined as the joint occurrence of higher economic uncertainty (viewed as exogenous) with
lower equity prices (through a cash flow or risk premium effect) and low real rates (through a pre-
cautionary savings effect). These papers stress the theoretical importance of volatility as a trigger
of FTS. By examining realized volatility of equity futures, however, we find little evidence that
FTS are related to an intraday increase in market uncertainty.
We contribute to the literature on the spillover effect in asset return and volatility. Earlier
studies mostly focus on equity markets and use low-frequency data. Engle et al. (1994), King
and Wadhwani (1990), Bae et al. (2003), Bekaert et al. (2005), Baele (2005), and Diebold and
Yilmaz (2009) investigate return and volatility spillover effects cross international stock markets.
Gande and Parsley (2005) study spillovers across government bond markets. A recent study by
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Bongaerts et al. (2018) use high-frequency data on individual stocks and examine spillovers of
jumps in prices, trading, and liquidity across equity markets. At a 5-minute frequency, they also
find a strong spillover effect in prices between Europe and American markets. We contribute to
the literature by analyzing the transmission of FTS events, where the movements in stock and bond
prices have to be contemporaneous and in opposite direction.
Our study also contributes to the large literature that investigates the effect of macroeconomic
announcements on asset prices. McQueen and Roley (1993) and Fleming and Remolona (1999)
show that releases of major macroeconomic announcements lead to sharp and nearly instantaneous
price changes in either the US Treasury bond market or equity market. Law et al. (2018) show that
stock market responses to macro announcements depend on expectations about monetary policy.
There are a few papers that conduct a joint analysis on stock and bond market reaction to macro an-
nouncements. Andersen et al. (2007) study responses to US macroeconomic news using 5-minute
returns on equity and bond market. They show a time-varying stock-bond realized correlation on
days with Non-farm Payroll announcement. Lahaye et al. (2011) link macro announcements to co-
jumps in US equity index futures and Treasury 30 years futures. Our contribution to literature is to
be the first to link macro announcements to the phenomenon of FTS, where stock and bond market
not only move substantially, but with stock market moving downward and bond market moving
upward. Also, our scope of analysis with 10 countries in the sample enables us to investigate the
global FTS effect of US macro announcements.
2 Data
We obtain high-frequency data for equity index futures and 10-year government bond futures for
10 countries from Thomson Reuters Tick History. It includes transaction prices, trading volumes,
bid and ask quotes and sizes for nearest-to-maturity (nearby) and second nearest-to-maturity (next)
futures. Each observation is time-stamped to the nearest millisecond, which is the time that the
message was transmitted by Reuters across its IDN real-time network. Our data cover seven devel-
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oped markets (US, UK, Germany, Japan, Canada, Australia, and France) and six emerging markets
(Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa). The sample period is from 8th January 1996 to 7th August
2017. Details of the futures contracts are relegated to Appendix Table A.1. We use equity index
and government bond futures as price movements in these assets reflect market-wide shocks, so our
FTS measure captures aggregate-level flights-to-safety.
We use the following steps to clean our data. First, we drop all observations outside trading
hours, on the last trading days of each futures contract, or on exchange holidays. Second, we
download daily high and daily low price for each contract from Datastream. High-frequency price
observations that are higher than the daily high or lower than the daily low price are deleted. It
turns out that the amount of deleted data is very small, less than 0.1% for most futures. The largest
proportion is for Mexican IPC nearby futures contract, which is 3.88%. It confirms the statement
by Liu et al. (2015) that the data provided by Thomson Reuter’s Tick History, especially the data
on futures, is very clean compared with the more widely used NYSE TAQ data. We construct
liquidity-maximum continuous futures series using nearby and next futures contracts. We roll over
from the nearby to the next contract on the day when there are more trades in the next contract than
the nearby contract. Although many contracts have long trading hours, we trim the intraday sample
to focus on the period when the cash stock market is open. Exceptions include the US and Canada
where the intraday sample start from 8:00 a.m. ET, as many US macro announcements are released
at 8:30 a.m. ET. We refer to Appendix Table A.2 for details.
We calculate the five-minute interval return as
rit, j = p
i
t, j− pit, j−1,
where pit, j is the log price at the end of five minute interval j for future i at day t. If the last
millisecond observed in a five-minute interval corresponds to several price observations, then the
last observation is used to calculate returns. We explicitly exclude overnight returns. The intraday
return over each day’s first five-minute interval is calculated as the log difference between the last
and the first observed price within the first interval. Our choice of the 5-minute frequency balances
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the need to avoid market microstructure noise and the need to obtain high-frequency observations.
Previous literature that also uses a five-minute frequency includes Andersen et al. (2007), Tauchen
and Zhou (2011), Liu et al. (2015), and Bongaerts et al. (2018). We delete a trading day if a futures
contract has fewer than 36 observations on that day, which means less than three hours of trading.
The Mexican equity index futures sample only starts in 2007 as it has very few return observations
until then. For other futures contracts, this threshold of a minimum of 36 observations per day has
little impact on sample size.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of 5-minute returns in percentage. Average
returns on bond futures are positive and close to 0.0001% except for Australia and Canada. German
government bond futures have the highest average return, consistent with the decline in the long-
term yield in the Euro area during the past ten years. Within equity futures, developed countries
all have negative average returns. The finding is consistent with studies such as Cliff et al. (2008)
and Lou et al. (2019), which have shown that US equity premium is mainly due to overnight
returns, and returns during the day are close to zero or even negative. Among emerging markets,
Mexico has a positive average return. Brazilian equity index futures have the highest return standard
deviation of 0.19%, more than double the level of Australia, which has the lowest volatility among
equity futures. The last two columns report the 1th and 99th percentile of five-minute returns. For
each instrument, the absolute magnitude of the 1st percentile return is similar to that of the 99th
percentile, suggesting the distribution of log returns is mostly symmetric.
3 Measures of Flight to Safety
3.1 Methodology
Our methodology of identifying FTS is inspired by the co-exceedance measures of Bae et al. (2003)
and Baele et al. (2019). In particular, we define an FTS as a five-minute interval during which the
standardized bond futures return is above a threshold while at the same time the standardized stock
index futures return is below a certain threshold:
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FT Sit, j = I{z
i,B
t, j > κ}× I{z
i,S
t, j <−κ}, (1)




















t−τ, j−1| , m = B or S, (3)
where I is indicator function, ri,Bt, j and r
i,S
t, j is the bond or equity index futures returns at 5-minute
interval j at day t in country i. σ i,Bt−1 and σ
i,S
t−1 are referred to as instantaneous volatility estimator
of bond and stock futures returns, respectively, based on five-minute returns in the past 250 days
excluding the nearest 5 days. The long window results in a slow-moving instantaneous volatility
estimator which is not affected by transitory large market swings. n is the total number of return
observations on each day. τ is a particular day, ranging from t − 250 to t − 6. The volatility
estimation is robust to the presence of jump (see Bajgrowicz et al. (2015), Barndorff-Nielsen and
Shephard (2006)). κ is the number of standard deviations the bond and equity returns need to
be above and below zero, respectively, before an interval is identified as an FTS. We impose the
same threshold to both equities and bonds. We refer to zi,mt, j as scaled returns as they are scaled by
volatility.
Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics of annualized estimated instantaneous volatilities
of intraday returns. Unsurprisingly, the volatility of bond futures returns is much lower than that of
equity futures returns. Australia equity futures have the lowest average volatility among all equity
futures, while Brazil’s equity futures are the most volatile. The annualized volatility of US equity
futures is 14.92%, close to the counterpart of the UK, Japan, and South Africa, and slightly lower
than those of Germany and France.
Table 2 reports summary statistics of scaled returns where each 5-minute return is scaled by its
instantaneous volatility. Note that the 1st and 99th percentiles for all futures are around -3 and 3,
respectively, somewhat higher than what would be implied by the normal distribution. The standard
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deviation of the scaled returns is higher than one across all futures, confirming that there is a jump
component in price dynamics not captured by the measure of instantaneous volatility.
For the US, the UK, Germany, Australia, Japan, and Canada, an FTS is defined as from the
domestic equity market to the domestic bond market. However, we define an FTS in Brazil, Mexico,
and South Africa as from the domestic equity market to the benchmark bond market in the same
region: US for Brazil and Mexico, Germany for South Africa. The reason is that the government
bonds of these emerging countries are not considered safe assets, especially not during stress times.
For France, which does not have domestic bond futures contracts, we also use German bonds as
the benchmark safe asset.
3.2 The choice of threshold
The choice of the threshold of κ is inevitably ad hoc. To examine the effect of different threshold
levels, we calculate the incidence of FTS and return impact for κ’s ranging from 2 to 6. Figure 1
reports the percentage of FTS days and the corresponding return impact across countries. When
κ increases, as shown in the graph, FTS incidence decreases while average return impact, defined
as bond minus equity return over the five-minute FTS interval, increases. For the US, FTS days
constitute 25% of trading days when the threshold is 2, and the percentage declines sharply to 8%
when κ goes up to 3. The average 5-minute return impact of FTS is around 0.4% when κ = 2, and
rises to 1.2% when κ = 6.
Table 3 shows how the number and percentage of FTS observations within different countries
varies with different levels for κ . Panel A shows that, when κ = 4, about 3.5% of US trading days
experience at least one FTS episode. This value is similar to the daily FTS incidence found in Baele
et al. (2019) using a more involved approach. A similar FTS incidence is found in France and Ger-
many. Asian developed markets Australia and Japan have fewer FTS events, with the percentage
to be below 1%. For emerging markets, South Africa experiences FTS on around 2% of trading
days, while Brazil and Mexico’s percentage of trading days are 1.33% and 1.03%, respectively.
Equity and bond return impact is more comparable across countries. The decrease in the equity
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market during the FTS 5-minute interval ranges mostly from 0.6% to 0.8%. The increase in the
bond market also mainly varies from 0.18% to 0.25%. A notable exception is Australia where the
return is as low as 0.03%.
Two specific FTS events in our sample are as follows. On June 4th 2010, after the release of
the May 2010 Employment Situation, there is FTS during the interval from 8:30 E.T. to 8:35 E.T
in Brazil, Canada, Germnay, France, South Africa, UK, US. According to the Wall Street Journal
2, “Analysts were disappointed by the low level of jobs created in the private sector, the worst
figure since January and well below the median projection”. On August 8th, 2011, fearful investors
reacted to the United States losing its AAA credit rating at the night of Friday August 5th . Our
data shows that there is FTS event from 10:25 to 10:30 ET in US, and the same time in Germany,
France, and South Africa.
Panels B and C of Table 3 show corresponding summary statistics for levels of κ equal to 3 and
5, respectively. When κ = 3, the US witnesses FTS on around 8% of trading days. During a typical
FTS episode, the equity market goes down by 0.49% while the bond market goes up by 0.18%.
With κ = 5, there are around 2% trading days that experience FTS, and the equity market impact
increases to -0.76%. Germany has 7.50% of trading days that experience FTS for κ = 3. The
return impact is -0.56% on the equity market and 0.13% on the bond market, similar to those on the
French market. A further rise in κ to 5 decreases the percentage of both countries to around 1.8%.
In comparison, Australia observes less incidence of FTS, as the percentage of trading days with
FTS is 1.68% when κ = 3, to 0.15% for κ = 5. Among emerging markets, about 5% of tradings
days in South Africa are identified as FTS days when κ = 3, but only 0.89% when κ = 5.
Overall, the analysis above indicates that κ = 4 balances FTS incidence and return impact well.





Our results show that there tend to be fewer FTS events in emerging markets, irrespective of what
threshold level is used. We now investigate to what extent this lower FTS incidence is simply
caused by a slower reaction of emerging equity markets to (global) FTS news. More specifically,
the liquid benchmark bond may react immediately to a FTS at interval T , while the less liquid
emerging equity market may only react in the subsequent 5-min interval T +1. We identify these
additional ‘lagged’ FTS events in the following way:
Lagged FT Sit, j = I{z
i,B
t, j > κ}× I{z
i,S
t, j >=−κ}× I{z
i,S
t+1, j <−κ}. (4)
We present the results for κ = 4 in Table 4. The first column repeats the number of days with
FTS events defined as in Equation (1) with κ = 4. The second column reports the number of days
with lagged FTS events, defined as in Equation (4). The number of lagged FTS events are in general
much lower than the benchmark FTS events. In particular, both Brazil and South Africa have more
than 60 FTS days, but only around 15 lagged FTS days. Mexico has 15 lagged FTS events and
23 FTS events, so the relative importance of lagged FTS events is higher than in other countries.
Overall, however, considering lagged stock market returns has limited impact on our FTS measure.
3.4 5-min FTS vs daily FTS
Do the days featuring 5-minute FTS events overlap with days featuring daily FTS events identified
in Baele et al. (2019)? We compare the two type of days using the daily FTS dummy from Baele
et al. (2019). We drop our data after 5th July 2015, which is the ending point of their sample
period. Also, as Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa are not included in their sample, the comparison
concentrates on developed countries.
The results are presented in Table 5. It turns out that for the US, there are 36 days with both
5-min FTS and daily FTS events, and 127 days with only 5-minute events. In other words, around
20% of 5-min FTS days also feature daily FTS events. The proportion is similar in Canada, France,
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Germany, and the UK. Meanwhile, the Japanese market has only two days that feature both types
of FTS events while Australia has none. Apart from different identification methodology, one
potential reason for the relatively low overlapping is that many daily FTS events are probably
driven by overnight returns, which are excluded in our sample. We will analyze these overnight
returns and their FTS incidence in future versions of this paper.
4 Characterization of FTS
This section provides a systematic characterization of high-frequency FTS. Section 4.1 investigates
to what extent FTS days exhibit multiple FTS 5-minute intervals. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 characterize
realized volatility and trading volume, respectively, before, during, and after FTS events.
4.1 Cluster of FTS events
Table 6 reports the percentage of days that have one, two, and three FTS. Although the majority of
FTS days experience one flight-to-safety, there is clear evidence of FTS clustering. For example,
the US has in total 174 FTS days, 78% of them witness one FTS, while 13% witness two FTS, and
6% have three events. The number of days with multiple FTS events are much higher than what
is implied by independence between occurrences of FTS. Countries also vary in the degree of FTS
clustering. Germany and France have a higher percentage of one-FTS days than the US, but the
days with two FTS are both around 9% out of total FTS days, much lower than the 13% of the
US. Emerging markets tend to have a lower degree of clustering. More than 86% of the FTS days
across emerging markets have only one FTS event.
4.2 Realized Volatility around FTS
How does the volatility dynamics in futures market evolve around FTS events? Figure 2 plots for
each country the median and inter-quartile range of volatility, measured by the absolute value of
5-minute scaled returns, for each five-minute interval around FTS. We follow Heston et al. (2010)
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in using the absolute value of returns as volatility proxy. In particular, for every five minute from
the third before the FTS interval (T-3) until the third after the FTS interval (T+3), we calculate the
median and inter-quartile of absolute scaled return on equity futures and bond futures across FTS
events of a particular country. We also plot the unconditional mean over the whole sample as the
benchmark. We observe a notable pattern across countries and both equity and bond markets: a
substantial increase in the magnitude of absolute return from T-1 to T, and a sharp decrease from T
to T+1. Meanwhile, the volatility from T-3 to T-1 and from T+1 to T+3 remains rather stable, and
close to the unconditional mean. Note that equity market volatility seems to be slightly elevated
after FTS compared to pre-FTS level. This is not surprising as an FTS involves a strong negative
stock return, which is known to raise subsequent volatility (the leverage effect). Table 7 presents
the mean absolute scaled returns. As it shows, German stock market volatility stays around 2 from
T-3 to T-1, jumps to 7.36 at FTS episode, declines sharply at T+1 to 2.62, and remains around 2.5
from T+2. An emerging market example is South Africa stock market, with volatility lower than 2
from T-3 to T-1, increases substantially to 6.15 at flight episode T, then decreases abruptly to below
2 at T+1.
In sum, by examining and comparing volatility before and after FTS events, Figure 2 clearly
shows that FTS intervals experience much larger market swings than pre- and post-FTS 5-minute
intervals. The difference suggests again that FTS occurs fast and tend to be short-lived. Moreover,
as stock market scaled returns are small at T+1, it confirms the previous result that considering
lagged stock returns have a limited impact on our identification of FTS events.
4.3 Trading volume around FTS
Are flights-to-safety accompanied by substantial trading volumes? The answer to this question
would not only help to understand the drivers of FTS, but also provide valuable guidance to the-
oretical models. To this end, we study trading volume patterns around FTS episodes. The high-
frequency futures data not only enable us to identity FTS during each five-minute interval, but also
allow us to examine trading behavior at the same frequency. Therefore, we can identify the link
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between FTS and tradings, which is not possible using daily data.
Table 8 shows the trading volume on equity index futures and bond futures in the five-minute
interval before, during, and after FTS. Column T-3 presents the trading volume during the third five-
minute interval preceding FTS episodes, while Column T+3 presents the trading volume during the
third five-minute interval following FTS episodes. Almost all countries show the same pattern that
within an FTS interval, the trading volume doubles or even quadruples (as in Japan equity futures)
compared to the pre-FTS level. In the next 15 minutes or three intervals, however, trading volumes
decrease dramatically, though not necessarily back to pre-FTS levels. For example, the trading
volume of US equity futures goes from 33,465 contracts at T-1 to 64,048 contracts at T, and back
to 37,446 contracts at T+3.
In sum, the results show that our identified FTS are associated with substantial investor trading
in both equity and bond markets, suggesting the important role of investor re-balancing in flights-
to-safety. After the episode, trading volumes decline toward pre-FTS levels quickly, indicating that
FTS do happen quickly and finish within five minutes.
4.4 The persistence of FTS
Do markets recover after FTS? Figure 3 reports the average cumulative return on equity and bond
futures over intervals following FTS events. It shows that there is reversal in equity and bond returns
following the FTS interval, though the degree is far from fully offsetting the return impact of FTS
events. For example, the return impact of US FTS on equity market is on average around -0.7%, but
within the following 90 five-minute intervals, the equity market recovers by 0.3%, suggesting that
part of the FTS impact is driven by market liquidity and therefore only transitory. Similar patterns
are also observed for other countries except Canada and Japan. In future version of the paper, we
will investigate the role of liquidity in more details.
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5 FTS Triggers
5.1 Macro news announcements and FTS
Previous sections suggest that FTS events are accompanied by substantial trading volume and tend
to be short-lived. These results indicate that information events may have an important role in
driving FTS events. In this section, therefore, we investigate the extent to which FTS are caused
by US pre-scheduled macro news announcements (MNAs), using a comprehensive set of macro
announcements listed in Table A.3. Note that most of the announcements are released at 8:30 a.m.
ET and 10:00 a.m. ET. Although US and Brazil stock cash market is closed at 8:30 ET, the futures
markets are already open. Also, the Europe and South Africa markets are still open at 8:30 ET
and 10:00 ET. This overlap allows us to study how many of the FTS events in those regions occur
immediately after macro announcements. Studies such as Andersen et al. (2007) and Bollerslev
et al. (2018) have shown that US stock and bond futures exhibit a robust and consistent response
to the surprises of some announcements. Moreover, Andersen et al. (2007) document that the mere
presence of an announcement, besides the size of the corresponding surprise, tends to increase
volatility. Therefore, instead of linking FTS to announcement surprises, we count the number of
FTS following macro announcements.
Panel A of Table 9 reports the total number of FTS events during the first and second five-
minute interval after macro announcements. In total, 77 FTS events in the US happen within ten
minutes after macro announcements, among all 233 US FTS events. Furthermore, 68 out of these
77 FTS events occur during the first 5-minute interval after announcements, indicating that these
FTS events are not only caused by macro announcements, but also within a rather tight window
after announcements. The Brazilian market experiences 26 FTS events within ten minutes after US
announcements, with 24 of them in the first five minutes. Similarly, there are 74 French FTS during
the ten minutes after announcements, and 71 of them happen within the first five minutes, showing
that US macro announcements also serve as an important trigger for FTS events in Europe.
Panel B of Table 9 reports the top 10 announcements with the largest number of FTS during the
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first 5-minute interval after the announcement. Across different countries, Employment Situation,
Construction Spending, ISM Manufacturing, Consumer Confidence, and Initial Jobless Claims
tend to occupy the top of the lists. These announcements are also shown in the literature (see Law
et al. (2018) and Kurov et al. (2019)) to have a significant and robust impact on stock and bond
markets. 26 announcements of the Employment Situation are followed by an FTS in the US during
the following five minutes. In Germany and France, more than 20 FTS events happen within 5
minutes after announcements of Employment. In Brazil and South Africa, the job reports also play
a major role, causing 12 and 14 FTS events, respectively. The number of FTS events in Germany,
France, UK and US following ISM Manufacturing, Construction Spending, Consumer Confidence,
and Initial Jobless Claims is roughly 1/3 of those following Employment Situation. However, these
four announcements are less important in driving FTS in other countries. The Mexican market
seems not affected by US macro announcements. Note that the top ten announcements lead to a
similar number of FTS in Germany and France as in the US, indicating a global nature of FTS,
which is examined closely in the next section.
Panel C of Table 9 reports the top 10 announcements that are most likely to trigger FTS events
during the second five-minute interval. Consistent with Panel A, few FTS occur during this episode.
For example, only one FTS in the US happens over the second five minutes after Employment Sit-
uation. One exception is FOMC, where three FTS from the US happen during the second interval.
These FOMC announcements are on 14:15 December 11th, 2007, 14:00 January 28th, 2015, and
14:00, January 27th 2016, respectively.
5.2 Other triggers of FTS
Future versions of this paper will also investigate other potential triggers of FTS, such as macroeco-
nomic announcements outside the US, the role of (unexpected) monetary policy decisions (such as
unexpected rate decisions or disappointing announcements related to quantitative easing), political
risk realizations (most recently, the vote for a Brexit and the ongoing Trade War), or large industry
or firm shocks (think of failure of a specific bank). Following Bongaerts et al. (2018), we will also
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investigate the role of liquity shocks as potential triggers for FTS. As signaled above, we will not
only consider news event during but also outside trading hours.
6 FTS transmission across countries
Now that we have analyzed and characterized FTS events in high frequency, a natural question
to ask is whether these events coincide in various countries. Given the short-lived nature of FTS
events, zooming in at 5-minutes interval gives a sharper view of FTS spillovers. Therefore, this
section studies the spillover effect of FTS across international markets. We first report country-
specific equity and bond market returns, as well as the number of FTS during FTS episodes from
the US, Germany, and Japan. Then we use Firthlogit model to examine if the occurrence of a high-
frequency FTS event in a particular country increases the possibility of observing a FTS in another
country in the same 5-minute interval.
6.1 Co-occurrence of FTS event across countries
Panel A of Table 10 reports the average equity and bond scaled returns on the intervals that US
FTS happen as well as the three intervals thereafter. If FTS events are country-specific and have
no overlap, then the average returns should be close to zero. However, the first column shows
that the equity scaled return is in general lower than -4 across countries at time T, which is the
threshold of FTS. Therefore, the equity markets in non-US countries also witness abrupt declines
when FTS occur in the US. For instance, Germany and France experience an average equity scaled
return as low as around -6.5. The scaled return on equity decreases by -5.61 on average in the UK.
Canada and South Africa also have a decline by -4.75. However, the equity price decline seems
to be limited to the exact interval T when US FTS occurs. When moving to the next interval T+1,
the decrease in equity scaled returns is much smaller in magnitude, which is generally lower than
0.5. Similar results hold for T+2 and T+3, suggesting that the impact of US FTS to other countries
happen very fast.
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The next four columns report bond scaled returns. Note that Mexico and Brazil are assigned
with US bond market. Therefore it is not surprising to observe large bond price surges. However,
for Canada, Germany, France, UK, and South Africa, the bond returns are in general higher than
4.5 at the time when a US FTS happens. In contrast, the next three columns show that following
scaled returns are close to zero, suggesting that the increase in bond prices concentrates on the
5-minute interval with US FTS.
Panel B reports the number of FTS that happen on the same five-minute interval with a US FTS.
Remarkably, for Brazil, 68 out of 81 FTS events coincide with US FTS events. The proportion for
Mexico is also high, with 18 out of 26 events happening during the same interval as in the US.
Similarly, Canada experiences 47 FTS in total, 33 of them occur simultaneously with US ones. The
results strongly indicate a regional, if not global, nature of FTS. As regards countries in Europe,
the UK, Germany, and France have around one-third of the FTS coinciding with US FTS, which is
also a significant proportion. South Africa has 75 FTS events, and almost half of them occur at the
same interval as the US. Some FTS happen in the five-minute intervals after an episode of US FTS,
though the cases are rare. For example, three out of the total 211 Germany FTS happen during the
five minutes next to a US episode. Overall, Table 10 suggests that FTS events in the US tend to
immediately trigger FTS events in other countries.
Next, we conduct a similar analysis on German FTS events, given the status of the German
market in Europe and Africa. Panel A of Table 11 reports the average equity and bond scaled returns
on German FTS intervals and the three intervals after. German FTS also immediately trigger a sharp
equity market decline and bond market surge in other countries. For example, the average equity
scaled return in the UK is as low as -5.74 at T, but become -0.13 at T+1. Panel B show that around
80% of French and South Africa FTS happen at the same five-minute interval as a German FTS. In
the British market, the proportion is lower but still more than 50%. Furthermore, the coincidence
is less likely for the US, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil. The disparity suggests the existence of
regional FTS that affect particularly Germany, France, UK, and South Africa. However, few FTS
from these European countries happen at the intervals after a German FTS, which suggests that the
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transmission of German FTS is also very fast across European countries.
Table 12 shows the impact of Japanese FTS on Australia, the only country that has overlapping
trading hours with Japan. Surprisingly, only 2 of the 34 Australian FTS happen at the same interval
as Japanese FTS. The absence of transmission suggests that FTS events in Asia are country-specific.
6.2 Explaining flight-to-safety by US and German FTS
After showing the coincidence of FTS events across countries, we now examine how FTS events
transmit from the US or Germany to other countries. In particular, we examine if the probability
of occurrence of FTS in a particular country can be explained by FTS events from the US and
Germany. We follow Bongaerts et al. (2018) in using Firthlogti model, which entails penalized
maximum likelihood estimation. Heinze and Schemper (2002) show that Firthlogit model instead
of regular Logit model overcomes the “separation problem” when events of interest are rare. The
dependent variable is an indicator variable of whether there is an FTS event at a particular 5-minute
interval in country i. For independent variables, we use indicator variables of FTS events in the
US and/or Germany at the same 5-minute interval, and an indicator variable of whether there exist
announcements on Employment Situation, ISM Manufacturing, Construction Spending, Consumer
Confidence, and Initial Jobless Claims at the beginning of the five-minute interval.
Table 13 presents the marginal effects of the Firthlogit models. The results in Panel A are
consistent with previous findings that US FTS events trigger FTS in other countries. Moreover,
the effects are both economically and significantly substantial, especially for European countries:
A US FTS occurrence increases the probability of FTS events by 48% in France and Germany,
and around 34% in the UK and South Africa. In particular, without US FTS, the unconditional
probability of occurrence of UK FTS is 1/(1+ exp(8.98)) = 0.01%, with -8.98 as the intercept
in the Firthlogit model. With US FTS incidence, the probability of UK FTS becomes 1/(1 +
exp(8.98−8.31))= 33.85% where 8.31 is the coefficient on US FTS. The difference is the marginal
effect 33.85%− 0.01% = 33.84%. The high intensity of transmission is not surprising given that
the overlapping trading hours between the US and Europe are on the morning in Eastern Time when
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many US announcements are released. In contrast, Mexico and Canada seem to be less affected by
US FTS, with the probability only increases by 16% and 18% when US FTS happen.
Panel B includes the indicator of the presence of macro announcement MNA = 1 or 0. It cap-
tures the triggering effect of macro announcements on FTS events in both US and other countries.
So the marginal effect on US FTS is not compounded by macro announcements. The marginal
effect is estimated at the mean of independent variables. Estimating at MNA = 0 leads to a similar
result. The inclusion of announcements reduces the marginal effect of US FTS events, especially
for European countries and South Africa. For example, the marginal effect of a US FTS on France
decreases from 48.1% to 36.4% with a lower t-value. This is consistent with the earlier discussion
that the high intensity of transmission in Panel A is partially due to releases of announcements.
For Canada and Brazil, the decrease is no more than 2%, much smaller in comparison. The lit-
tle change suggests that the transmission of FTS from the US to Canada and Brazil is not much
associated with macro announcements.
Panel C studies if German FTS events transmit to other countries. The independent variables
are the indicator of German FTS events and the indicator of macro announcements. The marginal
effect is also estimated at the mean. Notably, a German FTS increases the probability of FTS events
by 80.6% in France, and by 30.6% in South Africa. The comparison between Panel B and Panel
suggests that Brazil, Canada, and Mexico are more affected by US FTS events. Meanwhile, France
and South Africa are more affected by German FTS events. For the US, the probability increase is
also as high as 38.8% when an FTS happens in Germany, similar to the coefficient of 36.7% on US
FTS events for Germany. It makes it challenging to make inference on the transmission direction
between the two countries, and suggests that global FTS events (those that co-occur in the US and
Germany) comprise a similar share in US and German FTS events during the overlapping trading
hours. A simple counting confirms the idea. In particular, in the sample during overlapping hours,
there are in total 76 FTS events that happen at the same interval in both countries, 82 US FTS
events not triggering German ones, and 76 German FTS events not triggering US ones.
The fact that many German and US FTS events tend to happen at the same interval compounds
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the transmission estimation from the US and Germany to other countries. Therefore, Panel D
presents the model where independent variables include both indicator variables for US and Ger-
man FTS events, as well as the indicator of macro announcements. The results show that after
controlling for German FTS events, the marginal effect of US FTS events becomes close to zero
for France and South Africa, and decreases to 4.62% for the UK, compared to Panel B where the
marginal effects for there three countries are higher than 20%. Meanwhile, the marginal effects
of Germany FTS on American countries are also all close to zero, in contrast to the results from
Panel C. However, the effect of US (Germany) events on Brazil, Canada, and Mexico (France, UK,
South Africa) remains similar as in Panel B (C). The results indicate a dominant role played by
the US and Germany in regional FTS transmission in American and Europe/Africa, respectively.
Moreover, the US and Germany FTS co-co-occurrence from Panel B and C plus their role in re-
gional transmission suggests global FTS transmission from the US and Germany to other countries.
Note that the effect of macro announcements is not significant anymore, suggesting that the trigger
effect of announcements on these countries is captured by the transmission of FTS from the US
and Germany.
Overall, Table 13 suggests that first, FTS events transmit within regions, with the US being the
sender for countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Canada, while Germany being the send for countries
in Europe and Africa. Second, during the overlapping trading hours, there is strong evidence of
global transmission of FTS events from the US and Germany to other markets.
7 Robustness
Table 14 reports the robustness of our results when FTS events are identified by 1-minute equity and
bond returns. Panel A of Table 14 shows that with κ = 4, most countries have much more 1-minute
FTS events compared to the 5-minute ones. In an unreported table, I find that the 1th percentile
and 99th percentile of the scaled returns is also close to 3, similar to the 5-minute scaled returns.
Therefore, as the frequency changes from 5-minute to 1-minute, a larger amount of observations
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mechanically leads to more identified FTS events. The only exception is Mexico. The reason is
that Mexico’s equity index futures are not traded frequently enough. As a result, many one-minute
returns are simply missing. The results also suggest that to obtain a similar percentage of FTS days,
using a higher frequency of returns requires a higher threshold of κ . We will use κ equal to 5 even
higher in the future version of the paper.
Panel B of Table 14 investigates if macro announcements still serve as a trigger of 1-minute
FTS events. It turns out a substantial number of 1-minute FTS events occur immediately after
macro announcements. Panel C focuses on the robustness of FTS transmission across countries to
1-minute returns. Similar to the case of five minute, the UK, Germany, and France have around one-
third of the FTS coinciding with US FTS. However, a lower proportion of Brazilian and Canadian
FTS events co-occur with US. Instead, a significant amount of FTS events in these two countries
happen in T+1, the one-minute interval after an episode of US FTS. Overall, the results still confirm
the fast nature of transmission of FTS events. Panel D of Table 14 shows that about 80% of French
and South Africa FTS, and over 50% of British FTS happen at the same one-minute interval as
a German FTS, the proportion also similar to the five-minute case. Finally, Panel E conduct the
same Firthlogit analysis for 1-minute FTS events. Consistent with the results from Panel C, the
coefficient on US FTS is lower and less significant for both UK and Canada. On the other hand, the
coefficient on German FTS has a higher magnitude and/or becomes more significant for the UK,
France, and South Africa.
In summary, the overall results of 1-minute FTS events are qualitatively similar to the 5-minute
ones. However, given the fact that index futures in developing countries are traded less frequently
than their developed country counterparts, 1-minute frequency is less suitable for our study.
8 Conclusion
Using high-frequency data on equity index and government bond futures returns, we identify 5-
minute FTS episodes in 10 countries during which bond returns are positive while at the same
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time equity returns are large and negative. On average, 5-minute FTS events comprise less than
4% of the sample days, and when they occur, equities drop within the 5-min interval with 0.6% to
0.8%, while bonds increase with 0.18% to 0.25%. FTS events tend to be short-lived and associated
with high trading volume. While realized volatility surges during FTS, it is not particularly high
before or after FTS intervals. We document that many FTS are triggered by US macroeconomic
announcements and provide first evidence on how FTS transmit globally.
This first version of our paper represents only a first analysis of FTS at high frequency. We have
in mind several avenues for future research. First of all, we will not only consider Flight-to-Safety
(or ‘Risk-Off’) events, but also the opposite Flight-to-Risk (FTR, or ‘Risk-On’) events. Second,
we will not only analyze intraday 5-min intervals, but also overnight returns, as we now realize that
many FTS events already occur at market opening. Third, we will analyze the behavior of implied
volatility on equities (e.g. the VIX) and bonds around FTS/FTR. Fourth, and most importantly,
we will analyze a much broader set of triggers for both FTS and FTR, possible using text-based
news measures. Finally, we intend to link our FTS/FTR transmission model better to the existing
theoretical literature on crisis transmission.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for 5-minute returns and instantaneous volatility
This table reports summary statistics of 5-minute returns and annualized instantaneous volatility
for each country. Returns are in percentage. Instantaneous volatility is based on 5-minute returns
in the past 250 days excluding the nearest 5 days.
Panel A: 5-minute returns
Mean Std 1th 99th
Developed Countries
Australia 10-Year Gov Bond 0.00002 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Canada 10-Year Gov Bond 0.00003 0.04 -0.10 0.09
Germany 10-Year Gov Bond 0.00013 0.03 -0.08 0.08
Japan 10-Year Gov Bond 0.00011 0.03 -0.07 0.07
UK Long Gilt 0.00009 0.04 -0.10 0.09
US 10-Year T-note 0.00011 0.04 -0.10 0.09
Australia ASX 200 -0.00046 0.08 -0.22 0.22
Canada TSX60 -0.00018 0.11 -0.32 0.31
France CAC 40 -0.00029 0.12 -0.34 0.32
Germany FDAX -0.00032 0.12 -0.36 0.34
Japan Nikkei 225 -0.00037 0.13 -0.37 0.36
UK FTSE 100 -0.00041 0.10 -0.29 0.28
US E-mini S&P500 -0.00007 0.11 -0.31 0.30
Emerging Markets
Brazil Ibovespa -0.00024 0.19 -0.52 0.50
Mexico IPC 0.00026 0.13 -0.38 0.39
SouthAfrica JSE 40 -0.00030 0.10 -0.29 0.28
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Table 1: Continued
Panel B: Annualized instantaneous volatility
Mean Std 1th 99th
Developed Countries
Australia 10-Year Gov Bond 0.56 0.12 0.30 0.84
Canada 10-Year Gov Bond 4.50 0.86 2.52 6.25
Germany 10-Year Gov Bond 4.33 1.07 1.68 6.85
Japan 10-Year Gov Bond 2.58 1.03 1.01 5.36
UK Long Gilt 5.18 1.09 3.20 7.79
US 10-Year T-note 4.88 1.25 2.80 8.23
Australia ASX 200 9.68 3.39 2.68 19.50
Canada TSX60 13.81 5.93 3.70 33.39
France CAC 40 17.01 5.91 8.08 31.70
Germany FDAX 17.42 6.82 4.73 34.72
Japan Nikkei 225 14.89 3.79 5.02 25.26
UK FTSE 100 14.12 5.57 4.08 30.56
US E-mini S&P500 14.92 6.26 6.86 35.71
Emerging Markets
Brazil Ibovespa 25.33 8.27 8.09 48.41
Mexico IPC 12.92 4.82 4.53 25.80
SouthAfrica JSE 40 14.43 5.00 3.39 28.26
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Table 2: Summary statistics for 5-minute scaled return
This table reports summary statistics of scaled returns where five-minute interval returns are scaled
by instantaneous volatility based on five-minute returns in the past 250 days excluding the nearest
5 days.
Mean Std 1th 99th
Developed Countries
Australia 10-Year Gov Bond 0.00403 1.14 -2.80 2.81
Canada 10-Year Gov Bond 0.00115 1.08 -2.78 2.68
Germany 10-Year Gov Bond 0.00444 1.07 -2.90 2.75
Japan 10-Year Gov Bond 0.00435 1.11 -3.02 2.92
UK Long Gilt 0.00223 1.07 -2.88 2.78
US 10-Year T-note 0.00309 1.08 -2.79 2.68
Australia ASX 200 -0.00573 1.10 -2.97 2.89
Canada TSX60 -0.00133 1.11 -2.98 2.92
France CAC 40 -0.00206 1.07 -2.97 2.87
Germany FDAX -0.00213 1.10 -3.12 2.95
Japan Nikkei 225 -0.00294 1.10 -2.88 2.86
UK FTSE 100 -0.00415 1.08 -3.01 2.89
US E-mini S&P500 -0.00051 1.07 -2.97 2.95
Emerging Markets
Brazil Ibovespa -0.00102 1.06 -2.87 2.79
Mexico IPC 0.00179 1.07 -2.96 2.97
SouthAfrica JSE 40 -0.00269 1.06 -2.93 2.79
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Table 3: FTS instance and return
This table reports the number and percentage of days that flights-to-safety occurs. FTS are identi-
fied by indicator equation (1). Equity (Bond) 5-minute returns (in percentage) during FTS intervals
are reported.
Panel A: κ = 4
# of FTS days % of FTS days Equity 5-min ret Bond 5-min ret
Developed Countries
Australia 18 0.44 -0.46 0.03
Canada 41 0.94 -0.63 0.23
France 179 3.79 -0.69 0.18
Germany 166 3.06 -0.75 0.18
Japan 38 0.73 -0.69 0.13
UK 103 1.91 -0.63 0.20
US 174 3.51 -0.65 0.24
Emerging Markets
Brazil 66 1.33 -0.92 0.25
Mexico 23 1.03 -0.80 0.22
South Africa 65 2.15 -0.55 0.19
Panel B: κ = 3
# of FTS days % of FTS days Equity 5-min ret Bond 5-min ret
Developed Countries
Australia 68 1.68 -0.36 0.02
Canada 123 2.81 -0.48 0.17
France 400 8.47 -0.54 0.13
Germany 407 7.50 -0.56 0.13
Japan 134 2.57 -0.51 0.09
UK 307 5.69 -0.45 0.15
US 390 7.87 -0.49 0.18
Emerging Markets
Brazil 192 3.87 -0.76 0.17
Mexico 58 2.60 -0.65 0.17
South Africa 151 5.00 -0.44 0.15
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Table 3: Continued
Panel C: κ = 5
# of FTS days % of FTS days Equity 5-min ret Bond 5-min ret
Developed Countries
Australia 6 0.15 -0.72 0.03
Canada 19 0.43 -0.78 0.30
France 88 1.86 -0.80 0.21
Germany 87 1.60 -0.88 0.21
Japan 12 0.23 -0.90 0.20
UK 51 0.94 -0.75 0.26
US 92 1.86 -0.76 0.29
Emerging Markets
Brazil 30 0.60 -1.05 0.35
Mexico 6 0.27 -1.02 0.35
South Africa 27 0.89 -0.65 0.24
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Table 4: FTS with lagged stock market
This table reports the number of days that FTS and lagged FTS occur. FTS are determined by
indicator equation (1). Lagged FTS are determined by indicator equation (4).
# of FTS days # of lagged
FTS days
# of days with lagged
FTS but not FTS
Emerging Markets
Brazil 66 16 10
Mexico 23 15 9
South Africa 65 15 13
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Table 5: Daily FTS and 5-minute FTS
This table reports the total number of days that have daily FTS events, the number of days that
have 5-minute FTS events, the number days that have both daily FTS and 5-minute FTS, as well as
the number of days that have only one of the two FTS events. Daily FTS data is from Baele et al.














Australia 83 14 0 83 14
Canada 83 39 7 76 32
France 142 172 38 104 134
Germany 177 161 37 140 124
Japan 71 31 2 69 29
UK 185 97 25 160 72
US 209 163 36 173 127
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Table 6: FTS cluster
This table reports the total number of FTS days for each country and the percentage of FTS days
that have one, two, three FTS events. FTS events are identified with threshold κ = 4.










Australia 18 77.8 5.6 5.6
Canada 41 85.4 14.6 0.0
France 179 84.9 8.9 3.9
Germany 166 83.7 9.0 4.8
Japan 38 73.7 15.8 10.5
UK 103 84.5 9.7 3.9
US 174 78.7 13.2 6.3
Emerging Markets
Brazil 66 86.4 6.1 6.1
Mexico 23 87.0 13.0 0.0
South Africa 65 89.2 7.7 1.5
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Table 7: FTS and market volatility
This table reports the mean absolute scaled return on equity futures and bond futures around FTS.
The five-minute interval when FTS occur is denoted as T. The first, second, and third five-minute
interval before (after) the FTS interval are denoted as T-1, T-2, T-3 (T+1, T+2, T+3). Scaled
returns are calculated as five-minute interval returns divided by instantaneous volatility based on
five-minute returns in the past 250 days excluding the nearest 5 days. Panel A reports the volatility
of equity index futures. Panel B reports the volatility of bond futures.
Panel A: Mean absolute return on equity index futures
T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Developed Countries
Australia 1.87 2.68 2.58 6.01 2.98 2.79 3.45
Canada 1.72 1.84 2.72 6.86 3.06 2.72 2.44
France 1.98 1.77 1.90 6.92 2.73 2.38 2.51
Germany 2.32 2.10 2.28 7.36 2.62 2.50 2.66
Japan 2.27 2.15 2.51 6.76 3.20 2.09 2.94
UK 1.88 1.87 2.66 7.61 3.02 2.86 2.71
US 1.66 1.97 2.40 7.12 2.73 2.63 2.23
Emerging Markets
Brazil 1.78 1.90 1.56 6.39 2.25 2.30 2.38
Mexico 1.14 1.73 1.67 6.49 2.28 2.03 1.95
South Africa 1.92 1.54 1.86 6.15 1.96 1.79 1.88
Panel B: Mean absolute return on bond futures
T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Developed Countries
Australia 2.20 2.74 2.51 5.97 2.39 3.01 2.61
Canada 1.25 0.95 1.82 6.96 2.71 1.72 1.81
France 1.59 1.49 1.66 6.63 1.86 1.77 1.72
Germany 1.65 1.59 1.74 6.56 2.04 1.86 1.85
Japan 2.15 2.30 2.28 6.47 2.61 2.46 2.31
UK 1.47 1.41 1.81 6.60 2.05 1.92 1.59
US 1.34 1.45 2.21 7.24 2.49 2.05 1.79
Emerging Markets
Brazil 1.37 1.74 1.99 7.67 2.52 2.50 1.85
Mexico 1.40 1.37 2.90 7.11 2.87 2.82 2.38
South Africa 1.29 1.11 1.93 6.67 1.82 1.72 1.36
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Table 8: Trading around FTS
This table reports the trading volumes of futures contracts around FTS. The five-minute interval
when FTS occur is denoted as T. The first, second, and third five-minute interval before (after) the
FTS interval are denoted as T-1, T-2, T-3 (T+1, T+2, T+3). Panel A reports the trading volume on
equity index futures. Panel B reports the trading volume on the bond futures of each country or the
bond futures assigned to a country.
Panel A: Equity index futures
T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Developed Countries
Australia 824 867 862 1167 989 860 861
Canada 283 240 295 447 439 348 284
France 1949 2183 2075 5299 4109 3329 3260
Germany 1899 2105 2108 5541 4195 3341 3171
Japan 2996 3196 3081 5623 4193 3072 2758
UK 1623 1690 1819 4038 3095 2649 2447
US 27149 29164 33465 64048 50676 41181 37446
Emerging Markets
Brazil 750 836 800 2055 1352 1025 929
Mexico 47 44 34 54 59 66 67
South Africa 426 421 432 1001 795 609 567
Panel B: Bond futures
T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Developed Countries
Australia 1506 1586 1799 2217 2007 1576 1558
Canada 427 421 399 696 610 506 481
France 12391 12035 12283 37373 26664 20325 17996
Germany 12200 11929 12538 35932 26691 20063 18159
Japan 961 887 1075 1666 1152 849 796
UK 1443 1383 1507 3478 2741 2258 1712
US 12939 14159 16458 40217 30769 23614 20980
Emerging Markets
Brazil 15215 17127 17401 51823 36513 29901 25609
Mexico 17105 17879 27668 51229 38882 32081 29254
South Africa 11730 10807 12318 37453 25138 18637 17068
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Table 9: Macro announcements and FTS
This table reports the number of FTS events that are triggered by US macroeconomic announce-
ments. Panel A presents the total number of FTS events, the number of FTS events that occur
within the first five-minute interval and second five-minute interval after macro announcements.
Panel B and C list the number of FTS for each of the top ten macro announcements over the first
and second five-minute interval, respectively.
Panel A: FTS after macro announcements
# of FTS First 5-minute Second 5-minute
Brazil 81 24 2
Canada 47 11 2
France 223 71 3
Germany 211 64 4
Mexico 26 2 1
South Africa 75 31 1
UK 129 35 2
US 233 68 9
Panel B: FTS over the first 5-minute interval after each announcement
BR CA DE FR MX SA UK US
Employment 12 6 24 22 0 14 19 26
Construction Spending 2 0 7 8 0 4 6 9
ISM Manufacturing 2 0 8 9 0 4 7 9
Initial Jobless Claims 2 0 7 7 0 1 1 7
Consumer Confidence 0 1 8 8 0 1 2 7
Advanced Retail Sales 2 1 7 5 0 4 4 6
Durable Goods Orders 1 1 7 6 0 1 0 4
GDP Advance 1 0 5 4 0 1 2 3
Personal Income 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 2
Leading Economic Index 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 2
Panel C: FTS over the second 5-minute interval after each announcement
BR CA DE FR MX SA UK US
FOMC 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
Initial Jobless Claims 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
Factory Orders 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Employment 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
ISM Non Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Industrial Production 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Consumer Confidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
ISM Manufacturing 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
Construction Spending 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
UM Consumer Sentiment 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
34 156 
Table 10: FTS spillover from the US
This table reports across countries the average scaled return on equity and bond futures at and after
US FTS intervals, as well as the number of FTS occurring at and after US FTS intervals. The
five-minute interval when US FTS occur is denoted as T. Panel A reports the average scaled equity
return and bond return for each country from T to T+3. Panel B presents for each country the total
number of FTS, and the number of FTS occurring at T to T+3.
Panel A: Equity and bond scaled returns during and after US FTS interval
Equity Ret Bond Ret
T T+1 T+2 T+3 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Brazil -3.53 -0.25 0.51 0.05 7.37 -0.43 -0.41 -0.09
Canada -4.25 -0.34 0.32 0.25 4.51 0.32 -0.35 0.02
France -6.37 -0.20 -0.09 -0.29 5.65 0.18 -0.01 0.04
Germany -6.77 -0.17 0.05 -0.46 5.67 0.16 -0.00 0.02
Mexico -2.05 -1.20 -0.05 -0.27 6.33 -0.43 -0.33 -0.16
South Africa -4.75 -0.45 -0.06 0.06 5.45 -0.13 -0.00 0.23
UK -5.61 -0.28 0.09 -0.25 4.81 0.08 -0.27 0.15
Panel B: Number of FTS during and after US FTS interval
# of FTS T T+1 T+2 T+3
Brazil 81 68 4 5 3
Canada 47 33 3 0 0
France 223 76 4 4 2
Germany 211 76 3 4 2
Mexico 26 18 1 1 1
South Africa 75 34 1 2 0
UK 129 54 4 1 2
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Table 11: FTS spillover from Germany
This table reports across countries the average scaled return on equity and bond futures at and
after Germany FTS intervals, as well as the number of FTS occurring at and after Germany FTS
intervals. The five-minute interval when Germany FTS occur is denoted as T. Panel A reports the
average scaled equity return and bond return for each country from T to T+3. Panel B presents for
each country the total number of FTS, and the number of FTS occurring at T to T+3.
Panel A: Equity and bond scaled returns during and after Germany FTS interval
Equity Ret Bond Ret
T T+1 T+2 T+3 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Brazil -3.26 -0.53 0.40 -0.32 6.82 -0.08 -0.06 0.25
Canada -3.52 -0.64 0.09 0.02 4.41 0.46 -0.06 0.03
France -6.58 0.01 -0.22 -0.48 6.56 -0.03 -0.01 0.21
Mexico -1.65 -0.62 -0.08 -0.35 5.40 -0.54 0.15 0.12
South Africa -3.82 -0.41 -0.15 -0.22 6.40 -0.19 0.08 0.32
UK -5.74 -0.13 0.04 -0.52 4.91 0.28 -0.10 0.15
US -5.80 -0.19 0.16 -0.07 6.76 -0.03 -0.03 0.30
Panel B: Number of FTS during and after Germany FTS interval
# of FTS T T+1 T+2 T+3
Brazil 81 33 1 2 4
Canada 47 8 1 0 0
France 223 177 5 4 9
Mexico 26 4 2 0 1
South Africa 75 55 0 2 2
UK 129 70 8 1 5
US 233 76 6 2 4
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Table 12: FTS spillover from Japan
This table reports across countries the average scaled return on equity and bond futures at and after
Japan FTS intervals, as well as the number of FTS occurring at and after Japan FTS intervals. The
five-minute interval when Japan FTS occur is denoted as T. Panel A reports the average scaled
equity return and bond return for each country from T to T+3. Panel B presents for each country
the total number of FTS, and the number of FTS occurring at T to T+3.
Panel A: Equity and bond scaled returns during and after Japanese FTS interval
Equity Ret Bond Ret
T T+1 T+2 T+3 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Australia -1.69 -0.08 -0.49 0.44 1.63 0.00 0.22 -0.30
Panel B: Number of FTS during and after Japanese FTS interval
# of FTS T T+1 T+2 T+3
Australia 34 2 1 0 0
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Table 13: Firthlogit models of FTS events
This table presents the marginal effects of the firthlogit models. Panel A reports the Firthlogit model
where the independent variable is an indicator variable of US FTS events. Panel B reports the model
where independent variables are indicators of both US FTS events and macro announcements of
Employment Situation, ISM Manufacturing, Construction Spending, Consumer Confidence, and
Initial Jobless Claims. Panel C reports the results where the independent variables are indicators
of both German FTS events and macro announcements. Panel D reports the results where the
independent variables include German and US FTS event indicators and the indicator variable of
macro announcements. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: The effect of US FTS events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BA CA DE FR MX SA UK
FTS US 0.342∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(10.21) (6.39) (12.13) (12.13) (4.70) (7.16) (9.09)
N 388490 345651 200303 192498 150870 92511 202760
Panel B: The effect of US FTS events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BA CA DE FR MX SA UK
FTS US 0.329∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(8.89) (5.78) (8.62) (8.60) (4.72) (4.82) (6.42)
MNA 0.0000501 0.000111 0.00241∗∗ 0.00303∗∗ -0.0000964 0.00171∗ 0.000713∗∗
(0.83) (1.13) (2.74) (2.82) (-0.76) (2.31) (2.60)
N 388490 345651 200303 192498 150870 92511 202760
Panel C: The effect of German FTS events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BA CA FR MX SA UK US
FTS DE 0.177∗∗∗ 0.0378∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.0994∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(4.84) (2.02) (27.28) (2.23) (7.39) (8.13) (8.77)
MNA 0.000573∗ 0.00170 0.00124 -0.0000103 0.000631∗ 0.000595∗∗ 0.00611∗∗
(2.07) (1.53) (1.45) (-0.02) (2.23) (2.64) (3.29)
N 213155 124271 472150 52944 270363 526409 200303
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Table 13: Continued
Panel D: The effect of US and German FTS events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BA CA FR MX SA UK
FTS US 0.242∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.00482 0.193∗∗ 0.00115∗ 0.0462∗
(4.84) (3.92) (0.91) (3.25) (2.01) (2.18)
FTS DE 0.000302∗ -0.0000976 0.713∗∗∗ 0.0000192 0.148∗∗ 0.00370
(2.25) (-1.11) (13.04) (0.10) (2.81) (1.95)
MNA -0.00000189 0.000248 0.00106 -0.000206 0.000648 0.000393
(-0.02) (1.27) (1.24) (-0.96) (1.71) (1.69)
N 180551 121926 188650 52278 91361 197222
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Table 14: Robustness of 1-minute FTS events
This table reports the robustness of 1-minute FTS events. Panel A reports the number and percent-
age of days that 1-minute FTS events occur. FTS are identified by indicator equation (1). Equity
(Bond) 1-minute returns (in percentage) during FTS intervals are reported. Panel B reports the
number of 1-minute FTS events that are triggered by US macroeconomic announcements. Panel C
reports the spillover of FTS from US. Panel C reports the spillover of FTS from Germany. Panel E
reports the marginal effects of the firthlogit models.
Panel A: FTS instance and return
# of FTS days % of FTS days Equity 1-min ret Bond 1-min ret
Developed Countries
Australia 37 0.93 -0.19 0.02
Canada 69 2.09 -0.31 0.10
France 440 9.32 -0.33 0.10
Germany 442 8.15 -0.36 0.10
Japan 74 1.42 -0.37 0.05
UK 304 5.71 -0.29 0.11
US 398 8.03 -0.31 0.14
Emerging Markets
Brazil 183 3.79 -0.44 0.15
Mexico 3 1.15 -0.42 0.09
South Africa 159 5.31 -0.28 0.11
Panel B: FTS after macro announcements
# of FTS First 1-minute Second 1-minute
Brazil 246 89 7
Canada 106 16 3
Germany 678 156 17
France 695 156 15
Mexico 4 0 0
South Africa 201 66 3
UK 451 91 11
US 669 156 24
Panel C: Number of FTS during and after US FTS interval
# of FTS T(US)+0 T(US)+1 T(US)+2 T(US)+3
Australia 53 0 0 0 0
Brazil 246 179 21 8 11
Canada 106 48 12 5 8
Germany 678 214 5 6 7
France 695 221 9 5 9
India 9 0 0 0 0
Japan 112 0 0 0 0
Mexico 4 4 0 0 0
South Africa 201 79 2 3 3
UK 451 168 9 4 840
162 
Table 14: Continued
Panel D: Number of FTS during and after German FTS interval
# of FTS T(DE)+0 T(DE)+1 T(DE)+2 T(DE)+3
Australia 53 0 0 0 0
Brazil 246 100 6 5 6
Canada 106 28 3 0 4
France 695 555 22 17 19
India 9 0 0 0 0
Japan 112 0 0 0 0
Mexico 4 2 1 0 0
South Africa 201 150 7 6 5
UK 451 242 25 15 16
US 669 214 12 11 12
Panel E: The effect of US and German FTS events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BA CA FR MX SA UK
FTS US 0.172∗∗∗ 0.0208 0.0258∗ 0.0841 0.000363∗∗ 0.00811∗∗
(6.44) (1.92) (2.50) (1.29) (3.15) (3.11)
FTS DE 0.000265∗∗∗ 0.000855 0.697∗∗∗ 0.000409 0.201∗∗∗ 0.0359∗∗∗
(3.80) (1.74) (23.45) (0.97) (6.10) (3.49)
MNA 0.000249∗∗ 0.0000964 0.000461 0.0224 0.000529∗∗ 0.000317
(3.02) (1.02) (1.69) (0.74) (2.77) (1.93)
N 826606 433662 929534 26936 444523 963933
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Figure 1: 5-minute FTS vs Kappa
This figure shows the percentage of FTS days out of total trading days and corresponding average
return impact across countries and thresholds of κ . The return impact is calculated as bond return
minus equity return over the 5-minute interval when FTS are identified.
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Figure 2: Equity and bond market volatility around FTS events
This figure shows return volatility of equity and bond futures for each country around FTS events.
The five-minute interval when FTS occur is denoted as T. The first, second, and third five-minute
interval before (after) the FTS interval are denoted as T-1, T-2, T-3 (T+1, T+2, T+3). We calculate
the median and inter-quartile of absolute scaled return on equity futures and bond futures for each
interval across FTS events. we also plot the unconditional mean over the whole sample as the
benchmark.




















































































































































































































Figure 3: Return impact persistence of FTS events
This figure shows average cumulative returns on equity and bond futures following FTS events.
The five-minute interval when FTS occur is denoted as time 0. The t’th five-minute interval after
the FTS interval is denoted as time t.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Sample Period Contract Month
This table shows the name, the starting and ending date of futures data, and the contract month.
Underlying Instruments Sample Period Contract Month
Australia ASX Index 15 Dec 2000 - 11 Aug 2017 After 2010-June contract
expired:




3 / 6 / 9 / 12
Australian 10 Year Treasury Bond 8 Jan 1996 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
Brazil Bovespa Index 3 Mar 1997 - 11 Aug 2017 Even months.
Canada Ten-Year Government of Canada
Bond
3 Jan 1996 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
Canada S&P/TSX 60 Index Standard 8 Sep 1999 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
France CAC40 Index 6 Jan 1999 - 11 Aug 2017 3 monthly, 3 quarterly, 8
half-yearly
Germany DAX 8 Jan 1996 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
Germany Euro-Bund 16 Feb 1999 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
Japan Nikkei 225 8 Jan 1996 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
Japan JGB 8 Jan 1996 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
Mexico IPC 3 Jan 2007 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
South Africa FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index 6 Jul 2005 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
UK Long Gilt 1 Apr 1996 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
UK FTSE100 1 Apr 1996 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
US E-mini S&P 500 9 Sep 1997 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
US 10-Year T-Note 3 Jan 1996 - 11 Aug 2017 3 / 6 / 9 / 12
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Table A.2: Trading Hours
Futures Trading hour Sampled trading
hour
Cash Trading hours Time zone
Australia ASX Index Futures 9:50 to 16:30 10:00 to 16:00 S&P/ASX 200 Sydney time
Australian 10 Year Treasury Bond
Futures
8:30 to 16:30 10:00 to 16:00
Brazil Bovespa Index Futures 09:00 to 17:55 09:00 to 17:00 IBOVESPA Brasília time
10:00 to 17:00
Canada S&P/TSX 60 Index
Futures
6:00 to 16:15 8:00 to 16:00 S&P/TSX 60 Index Eastern Time
Canada Ten-Year Government of
Canada Bond Futures
6:00 to 16:30 9:30 to 16:00
France CAC40 Index Futures 07:00 - 18:30 9:00 to 17:30 CAC 40 CET
9:00 to 17:30
Germany DAX futures 07:50 to 22:00 9:00 to 17:30 DAX CET
Germany Euro-Bund Futures 08:00 to 22:00 9:00 to 17:30
Japan Nikkei 225 Futures 8:45-15:15 9:00 to 15:00 Nikkei 225 Tokyo Time
Japan JGB Futures 8:45-15:00 9:00 to 15:00
Mexico IPC Futures 7:30 to 15:00 7:30 to 15:00 S&P/BMV IPC Mexico City Time
8:30 to 15:00
South Africa FTSE/JSE Top 40
Index Future




FTSE 100 Index Futures 1:00 to 21:00 8:00 to 16:30 FTSE 100 London Time
UK Long Gilt Futures 8:00 to 18:00 8:00 to 16:30
US E-mini S&P 500 Except 16:15 to
16:30
8:00 to 16:00 S&P 500 New York Time




Table A.3: Macroeconomic News Announcements
Category Announcement Frequency Time Source
Income GDP Advance Quarterly 8:30 BEA
GDP Preliminary Quarterly 8:30 BEA
GDP Final Quarterly 8:30 BEA
Personal Income Monthly 8:30 BEA
Employment Initial Jobless Claims Monthly 8:30 ETA
Employment Situation Monthly 8:30 BLS
Industrial Activity Industrial Production & Capacity
Utilization
Monthly 9:15 FRB
Factory Orders Monthly 10:00 BC
Construction Spending Monthly 10:00 BC
Durable Goods Orders Monthly 8:30 BC
Business Inventory Monthly 8:30 BC
Consumption Advance Retail Sales Monthly 8:30 BC
Consumer Credit Monthly 15:00 FRB
Personal Consumption Monthly 8:30 BEA
Housing Sector Building Permits & Housing Starts Monthly 8:30 BC
New Home Sales Monthly 10:00 BC
Net Exports Trade Balance Monthly 8:30 BEA
Government Government Budget Monthly 14:00 USDT
Inflation CPI Monthly 8:30 BLS
PPI Monthly 8:30 BLS
Forward-looking Index UM Consumer Sentiment Pre Monthly 9:55 TR/UM
UM Consumer Sentiment Final Monthly 9:55 TR/UM
Consumer Confidence Index Monthly 10:00 CB
Index of Leading Indices Monthly 10:00 CB
ISM Manufacturing Index Monthly 10:00 ISM
ISM Non-manufacturing Index Monthly 10:00 ISM
Monetary Policy FOMC Announcement
8 times
a year
FED
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